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There is now wide acknowledgement that traditional single-species approaches are
not adapted to the management of mixed fisheries as they lack the systemic view
required to adequately address the ecological, economic and social dimensions of sus-
tainability. The thesis aims to advance the development of more integrated approaches
to advise Total Allowable Catch (TAC) decisions in mixed fisheries by: (1) accounting
for technical, but also economic interactions among jointly harvested species, and (2)
addressing the variety of sustainability requirements faced in such fisheries. The devel-
oped methodology calling on the eco-viability approach has been applied to two mixed
fisheries operating in different management contexts: the French demersal fishery in
the Bay of Biscay (BoB) and the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark
Fishery (SESSF).
Explicitly representing the technical and economic interactions structuring mixed
fisheries, the ecological-economic simulation model IAM is used to assess the ecologi-
cal, economic and social impacts of alternative harvest control rules in these fisheries.
The thesis notably contributes to improving the representation of human dynamics
in the type of models used to advise TAC decisions in mixed fisheries. It particularly
discusses the implications in terms of provided advice of accounting for dynamics in
the allocation of fishing effort, the trading of individual quotas and fish markets. The
thesis also focuses on how the multiple dimensions of sustainability can be considered
in the provision of fisheries management advice. The eco-viability approach is used here
to identify future paths maintaining a fishery within ecologically, economically and so-
cially acceptable bounds. Specifically, biological sustainability pertains to maintaining
harvested stocks above a limit biomass threshold. Economic sustainability refers to the
ability of fleets or vessels to ensure the remuneration of both physical and human forms
of capital. Finally, an upper limit on the price of fish is considered to ensure that fish
xiii
remains affordable to the consumer.
Regarding modelling developments, the thesis presents a process-based model of
ITQ (Individual Tradable Quotas) markets in mixed fisheries that captures the eco-
nomic incentives that ITQ markets provide in a multi-species context, notably those
to redirect fishing effort towards species not under quota or the TAC of which is not
constraining. Numerical simulations in the SESSF also show the flexibility that exists
in the fishery to adjust fishing practices to quota availability, thereby highlighting the
importance of accounting for fishing dynamics when advising TAC decisions in mixed
fisheries. Finally, eco-viability analyses carried out in both fisheries highlight trade-
offs between conservation and economic objectives but also trade-offs pertaining to the
distribution of benefits between capital owners, crews, and consumers.
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1.1 Addressing the modern concept of sustainabil-
ity
1.1.1 Definition and normative foundations
Scientists have mostly associated the notion of sustainability to that of continuance.
In this sense, sustainability refers to the quality of being able to maintain oneself over
time (e.g. see definitions from the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Oxford
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, or Collins English Dictionary) and can apply to systems
(e.g. ecosystems, socio-ecosystems), entities (e.g. a species, a business) or processes (e.g.
ecological adaptation, resource exploitation, exchange of goods or services). The role
of sustainability science is therefore to understand the dynamics of various systems,
entities, or processes, and identify the condition(s) for their perpetuation. However,
Becker (2012) notes that the modern concept of sustainability cannot be reduced to
the sole meaning of continuance as it is also concerned with fundamental human-nature
relationships, namely (i) those between humans and their contemporaries, (ii) those
between present and future generations, and (iii) those between humans and nature.
Such relations have been referred to in political statements on sustainability such as the
Bründtland report (WCED, 1987) 1 which defines sustainable development as one "that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs" and states that "the strategy for sustainable development aims to
promote harmony among human beings and between humanity and nature" (Chapter
2). Over the past fifty years, sustainability has been established as a major goal to
1. One can also mention the Johannesburg Declaration (U.N., 2002) Annex II
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guide long-term human actions. This aspiration has brought to light and reinforced
the ethical dimension of sustainability. The factual analysis of continuance thus only
partially addresses the question of sustainability which now involves normative choices
regarding, for instance, what ought to be maintained or how should humans relate to
their contemporaries, future generations and nature. The reference to ethics is there-
fore necessary for scientists to state their position. In this regard, this thesis adheres
to the normative positioning of Baumgärtner and Quaas (2010) which characterized
sustainability as the pursuit of justice in each of the aforementioned relationships, that
are, in respective order, (i) intra-generational justice, (ii) inter-generational justice,
and (iii) physiocentric ethics. In the specific example of sustainability in the exploita-
tion of a natural resource, intra-generational justice can be interpreted as justice in
the distribution of benefits (material or immaterial) within a local community, society,
or among nations. Inter-generational justice calls for a fair treatment of future gener-
ations regarding the presence or absence of the resource and associated services and
benefits. Finally, the question of justice between humans and nature focuses on the
importance given to nature in itself with respect to its human valuation. This aspect is
at the heart of debates between advocates of weak and strong sustainability, the first
assuming substitutability between natural and human capital, an assumption which is
refuted by the second (Neumayer, 2003).
1.1.2 Sustainability in a context of uncertainties
In its meaning of continuance and duty regarding future generations, sustainabil-
ity is deeply rooted in the future. Yet, its establishment as a guiding principle for
human actions makes it a matter for present generations. In this regard, Baumgärt-
ner and Quaas (2009) suggest to view sustainability as an attribute of present actions
rather than one of future development. However, present decisions for sustainability
are thwarted by what Faber et al. (1992) would call “surprises”.
Surprises can relate to the future evolution of the system, entity or process at stake.
They can be the consequence of the present generation’s limited understanding of the
dynamics involved and unpredictability of certain events. In the typology proposed by
Faber et al. (1992), the former would fall under the “risk” (outcomes and associated
probabilities are known) or “uncertainty” (outcomes are known without their associ-
ated probabilities) categories, whereas the latter would be referred to as “ignorance”.
Political declarations on sustainability often refer to the precautionary principle, the
application of which is legitimized by the scientific uncertainty regarding future events
(González-Laxe, 2005). Defined in the Rio Declaration, the principle states that "where
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there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation" (U.N., 1992). Sustainable management is therefore one that must account
for uncertainties regarding the consequences of present actions.
Relevant to the question of sustainability are also unknowns pertaining to the needs
and preferences of future generations. In this regard, one can see in strong sustainability
the recognition of our limited ability to speak for coming generations, justifying that
we leave them with the ability to decide for themselves (Howarth, 1995; Baumgärtner
and Quaas, 2009).
1.1.3 Viability theory to address the sustainability of renew-
able resource extraction
Mathematically formalized by Jean-Pierre Aubin in the early 1990’s, viability the-
ory has been recognized by many scholars as a relevant framework to address the
question of sustainability in the exploitation of renewable resources (see for example
a recent review carried out by Oubraham and Zaccour (2018)). Viability theory is a
field of mathematics interested in the evolution of (controlled) dynamic systems whose
state (and control) variables are subject to a set of constraints.
Solving a viability problem consists in the identification of trajectories X(.) and as-
sociated controls (or decisions) U(.) that meet the following dynamics and constraints:

X(t+ 1) = f(t,X(t), U(t))
∀t ∈ TU(t) ∈ B(t,X(t))
X(t) ∈ A(t)
where A(t) is the set of acceptable states of the system that can be time-dependent,
B(t,X(t)) the set of admissible controls which can be time- and state-dependent, T
the time period over which the system is studied, and f(t,X(t), U(t)) the controlled
dynamics function.
Viability theory introduces several mathematical objects of interest, among which
the viability kernel (i.e. the ensemble of viable states, (Aubin, 1991)) or for a system
out of its viability kernel, the notion of time of crisis (i.e. the time required for a system
in crisis to reach its viability kernel (Doyen and Saint-Pierre, 1997)).
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When the set of acceptable states A(.) reflects constraints pertaining to the con-
tinuation of a system’s critical funds, functions or services, viability theory addresses
the continuance aspect of sustainability. In addition to being strongly related to the
idea of continuance, viability theory also deals with some of the ethical foundations
embedded in the modern concept of sustainability. As highlighted by Baumgärtner and
Quaas (2009), imposing constraints that aim at maintaining both natural and human
forms of funds and services bears strong similarities with strong sustainability. Beyond
justice between humans and nature, the framework can also incorporate objectives of
intra-generational justice by ensuring that funds or services associated to the needs
of different groups of people are maintained over time. Finally, when acceptability
constraints A(.) are the same at all times, viable paths are by nature meeting inter-
generational equity requirements (Martinet and Doyen, 2007).
Originally developed for deterministic systems, the viability framework was ex-
tended to formally address stochastic contexts by De Lara and Doyen (2008), thus
enabling to address the uncertain nature of systems, entities or processes at stake.
1.2 Sustainability in fisheries management: the Ecosys-
tem Approach to Fisheries and science in sup-
port to its implementation
1.2.1 Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries: the incarnation of
sustainability in fisheries management
Concomitant to the progressive affirmation of sustainability as a major political
engagement, the need to transition towards a more integrated approach to fisheries
management, able to address the multiple facets of sustainability has made its way in
the international political arena. The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) -also re-
ferred to as Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM)- was introduced in 2001
during the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem as
the framework to operationalize sustainability in the management of fisheries (Garcia
and Cochrane, 2005). Recognized by many jurisdictions as the new standard to man-
age fisheries (EU, 2013; NOAA, 2016; DFO, 2018; DAFF, 2018b) , its purpose was
to "plan, develop and manage fisheries in a manner that addresses the multiplicity of
societal needs and desires, without jeopardizing the options for future generations to
benefit from a full range of goods and services provided by marine ecosystems". Pri-
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science in support to its implementation
marily focusing on ensuring ecologically sustainable fisheries (Stephenson et al., 2017),
fisheries management frameworks are increasingly transitioning towards an explicit in-
tegration of the four pillars of sustainability, namely ecological, economic, social and
institutional (Benson and Stephenson, 2018; Hobday et al., 2018; Stephenson et al.,
2018, 2019; Alexander et al., 2019; Foley et al., 2020).
EAF also aimed to "balance diverse societal objectives, by taking account of the
knowledge and uncertainties about biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems
and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologi-
cally meaningful boundaries" (FAO, 2003). The latter reference to knowledge and un-
certainties highlights the crucial role that science has to play in the operationalization
of EAF, further stressed by Garcia and Cochrane (2005). Smith et al. (2007) note that
science can be involved in three steps of the fisheries management process, namely mon-
itoring, assessment and decision-making. In subsequent developments, greater attention
will be given to the two latter aspects as the areas covered in the present thesis. The
assessment phase involves a large spectrum of methods, from quantitative models or
empirical indicators assessing the status of fish stocks, to ecosystem indicators reflect-
ing on ecosystem state or economic indicators evaluating the performance of fishing
fleets. Scientific support to fisheries-related decision-making typically consists in the
ex-ante evaluation of management options (e.g. Management Strategy Evaluation 2)
and the development of methods that can help structure and solve decision problems
(e.g. Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis 3).
1.2.2 Development of integrated models to operationalize the
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries
Biological single-species approaches have traditionally dominated the management
of fisheries, with management objectives specified as species-specific reference points,
stocks assessed individually, and, potentially, management strategies evaluated using
single-species Management Strategy Evaluation frameworks (Punt, 2017). Meeting the
ambitions of EAF yet requires the development of approaches that capture the ecolog-
ical, economic and social complexities of the systems at stake, and assess the impacts
of management decisions in these three dimensions. Integrated modelling has therefore
become an active area of research to support decision-making in an EAF perspective.
2. Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) refers to the simulation-based evaluation of manage-
ment strategies to highlight the trade-offs associated to a set of alternatives and assess the consequence
of uncertainty on the achievement of management objectives (Punt et al., 2016a).
3. Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is a field of operations research that aims at solving
decision-making problems involving multiple (and usually conflicting) criteria.
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Integrated models such as the ones identified by Nielsen et al. (2018) or Melbourne-
Thomas et al. (2017) enable the representation of complex systems by accounting for
interactions at various scales and across several dimensions.
To support tactical decision-making, the choice has often been to tailor the model
to the question asked by only representing the relevant components and processes. It is
for instance the case of Models of Intermediate Complexity for Ecosystem assessment
(MICE) (Plagányi et al., 2014) which opt for a simplified representation of the ecological
realm, hence standing halfway between single-species and whole-of-ecosystem models.
Human dynamics in such models have generally remained fairly minimal. In the same
vein, bio-economic simulation models tend to focus on the representation of socio-
economic dynamics and that of harvested stocks, often to the expense of ecological
complexity.
1.2.3 Eco-viability modelling for holistic sustainability assess-
ments of fisheries
Building on fisheries bio-economic models, applications of eco-viability modelling
to fishery systems have outlined the potential of the approach to operationalize EAF
(Doyen et al., 2017). As a framework assessing the sustainability of complex systems
subject to uncertainties, eco-viability indeed addresses the main principles of EAF.
Whereas early-age viability models were mostly stylized applications to allow for an-
alytical solutions, more recent applications involving simulation models –generally of
intermediate complexity as described in Section 1.2.2- have enabled greater realism in
the representation of fisheries systems and accounting of uncertainties in the modelled
processes.
As noted by Oubraham and Zaccour (2018), nearly half of the applications of via-
bility theory to the management of renewable resources have been on fisheries study-
cases. These applications have considered a variety of sustainability or acceptability
constraints. Those pertaining to the ecological viability of the studied systems have
mostly been lower bounds on stock abundance, but some authors have also considered
minimum thresholds of biodiversity indices (Cissé et al., 2013, 2015) or maximum catch
levels for TEP (Threatened, Endangered or Protected) species (Gourguet et al., 2016).
Economic viability has generally been interpreted as the generation of positive profits
(De Lara and Martinet, 2009; Gourguet et al., 2016), with sometimes consideration of
minimum crew remuneration (Maynou, 2019). Finally, the social dimension of EAF has
been addressed by constraints pertaining to matters of food security (Eisenack et al.,
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2006; Hardy et al., 2013; Cissé et al., 2013, 2015), employment (Péreau et al., 2012;
Gourguet et al., 2013), recreational catch (Thébaud et al., 2014) or equality in access
to the resource (Curtin and Martinet, 2013).
When focusing on the identification of viable management levers (i.e. controls in
the viability formalism), viability modelling becomes a useful tool to support decision-
making. The main management lever considered in viability studies of fisheries has
been fishing effort (Oubraham and Zaccour, 2018), hence providing operational advice
for fisheries under effort regulation. Although a large fraction of the world’s fisheries,
particularly in Europe, Oceania and North-America, are managed using output con-
trols, fewer studies have considered the outputs as control variables (a few exceptions
lie in the works of Eisenack et al. (2006); Péreau et al. (2012); Curtin and Martinet
(2013) using catch levels or the allocation of catch quota as control variables), thereby
underlining a current lack of eco-viability models to advise decision-making in fisheries
under output controls.
1.3 Managing mixed fisheries
Mixed fisheries refer to those where the species caught are connected in various
ways. Interactions among species in the harvesting process are referred to as technical
and involve catching various species either simultaneously through the course of unse-
lective fishing operations or sequentially throughout the season. Species can also be at
the heart of economic interactions, with the revenue and costs of their harvest being
interdependent 4.
Far from being anecdotal cases, mixed fisheries actually represent the dominant
type of fishing worldwide (Cashion et al., 2018) and are found in all regions of the
globe. In addition to their large commonality, they are also of great relevance to the
study of sustainable fisheries management because of the multi-dimensional (i.e. eco-
logical, economic and social) trade-offs that emerge from the numerous (and uncertain)
interactions involved. In this regard, they make good candidates to explore the useful-
ness of eco-viability approaches to assist in identifying harvesting strategies that meet
multi-dimensional sustainability requirements.
4. When attention is also given to the trophic interactions among caught species (i.e. the fact that
they are connected in the food web), one usually refers to the term multispecies fishery (Santurtún
et al., 2014). The present thesis focuses on mixed fisheries interactions and therefore does not address
this latter aspect.
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1.3.1 Limitations of single-species approaches for the manage-
ment of mixed fisheries
The management of fisheries has been dominated by the application of single-species
approaches but such approaches are problematic when applied in mixed fisheries for
various reasons. First, objectives specified at the stock level are generally not achievable
for all stocks simultaneously when technical interactions constrain the composition of
catch in mixed fisheries (Vinther et al., 2004; Ulrich et al., 2011, 2017). This can lead
to the so-called issue of « choke species » (Schrope, 2010), when low catch limits on
a species prevent TACs for jointly caught species to be fully caught, leading to lost
yield. Furthermore, low catch limits on species with no or little commercial value can
act as an incentive to discard over-quota catches, so as not to lose fishing opportunities
on more valuable species. With discard mitigation policies being increasingly adopted
globally (Karp et al., 2019), it is important to ensure that TACs in mixed fisheries are
consistent with the fleets’ technical characteristics to reduce the incentive to discard
over-quota catches.
Second, single-species approaches miss the fishery-wide view necessary to assess
most of the human-related outcomes (i.e. economic and social) that manifest at this
scale. Addressing economic or social management objectives in mixed fisheries therefore
requires the development of integrated approaches to ensure that stock-specific regu-
lations achieve fishery-wide objectives. Despite not being an issue specific to mixed
fisheries, single-species management also lacks the breadth to address objectives that
relate to the broader ecosystem in which fisheries operate.
1.3.2 Specific management arrangements in mixed fisheries
Management arrangements in mixed fisheries have been adapted in various ways to
address the limitations of applying single-species approaches. In European mixed fish-
eries’ management plans, targets are progressively being specified as reference ranges
rather than points (EU, 2016, 2018b, 2019a,b). Defined as ranges of fishing mortality
rates able to provide at least 95% of MSY, these so-called "MSY ranges" allow for some
flexibility in the application of objectives still specified at the stock level. As discussed
by Rindorf et al. (2017a), not only can they be used to reconcile catch limits with
technical constraints, but they also give room for system-wide considerations (e.g. eco-
logical objectives for the broader ecosystem or economic and social objectives for the
fishery) to be discussed. Other jurisdictions have chosen to specify management objec-
tives at the scale of the (mixed) fishery rather than that of the stock. This is the case
8
1.3. Managing mixed fisheries
for Australian federal fisheries, where the stated objective of Maximum Economic Yield
(MEY) is defined as the maximization of fishery-wide net economic returns (DAFF,
2018b).
In order to avoid commercial fisheries being "choked" by species that have been
overfished or the catch of which is prohibited, some jurisdictions have put in place
catch limits that aim at covering unavoidable by-catch of the latter when harvesting
target species. It is for instance the case of "incidental" Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
limits for species under rebuilding strategy in the Australian Southern and Eastern
Scalefish and Shark Fishery (AFMA, 2017), or "bycatch TACs" for prohibited species
in groundfish fisheries off British Columbia and Alaska (Diamond, 2004).
Flexibility has also been pursued in the quota systems themselves, with for in-
stance centralized (e.g. through Producer Organizations) or market-based (e.g. Indi-
vidual Transferable Quota (ITQ) markets) transfers of quota, roll-over provisions (i.e.
the possibility to save some amount of uncaught quota carried forward to the following
season), retrospective balancing (i.e. the possibility to retrospectively acquire quota to
match landings), deemed-value payments (i.e. a fee that is charged to fishermen for
landings over quota holdings), species equivalence (i.e. the possibility to convert quota
for a species into that for another one according to a pre-defined ratio) or basket quo-
tas (i.e. quotas for a group of species rather than individual species) (Sanchirico et al.,
2006).
1.3.3 Scientific advice for mixed fisheries: some current ap-
proaches and limitations
Scientific input is often sought to support tactical decision-making involved in some
of these mixed fisheries management arrangements. The FCube approach has for in-
stance been developed within the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) to guide annual TAC decisions and the implementation of MSY ranges in Eu-
ropean mixed fisheries (Ulrich et al., 2017; ICES, 2017b). So far, it has been used to
provide mixed fisheries advice for the North Sea, Celtic Sea and Iberian waters (ICES,
2017b). In the Australian Northern Prawn Fishery, bio-economic modelling has become
integral part of the scientific advice provided to set effort targets maximizing economic
returns to the fishing industry (Dichmont et al., 2010).
Despite their adoption in advisory processes, these approaches are facing criticisms
regarding, among others, assumptions made on the representation of fishing behaviour
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in the models. Indeed, the allocation of fishing effort among different activities practised
in mixed fisheries 5 has currently been modelled as an exogenous process, an assumption
criticized for its lack of realism (Pascoe et al., 2016; Weninger, 2019).
1.4 Thesis objectives
The implementation of EAF requires the development of decision-support approaches
covering the complexity and uncertainties of the systems to be managed and able to
reconcile multi-facetted management objectives. Mixed fisheries are typical examples
of systems lacking adequate approaches to operationalize EAF. In this context, the
thesis aims at proposing an operational approach building on eco-viability modelling
to support TAC decisions in mixed fisheries. The approach involves: (1) capturing the
system’s processes that are relevant to the TAC setting question, (2) identifying ap-
propriate sustainability constraints for the system and relating them to the considered
management lever, here the TACs, and (3) conveying the results in a way that is infor-
mative and useful for decision-makers. Particular developments have been undertaken
in relation to these three generic objectives.
With regards to the first point, the thesis aims at improving the representation of
mixed fisheries’ interactions (technical and economic) in the approaches used to ad-
vise TAC decisions in mixed fisheries. The integrated ecological-economic simulation
model IAM developed by the French Research Institute for the Exploitation of the Sea
(Ifremer) since 2009 to represent the dynamics of multi-species, multi-fleet and multi-
metier fisheries (Merzereaud et al., 2011; Macher et al., 2018; Nielsen et al., 2018) is
further developed to address this latter objective. In particular, the thesis investigates
the implications of endogenizing three key processes pertaining to the human dimen-
sions of fisheries systems which have mostly remained exogenous in models used to
provide mixed fisheries TAC advice, namely fishing behaviour, dynamics of fish prices
and allocation of quota.
With regards to the second point, the thesis aims at refining the set of sustainability
constraints experienced in such systems, with a particular focus on economic and so-
cial dimensions. Furthermore, it aims at making eco-viability modelling an operational
approach for the implementation of EAF in fisheries under TAC management, and
therefore differs from most fisheries eco-viability modelling work in its consideration of
5. In Europe, the notion of metier has been introduced to describe fishing activity based on the
gear used and the species targeted (EU 2008).
10
1.5. Context of the PhD
the fisheries’ output (i.e. the catch) as the system’s control variable.
Finally, comprehensively advising management with respect to the numerous facets
of EAF comes with a particularly challenging communication task. In this regard, the
thesis will work at conveying results in a way that is synthetic enough to facilitate
decision-making, but analytical enough to appreciate trade-offs underlying TAC deci-
sions in these fisheries.
1.5 Context of the PhD
The PhD has been conducted under a co-tutelle agreement between the Univer-
sity of Western Brittany (UBO) in Brest (France) and the University of Tasmania
(UTAS) in Hobart (Australia). Is was co-funded by Ifremer and the UTAS-CSIRO
(Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) Quantitative Marine
Science (QMS) PhD program. Additional financial support has also been provided by
CSIRO in the form of a ResearchPlus Postgraduate Top-up Scholarship, as well as the
Ecole des Docteurs of University Bretagne Loire and the Conseil Régional de Bretagne.
The first year of the PhD was carried out in Brest within the research unit Amure
(Ifremer, UBO, CNRS). I was then hosted by CSIRO in Hobart for a year and a half
before coming back to France for the final six months of the PhD. The time spent in
both countries allowed the approach to be applied in two mixed fisheries under different
management arrangements, namely the French demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay
(BoB) and the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF).
1.6 Case studies
The thesis builds on two study-cases: the French demersal fishery in the Bay of
Biscay and the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Both are
mixed fisheries where several fleets, characterized by different fishing technologies and
harvest strategies, capture a couple hundred of species more or less selectively. Joint
productions are therefore a critical issue in the management of these fisheries, which
mostly relies on output controls in the form of TACs and quotas. They are also impor-
tant commercial fisheries in their respective regions. Aside from these common features,
the two fisheries operate in different management contexts which are detailed in the
following sections. The fisheries’ main characteristics are summarized in Table 1.1.
11
Chapter 1 – General introduction
Table 1.1 – Comparison of the two studied fisheries: the French demersal fishery in the
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1.6.1 Bay of Biscay French demersal fishery (BoB)
Figure 1.1 – Operating area of the Bay of Biscay demersal fishery (in blue).
The Bay of Biscay (ICES divisions VIIIabd) is characterized by a wide shelf extend-
ing west of France (Figure 1.1) supporting important pelagic and demersal fisheries.
Although fleets operating in the area come from various European countries (France,
Spain, Belgium), the thesis focuses on the French component of the demersal fish-
ery, with the other countries contributions being taken into account as exogenously
determined components of the system. Several fleets using different gears (e.g. trawl,
gillnet, longline) and characterized by different specialization strategies are involved in
the demersal fishery (Macher et al., 2015). As a consequence of poorly selective fishing
practices, important technical interactions arise among fleets catching the same species
(e.g. between specialized hake gillnetters and specialized Norway lobster trawlers catch-
ing hake juveniles).
In 2016, French demersal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay generated a gross value
of production of 303 Me(23% of French wild fisheries GVP), 90% of which being ac-
counted for by 22 species among the 250 retained. Demersal species in the Bay of Biscay
are both destined to the French (e.g. the quasi totality of Norway lobster landings) and
export (e.g. export of hake to Spain) markets. In 2016, 710 vessels participated in the
fishery, and employed 3187 crew members.
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Management of these fisheries mostly relies on output controls in the form of TACs
on the main commercial stocks which are complemented by other conservation mea-
sures such as minimum landing sizes or minimum mesh sizes and access is regulated by
fishing licenses. TACs are set at the European level and allocated among member States
following the "relative stability" principle. States are responsible for the administration
of and compliance with their respective quotas. In France, quotas are allocated in the
form of collective sub-quotas to Producer Organisations, which manage them according
to their own internal rules (Larabi et al., 2013). TAC setting in the EU is guided by
ICES’ scientific advice, which is consistent with the Common Fisheries Policy’s objec-
tive of restoring and maintaining fish stocks above levels able to produce MSY (EU,
2013). ICES’ TAC advice for demersal fisheries in the Bay of Biscay has so far only
relied on single-species stock assessments, without accounting for mixed fisheries inter-
actions. Yet, ICES Working Group on Mixed Fisheries Advice (WGMIXFISH-Advice)
is currently working on the provision of mixed fisheries advice for the region using the
FCube methodology.
Progressively implemented between 2015 and 2019, the European landing obligation
requires for all species under TAC management to be landed (EU, 2013). Flexibility
mechanisms have however been introduced such as inter-species quota flexibility or
exemptions in the form of survivability or de minimis discard allowances.
1.6.2 Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark
Fishery (SESSF)
The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery ranges from
Fraser Island (Queensland) to Cape Leeuwin (Western Australia) and expands from
shallow to deep-water fishing grounds (Figure 1.2). In 2016, it was Australia’s largest
federal fishery in terms of volume caught and second most valuable (Patterson et al.,
2017).
The fishery is composed of four sectors: the Commonwealth Trawl Sector (CTS),
the Gillnet Hook and Trap Sector (GHTS) consisting of two sub-sectors, the Shark
Gillnet Shark Hook Sector (SGSHS) and the Scalefish Hook Sector (SHS), the East
Coast Deepwater Trawl Sector (ECDWTS) and the Great Australian Bight Trawl Sec-
tor (GABTS) (Figure 1.2). The thesis focuses on the first two as the latter two are
independent and managed separately. The CTS and GHTS are complex multi-species
and multi-fleet fishing sectors featuring the typical mixed fisheries interactions. Bottom
trawl and Danish seine are used in the CTS to target scalefish and crustacean species
14
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Figure 1.2 – Operating area of the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark
Fishery and its different sectors.
CTS: Commonwealth Trawl Sector, SGSHS: Shark Gillnet Shark Hook Sector, GABTS:
Great Australian Bight Trawl Sector, ECDWTS: East Coast Deep-Water Trawl Sector,
SHS: Scalefish Hook Sector
from shallow waters to depths up to 1000m. In the GHTS, gillnets are mostly used to
target shark species, whereas longlines and droplines are used to catch both shark and
scalefish species.In 2015, both sectors landed 12,000 ton of fish mostly destined to the
Australian market. The gross value of production was AU$55M, 90% of which being
accounted for by 18 species.
Management of the fishery is primarily through output controls consisting of TACs
generally revised every 3 to 5 years and allocated as individual quotas. The ITQ system
was first introduced in 1992 and allows for the lease and permanent transfer of quota
units through markets (Connor and Alden, 2001). TACs are complemented by input
controls including limited entry, spatial closures and gear restrictions. Like other Aus-
tralian federal fisheries, management in the SESSF is subject to objectives specified in
the Commonwealth Fisheries Harvest Strategy Policy (DAFF, 2018b) for commercial
species and the Commonwealth Fisheries Bycatch Policy (DAFF, 2018a) for by-catch
species. In particular, the management of commercial species (including target and by-
product species) shall aim at maximizing the fishery’s net economic returns to the Aus-
tralian community (i.e. MEY) while ensuring ecological sustainability (DAFF, 2018b).
However in practice, management aims to maximise economic returns to capital owners
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with TACs set to maximise fishery’s profits. TAC setting is advised by regular stock
assessments undertaken by AFMA Resource Assessment Groups (RAGs). The lat-
ter provide Recommended Biological Catches (RBCs) to the South East Management
Advisory Committee (SEMAC), which, in turn, make their recommendations to the
AFMA Commission for final decision. Despite an explicit fishery-wide MEY objective
for multi-species fisheries (DAFF, 2018b), RBCs still correspond to single-stock MEY
proxies 6. Joint productions are however accounted for in the determination of inciden-
tal TACs for species under rebuilding strategy, the latter being advised by companion
species analyses (Klaer and Smith, 2012).
1.7 Structure of the thesis
Besides the introducing and concluding chapters, the thesis is composed of four
stand-alone chapters collectively oriented towards the provision of mixed fisheries TAC
advice embracing both the complex dynamics of these systems and the multiple con-
straints that their sustainability entails.
Chapters 2 and 5 apply the eco-viability approach to identify harvest rates for
Harvest Control Rules 7 (HCR) in mixed fisheries that meet a set of sustainabil-
ity/acceptability constraints. Both chapters follow the same methodology: (1) simu-
lation of a range of HCR harvest rates for technically interacting stocks, (2) identifica-
tion of achievable targets given technical interactions, and (3) evaluation of the latter
regarding identified eco-viability constraints. Simulations are carried out using the inte-
grated ecological-economic simulation model IAM. Besides their common purpose and
methodology, the two chapters differ mostly on three aspects. First, the study-case:
whereas the second chapter treats the French demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay,
the fifth is an application to the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark
Fishery. The second difference lies in the set of sustainability, or acceptability, con-
straints considered. As shown on Figure 1.3B, the focus of the second chapter is on the
fishery’s inputs. The constraints considered here relate to: (1) the preservation of the
fishery’s natural capital, in the form of minimum (spawning) stock biomass thresholds,
(2) the profitability of the fishery’s investment in physical capital, addressed by con-
6. The proxy of stock biomass at MEY is 1.2 that at MSY (BMEY = 1.2BMSY ). Its equivalent in
terms of fishing mortality is FMEY = 0.8FMSY )
7. Harvest control rules are a set of pre-agreed rules that determine how much fishing effort or
catch is allowed in a fishery. Such limits are a function of an indicator of stock status, which can be a
model estimation of abundance derived from a quantitative stock assessment or a direct measurement
based on survey or fishery data. The thesis considered a simple HCR defined as a constant fishing
mortality rate (or harvest rate) applied to the stock’s estimated abundance.
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(A) IAM model
Outline colors relate to the chapters that led to the development and implementation of
the different modules. Filling colors indicate the modules in which the various eco-viability
indicators from Figure 1.3B are calculated.
(B) Eco-viability framework
Figure 1.3 – Evolution of the integrated ecological-economic simulation model IAM
and eco-viability framework throughout the thesis
straints on gross and net profits, and (3) the ability of the fishery to maintain its human
capital (i.e. its workforce), translated into constraints on the wage of fishing crews. In
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the fifth chapter, an upper threshold on the price of fish was added to the latter set
of constraints to maintain acceptable prices for consumers. Finally, they differ in the
degree of endogenization of the systems’ "human" dynamics. Benefiting from the de-
velopments conducted in the third and fourth chapters, SESSF simulations involve an
endogenous representation of the individual allocation of fishing effort among metiers,
the trading of ITQs and the evolution of fish prices in response to the quantity of fish
landed. Such developments were considered in reaction to the second chapter applied
to the BoB, where the constant allocation of fishing effort among metiers, and of quo-
tas among individual harvesters, were identified as potential limits to the conclusions
drawn.
The third and fourth chapters contribute to improving the representation of “hu-
man” dynamics in the models used to advise TAC decisions in mixed fisheries, specif-
ically highlighting how their consideration impacts the advice produced. The third
chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the equilibrium of ITQ markets in mixed fish-
eries, followed by the numerical application to the SESSF of an algorithm mimicking
the Walrassian tatônnement process to reach such equilibrium. The latter algorithm
has then been introduced into IAM to model multispecies ITQ markets (Figure 1.3A).
Using this new feature of the model, the fourth chapter investigates how the dynam-
ics of ITQ markets might interact with that of fishing behaviour to determine the
composition of catch in mixed fisheries.
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CHAPTER 2
PROVIDING INTEGRATED TOTAL CATCH ADVICE
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MIXED FISHERIES WITH
AN ECO-VIABILITY APPROACH
This chapter is published as:
Briton, F., Macher, C., Merzeréaud, M., Le Grand, C., Fifas S., Thébaud O. Providing
Integrated Total Catch Advice for the Management of Mixed Fisheries with an Eco-
viability Approach. Environ Model Assess 25, 307–325 (2020)
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Abstract
Well-established single-species approaches are not adapted to the management of
mixed fisheries where multiple species are simultaneously caught in unselective fish-
ing operations. In particular, ignoring joint production when setting Total Allowable
Catches (TACs) for individual species is likely to lead to over-quota discards or, when
discards are not allowed, to lost fishing opportunities. Furthermore, economic and so-
cial objectives have been poorly addressed in the design of fisheries harvest strategies,
despite being an explicit objective of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management in many
jurisdictions worldwide. We introduce the notion of operating space as the ensemble
of reachable, single-species fishing mortality targets, given joint production in a mixed
fishery. We then use the concept of eco-viability to identify TAC combinations which
simultaneously meet biological and economic sustainability constraints. The approach
is applied to the joint management of the European hake and common sole fishery in
the Bay of Biscay, also accounting for the dynamics of the stocks of Norway lobster
and European seabass. Results show that fishing at the upper end of the MSY range
for sole and slightly above Fmsy for hake can generate gains in terms of long-term
economic viability of the fleets without impeding the biological viability of the stocks,
nor the incentives for crews to remain in the fishery. We also identify reachable fish-
ing mortality targets in the MSY ranges for these two species, given existing technical
interactions.
2.1 Introduction
Ecosystem-based approaches are increasingly being adopted for the management
of natural resources, and fisheries make no exception, with the proposal of ecosystem-
based fisheries management (EBFM) guidelines in the early 2000’s (García, 2003; Pik-
itch, 2004), and their subsequent implementation in policy (Pitcher et al., 2009; Link
and Browman, 2017).
Among other aspirations, EBFM aims at accounting for the technical interactions
among jointly caught species in mixed fisheries. Joint production in mixed fisheries con-
strains the ability of fishing operators to fully use the quotas they have been allocated
for different species. In a management scheme where individual quotas are not trans-
ferable, if harvesters stop fishing once they have reached their most limiting quota, any
quota they have left for the other species is lost. The existence of unfished quotas may
create an incentive for harvesters to continue fishing in order to fully use their fishing
opportunities on valuable species while discarding or illegally selling the catches of their
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"choke species" (Schrope, 2010), i.e. the species for which they do not have quota. In
addition to excessive pressure on the stocks of concern, discards of "choke species" can
compromise the reliability of catch data underlying stock assessments as they make
evaluation of the quantity of fish that is actually removed from the stock more difficult
(Rijnsdorp et al., 2007). It is therefore particularly relevant to anticipate any quota
under-consumption which may result from joint production. Indeed, minimizing such
under-consumption is likely to facilitate compliance with quota regulations.
Attempts to account for the multispecies nature of fisheries in scientific catch rec-
ommendations have been developing in many jurisdictions, usually based on adapta-
tions of the historical, and well established single-species assessment framework. In
Europe, the FCube framework (Ulrich et al., 2011; ICES, 2015b) has been used by
ICES since 2009 to reconcile single-species MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield) catch
recommendations for the North Sea, Celtic Sea, and Iberian Waters mixed fisheries.
The introduction of a landing obligation as part of the latest reform of the Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) (EU, 2013) highlighted the potential mismatches between catch
opportunities and fishing practices, and their determinant role for the economic viabil-
ity of a number of European fleets (Simons et al., 2015; Prellezo et al., 2016). A degree
of flexibility has been sought with the definition of target ranges around MSY, rather
than single target reference points (EU, 2014) and discussions on how such ranges can
be used in practice are ongoing (Ulrich et al., 2017). In Australia, the Commonwealth
Harvest Strategy Policy identified Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) as a target for
management (DAFF, 2007), which has been interpreted in a context of mixed fisheries
as maximizing the economic returns from the fishery as a whole (Pascoe et al., 2015).
This approach has the advantage of explicitly accounting for the technical interactions
observed in mixed fisheries. The practical implementation of this approach, however,
has proved difficult, as it requires both a good knowledge of all commercial stocks in
a mixed fishery (where only the most valuable stocks are generally well known) and
a reliable representation of its economic components (i.e. fleets’ cost structures and
market prices) (Pascoe et al., 2015; Hoshino et al., 2018).
The move towards EBFM also calls for the formulation of multi-dimensional objec-
tives that integrate the preservation of biological resources as well as the services they
provide to society. So far, fisheries management objectives have generally been formu-
lated as the maximization of a quantity, be it the long-term production of the fishery
when setting target reference points at the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY 1), or
1. MSY is defined as a limit reference point in the US (Magnuson-Stevens Act, 2007) and in the
European Union (Common Fisheries Policy, 2013).
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the sustainable economic returns to the fishing industry when aiming at the Maxi-
mum Economic Yield (MEY). However, such maximizing approaches often fall short
of embedding multi-criteria objectives as argued by Martinet et al. (2010). In Europe,
despite the Common Fisheries Policy regulation specifically stating that "the Common
Fisheries Policy shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sus-
tainable economic, environmental and social conditions" (EU, 2009), ICES scientific
catch recommendations are only based on the evaluation of the stocks status, with
no account nor insight into the economic or social impacts of fishing. Based on the
observation that ICES catch advice is often disregarded by EU member states fish-
eries ministers (Villasante et al., 2011; Carpenter et al., 2016), who are ultimately
constrained by the social acceptability of their decisions, ICES has recognized the need
to provide more integrated management advice (ICES, 2014a) in order to increase the
transparency of the decision-making process. The work presented in this paper con-
tributes to the ongoing reflexion among the scientific community on how to incorporate
social and economic considerations in their recommendations to decision-makers, with
particular emphasis on mixed-fisheries Total Allowable Catch (TAC) advice (ICES,
2016d; Rindorf et al., 2017a; Voss et al., 2017).
Viability theory (Aubin, 1991; Aubin et al., 2011) is particularly well-suited to ac-
count for the variety of sustainability requirements faced by a socio-ecosystem, and
has been recognized as a relevant assessment framework to support management of
renewable resources (review by Oubraham and Zaccour (2018)). Often referred to as
co-viability or eco-viability when constraints of various types (e.g. biological, economic,
social) are to be met simultaneously, the viability approach consists in identifying paths
of a system’s evolution that remain within predefined acceptability bounds. As opposed
to optimization approaches which require the different objectives to be weighed one
against another, the approach gives equal importance to the objectives identified as
component parts of the system’s sustainability. Indeed, an evolution of the system is
considered viable if and only if all viability thresholds are respected at any time. Such
an inter-temporal requirement also allows to account for inter-generationnal equity, as
highlighted by Martinet and Doyen (2007); Doyen and Martinet (2012); De Lara et al.
(2015). As it does not aim for a particular target but rather looks for a viable operat-
ing space, the viability approach seem particularly well suited to address the flexibility
requirements that are strongly needed for the management of mixed fisheries (Rindorf
et al., 2017a).
Since the mathematical formulation of viability theory in the early 1990’s, nearly
22
2.1. Introduction
half of its applications have been fisheries study-cases (Oubraham and Zaccour, 2018).
Most study-cases investigated how the inputs (e.g fishing effort, fleet size, investment
in the fishery) should be set in order to maintain or restore a fishery’s viability (Béné
et al., 2001; Cissé et al., 2013, 2015; Gourguet et al., 2013, 2016; Martinet et al., 2010).
Considering the fishery’s inputs as the control variable in viability studies provides
useful advice for the management of fisheries under effort regulation. However, it lacks
operationality for fisheries managed under output-controls where the regulation exerts
on catches via the definition of Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas. This im-
plementation of catch limits on exploited stocks has now become a keystone in the
management of many fisheries worldwide (including in the USA, the EU except in
the Mediterranean, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, and South Africa, among others).
Hence, it seems crucial to adapt the viability assessment framework to fisheries under
output-controls (and the associated catch-share management systems). Scientific ad-
vice in such fisheries is generally given in terms of total catches that can be biologically
sustained by the stock, the estimation of which derives from population models when
possible, or from the application of some precautionary decision rules. Successfully
managing a fishery from the output side not only requires setting appropriate caps on
total catches (i.e. how much can be fished), but also identifying means of incentivizing
efficient prosecution of the fishery (i.e who gets which share of the catch), which is
widely absent from current ichtyocentric scientific advice. Thinking about by whom
and how a quota is fished is far from anecdotal as this can impact (1) the stock status,
as all gears are not equally selective, (2) the economic performance of the fishery, as
all harvesters are not equally efficient, and (3) how the economic and social benefits
(direct and indirect employment, supply of fish, persistence of local knowledge and
tradition) generated by the exploitation of a common resource will be redistributed
(Symes and Phillipson, 2009).
In the last two decades, the development of Integrated Ecological–Economic Fish-
eries Models (IEEFMs) has opened the way to a better understanding of the feedbacks
between ecological and socio-economic dynamics, and the formulation of management
advice embedding both biological and socio-economic assessments (Nielsen et al., 2018).
The development of these models also enabled fishing behaviour to be explicitly mod-
elled. Consequently, fishing effort and its direct effect on the resource (i.e. the fishing
mortality) emerge as the response of harvesters to an ensemble of regulations and/or
other incentives rather than being treated exogenously. Since fisheries management is
about seeking to manage fishing activities, not resources (Hilborn, 2007; Fulton et al.,
2011), representation of fishers’ behaviour in the models provides better insights regard-
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ing the expected effectiveness of management options in meeting specified objectives.
Our work follows in this vein by explicitly modelling the options fishers face, given
catch limits on the different species they catch.
The objective of the present paper is to develop an approach to management advice
that integratesmultiple objectives formixed fisheries under output controls. After
describing the IEEFM used to simulate management scenarios, we define the eco-
viability framework used to reconcile biological and economic management objectives.
We apply the approach to the Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fishery, for which we
present a first attempt at providing integrated TAC advice, accounting for multiple
objectives. We show that gains can be expected in terms of long-term economic viability
of the fleets without impeding the biological viability of the stocks, nor the incentives
for crews to remain in the fishery.
2.2 The Bay of Biscay mixed demersal fishery
The Bay of Biscay has historically been an important fishing region in the North-
East Atlantic, especially for France. More than 200 species are fished in the Bay but
80% of landings in value were accounted for by 21 species in 2016. The most valuable
species are bentho-demersal species, namely Norway lobster, anglerfish, common sole,
European hake and European seabass. In 2016, the landings of those 5 species from
the Bay generated a gross value of 200 Me.
Fisheries in the Bay of Biscay are managed under the Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP), with some managed by coastal states. Management mostly relies on conserva-
tion measures (TACs, minimum landing sizes), and about 1/4 of the stocks are man-
aged through EU TAC. Multi-annual plans are also in place for common sole (Council
Regulation (EC) No 388/2006) and the northern stock of European hake (Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No 388/2006), but should be both replaced by the multi-annual plan for
the Western Waters (EU, 2018a), a single regulation embracing demersal and deep-sea
stocks, and their fisheries in the Western Waters. TACs are set in line with the MSY
objective stated in the CFP. France is allocated a share of the EU TACs following the
“relative stability” principle and allocates its national quotas to Producer Organisa-
tions (POs) proportionally to their members’ historical catches. POs are responsible for
managing their quotas and specifically making sure they are not over-caught (Larabi
et al., 2013).Individual harvesters do not own the fishing rights but are limited to fish-
ing what they have been allocated by the PO, which strongly contrasts with fisheries
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Figure 2.1 – Economic dependence of the demersal fleets on the five key bentho-
demersal species. Economic dependence was calculated as the share of each species
in the gross value of landings of the fleet. Codes on the left vertical axis correspond to
segments of vessels of different lengths for each fleet. Source: Système d’Information
Halieutique (2018)
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The Bay of Biscay bentho-demersal fishery is a typical mixed fishery where many
fleets operate in multiple fisheries, either sequentially because of fishing seasonality
or simultaneously because of non-selective fishing practices. As shown on Figure 2.1,
some fleets are specialized in targeting particular species which account for most of their
revenue (e.g. hake longliners, hake gillnetters, bass longliners and specialized Norway
lobster trawlers), whereas others depend on a broader range of species (e.g. mixed
netters, sole gillnetters and trawlers). The technical interactions are not accounted for
in TAC decisions made at the European level, which can cause discrepancies between
fishing opportunities and what is technically achievable for the fleets. In 2016, French
quotas for common sole, Norway lobster, whiting and megrim have been fully caught.
Those for Pollock, anglerfish and blue whiting were respectively taken up by 87%, 85%
and 72% , whereas there was less tension on the hake quota (60% uptake). So far,
discards in the fishery have been more related to bycatch of undersized individuals
(e.g. small hakes in the Norway lobster fishery) and quality rather than to major choke
effects.
Besides ensuring a sustainable exploitation of fish stocks, interviews with repre-
sentatives from Producers Organisations highlighted that an ageing fishing fleet and
the volatility of crews are major concerns in the region. Issues of overcapacity in the
region have also been highlighted in the past (Guillen et al., 2013; Gourguet et al.,
2013; Bellanger et al., 2018) and addressed through limited entry and publicly funded
decommissioning schemes (Quillérou and Guyader, 2012). Although we estimated that
in 2016 all 44 fishing segments in the fishery had overall positive gross profits, only
41 showed positive net profits, which highlights the difficulties in renewing the fishing
fleet. The economic performance of some segments (e.g. trawlers) is also highly sensi-
tive to the variability in fuel price. Crew volatility is likely to be the reason for wages
above the national average as our estimations show that all fishing segments were in
average paying their crews a full-time equivalent wage above the mean wage of a French
seaman.
2.3 Bio-economic simulation model
Simulations were run with the bioeconomic model IAM referenced in Nielsen et al.
(2018) and Macher et al. (2018), and already used to assess the impacts of various
management scenarios on the Bay of Biscay mixed fishery (Raveau et al., 2012; Guillen
et al., 2013; Bellanger et al., 2018). IAM is a multi-species, multi-fleet or multi-vessel,
and multi-metier model that can include stochasticity on recruitment and fish prices.
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It runs with an annual time-step and is spatially aggregated. In line with the Man-
agement Strategy Evaluation (MSE) approach (Punt et al., 2016a), IAM was divided
into an operating model which represents the biological and harvesting components




Depending on data availability and/or its importance in the modelled system, a
stock can either be modelled using annual age-based dynamics, quarterly age-based
dynamics, or a static model which assumes that the total biomass of the stock remains
constant.
Age-based dynamics are governed by:
Ns,a+1,t+1 = Ns,a,t e−Zs,a,t a ∈ [Amin;Amax − 1],
Ns,Amax,t+1 = Ns,Amax−1,t e−Zs,Amax−1,t +Ns,Amax,t e−Zs,Amax,t ,
(2.1)
where Ns,a,t stands for the number of individuals of age a from stock s at time t,
which experience a total mortality Zs,a,t equal to the sum of natural mortality Ms,a
and fishing mortality Fs,a,t. The fishing mortality applied to the stock is the sum of the
fishing mortalities by vessel i and metier m (Fs,a,i,m,t) and the fishing mortality exerted
by non-explicitly modelled fleets (Fs,a,t,OTH): Fs,a,t =
∑
i,m Fs,a,i,m,t + Fs,a,t,OTH .
The quarterly version of this age-based dynamics is detailed in Supplementary Ma-
terial - Table S.6(a) .
Fishing mortalities at age by vessel and metier are proportional to individual fishing
efforts by metier, assuming a constant catchability rate:
Fi,m,s,a,t = qi,m,s,a × Ei,m,t. (2.2)





with Mats,a being the proportion of mature individuals of age a in stock s and ws,a
the stock’s mean weights at age.
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Short-term fishing behaviour module
The short-term behaviour module determines fishing efforts at the metier level for
each individual harvester. A metier is a combination of gear and targeted species, and
aims at accounting for regional fishing specialisations. Individual fishing efforts at the
metier level (Ei,m,t) ensuing from the quota constraint are calculated in a 2-step process:
1. Calculation of the effort Ei,m,s,t required to catch the quota Qi,s,t for each indi-
vidual harvester i, metier m and stock s . Assuming a constant allocation of the
individual total effort Ei,t among the different metiers used by harvester i, the
problem to solve can be formulated as:





Ei,m,s,t = Ei,t × αi,m,
Ei,t = Ei,t0 × λi,s,t.
(2.4)
Individual landings by metier for species the dynamics of which are explicitly
modelled (hereafter referred to as "dynamic species") are given by:
Li,m,s,a,t = (1− ds,a)ws,a
Fi,m,s,a,t
Zs,a,t
Ns,a,t (1− e−Zs,a,t), (2.5)
with ds,a standing for the proportion of discarded individuals of age a and stock
s (assumed constant), and ws,a being the individual weight at age in the landings
of stock s.
Those for static species are given by:
Li,m,s,a,t = LPUEi,m,s × Ei,m,t, (2.6)
LPUEi,m,s being the landings of stock s per unit of effort for individual harvester
i using metier m.
αi,m is the proportion of total effort of individual i attributed to metier m. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that individual harvesters practice the different
metiers in the same proportions as they did in the reference year, that is αi,m =
αi,m,t0 . This assumption is justified as tradition was shown to be an important
driver of fishing practices in other demersal fisheries(Marchal et al., 2013; Girardin
et al., 2017). Fishermen’s adaptation to seasonal dynamics of exploited stocks,
weather conditions, seasonal gear restrictions count among likely explanations of
the strong inertia often observed in fishing patterns. Introducing flexibility in the
allocation of effort across metiers at the individual fisher level was beyond the
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scope of the present study, but will be the focus of further research using the
model.
2. Effort reconciliation at the metier level so that each fisherman stops fishing with
metier m either when its most constraining quota is exhausted or when he has
reached the upper limit Emax, i.e.:




This module calculates for each individual harvester i a variety of economic outputs
described in Bellanger et al. (2018).
Among them, three indicators are of particular interest:
— the Gross Operating Surplus (GOS), i.e. the gross income from landings minus
all operating costs
GOSi,t = (1− cshri)× rtbsi,t − Cfixi, (2.8)
rtbsi,t = GV Li,t −
∑
m
CvarUEi,m × Ei,m,t, (2.9)
rtbs being the "return to be shared" and cshr its proportion allocated to the crew,
GV L the gross value of landings, CvarUE the variable costs per unit effort, and
Cfix the fixed costs.
— the Net Operating Surplus (NOS), i.e. the Gross Operating Surplus minus capital
depreciation costs Cdep
NOSi,t = GOSi,t − Cdepi. (2.10)
(2.11)





FTE being the full-time equivalent number of men on board a vessel.
2.3.2 Management procedures
The management procedure module is used to set and allocate TACs. At the end
of each year, the EU TAC for the following year is calculated so that the stock is
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harvested under a fishing mortality F target according to the procedure described in
Appendix A.2. Hereafter, the term management strategy will refer to the specification
of fishing mortality targets (and associated catch limitations) for the regulated stocks.
The French quotaQs,t is derived from the EU TAC according to the relative stability
principle:
Qs,t = TACshrs × TACs,t, (2.13)
with TACshrs the French share of the EU TAC of stock s.
The national quota is then allocated to producer organisations (POs), and in turn
to individual harvesters following an allocation key Qshrs provided as an input 2
Qi,s,t = Qshri,s ×Qs,t. (2.14)
2.4 Eco-viability evaluation
2.4.1 Eco-viability framework
Identifying appropriate acceptability constraints is a determinant step in the oper-
ationalization of the viability approach. It consists in:
1. Identifying the elements which determine the persistence of the system, i.e which
variables are constrained;
2. Defining the acceptability threshold for the identified variables;
3. And identifying tolerance levels regarding the frequency with which these thresh-
olds should be met in stochastic systems (Thébaud et al., 2014).
For this study we conditioned the viability of the fishing activity on the maintenance
of its production factors. First, as any activity based on the exploitation of a natural
resource, fishing can only persist if the resource, here the fish stocks, is present. In this
regard, the spawning biomass of the stocks should not fall below a limit threshold Blim,
under which recruitment is likely to be impaired (ICES, 2015a).
The viability of stock s was thus calculated as:
VBIO(s) = 1 if SSBs(t) ≥ Blims ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(2.15)
We also calculated a biological viability index aggregated accross all dynamically





VBIO(ALL) = 1 if SSBs(t) ≥ Blims ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],∀s ∈ {HKE, SOL, BSS, NEP},
= 0 otherwise.
(2.16)
Second, we consider the fact that fishing companies should be able to maintain
their means of production, i.e. capital and labour. Ensuring the renewal of the physical
capital for fishing (i.e. vessel, gears, motor...) was expressed as a need to maintain
positive Net Operating Surplus. In other words, fishing companies should be able to
make sufficient profits not only to cover operating costs (fuels costs, fixed costs and
crew costs), but also to cover the depreciation of their capital, in order to be able
to renew their equipments when needed. This can be seen as a long-term economic
viability constraint, which was not applied on a yearly basis but rather evaluated over




10 ), deemed a relevant time scale for
capital renewal.
The long-term viability of fleet f was thus calculated as:
VLT (f) = 1 if NOS(f) ≥ 0,
= 0 otherwise.
(2.17)
In addition to the long-term economic viability of the fleets, we also considered their
capacity to regularly cover their operating costs throughout the simulation period, i.e.
to show a positive Gross Operating Surplus. Individual economic data (Service de
la Statistique et de la Prospective, 2016) showed that having negative gross profits
one year did not necessarily prevent fishing vessels from continued operation in the
fishery in the following years. This profitability constraint was thus applied on the GOS




2 ). This short-term economic
objective is less constraining than the long-term objective defined supra since it does not
account for capital depreciation costs. However, it evaluates the regularity of economic
performance, which is considered important by the fishing industry.
The short-term viability of fleet f was calculated as:
VST (f) = 1 if GOS(f, t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [t0 + 1; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(2.18)
Third, a key production factor to maintain in the fishery is the workforce, especially
as interviews with representatives from French producer organisations highlighted the
extreme volatility of crews in the region. Keeping fishing crews active in the fishery
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was ensured in this application by maintaining their annual full-time equivalent wage
above a minimum threshold WageFTEmin .
The crew viability of fleet f was calculated as:
VCREW (f) = 1 if WageFTE(f, t) ≥ WageFTEmin ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(2.19)
2.4.2 Eco-viability under uncertainty
Precautionary management requires articulating the acceptability constraints with
possible uncertainties on the modelled processes. In our model, stochasticity applies
to the recruitment of the dynamic species. De Lara and Doyen (2008) and De Lara
et al. (2015) presented how uncertainties could be addressed in the viability frame-
work, thanks to the concept of stochastic viability which is interpreted as maximizing
the probability of respecting acceptability constraints. We estimated this probability
through a Monte-Carlo simulation approach, which consists in running a number nrep
of replicates for which the value of the uncertain factor(s) is drawn in a probability
distribution.
For each management strategy St, probabilities were derived for each type of via-
bility: PVBIO(St, s), PVST (St, f), PVLT (St, f), and PVCREW (St, f). As viability indicators
defined in Section 2.4.1 are booleans, the probability of viability was calculated as the




rep=1 V (St, rep)
nrep
. (2.20)
Examples of stochastic economic trajectories and the associated viability probabil-
ities are given in Figure E.1.
2.5 Model’s dimensions and calibration
To select the fleets to model, we considered the four key demersal stocks under
EU TAC management in the Bay of Biscay (northern stock of European hake, Bay of
Biscay stock of common sole, Bay of Biscay stock of Norway lobster, and anglerfish
in the Bay of Biscay and Celtic Sea). Modelled vessels were the French vessels con-
tributing significantly to the landings of at least one of the four key stocks (in order
to ensure that > 95% of the landings of each stock was accounted for by the model).
In addition, we identified fleets depending economically on a stock as those for which
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more than 30% of the gross value of landings was made up of landings of this stock.
Vessels that were economically dependent on one of the stocks were also included in
the model, even if their contribution to landings was limited. In total, 710 vessels were
identified and allocated to fleets adapted from the European Data Collection Frame-
work typology of fishing fleets (EU, 2008), to account for regional specificities. The
fleets were further divided into length categories to define segments sharing the same
cost structures. Each vessel was modelled individually, but results were aggregated at
the segment level by averaging economic indicators across all vessels in the segment, in
order to represent regional differences in the structure of fishing activities from North
to South of the Bay. Fishing activity of the vessels was described through 13 metiers
referenced in Appendix - Table B.3.
The 21 most important species or group of species (e.g. anglerfish or megrim) caught
by the modelled fleets in the Bay of Biscay were explicitly represented using IAM (list
in Table B.1), and all remaining catches were pooled in an "Other species" category. As
mentioned in Section 2.3, some species were modelled dynamically, whereas others are
considered "static". The possibility to dynamically model a stock is first constrained
by data availability: for many stocks, data is too scarce to assess the stock with an
analytical model. In the European context, this concerns all stocks which are considered
to be data limited (ICES categories 3 to 6 3- cf Table B.1). The rationale for the selection
of stocks that were modelled dynamically was that:
— The modelled vessels should be important contributors to the total landings of the
stock, since any change in the fishing effort of those vessels is likely to impact the
stock status. On the contrary, all other things (effort of other fleets, environmental
conditions) being equal, it is reasonable to assume a constant biomass of the
stocks that are only marginally impacted by the effort of the modelled fleets.
— At least one fleet was economically dependent on the stock. The economic via-
bility of such fleets is likely to be impacted by changes in catch rates (i.e. catches
per unit of effort) consecutive to changes in stock biomass.
Only five species met those criteria as shown by Figure 2.2, namely Norway lob-
ster, Common sole, anglerfish, European seabass and European hake. Among those,
only Norway lobster, Common sole, European seabass and European hake could be dy-
namically modelled in IAM as the species of anglerfish were classified as a data-limited.
3. On the basis of available knowledge, ICES classifies the stocks into six main categories. Stocks
in categories 1 and 2 are qualified as "data-rich" whereas others fall into the "data-limited" category
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Figure 2.2 – Contribution of the modelled vessels to the total landings of the stocks
(top panel) and number of fleets economically dependent on the important commer-
cial species in the Bay of Biscay (lower panel). A fleet was considered economically
dependent on a stock when the landings of the latter accounted for > 30% of the fleet’s
total value of landings. The absence of bar on the lower panel means that no fleet was
economically dependent on the stock.
Sources: French landings and value of landings: Système d’Information Halieutique (2018)
Total landings of the stocks: ICES (2018a)
Parameters for the stock dynamics of European hake, common sole and European
seabass were derived from the 2016 ICES stock assessments (ICES, 2017a). For Norway
lobster, they were estimated from an XSA (Darby and Flatman, 1994; Shepherd, 1999)
stock assessment. The recent UWTV survey "LANGOLF-TV", which started in 2014,
was included as an additional tunning fleet compared to XSA stock assessments carried
out before 2016 (see ICES (2017a) for more details on the survey). All parameters are
given in Table B.2. Annual recruitments for those stocks were estimated from Hockey-
Stick stock-recruitment relationships. Uncertainties on recruitment were accounted for
by randomly sampling the parameters of the stock-recruitment relationship among a
list of potential candidates estimated by softwares PlotMSY (sole) or EqSim (hake and
seabass) as detailed in ICES (2014b).
Effort and production data by vessel and metier were calculated from the SACROIS
database which is an algorithm crossing multiple existing data sources (auction halls,
logbooks, dealer reports) to provide the best possible estimation of effort and produc-
tion by vessel at the trip level (Système d’Information Halieutique, 2018). The maxi-
34
2.5. Model’s dimensions and calibration
mal fishing effort Emax was set uniformly for all vessels at 300 days/year. Fish prices
were kept constant and equal to the ones recorded in auction sales in 2016 (Système
d’Information Halieutique, 2018). Prices were defined at the vessel and metier level in
order to account for spatial variations in prices and differences in prices between gears
(e.g. seabass fished with a longline is more expensive than fished with a net or a trawl).
Cost structures were estimated for each fleet segment from 2016 economic data
(Service de la Statistique et de la Prospective, 2016). The vessels’ cost structures were
derived from those estimated for their segment, following the procedure described in
Appendix B.3.
TACshrs was set as the proportion of French landings relative to total landings
in 2016. French landings were provided by Système d’Information Halieutique (2018),
and total landings by ICES (2018a).
Acceptability constraints and the value of the thresholds for this application are
summarized in Table 2.1.








BlimSOL stock year 7,600 t ICES (2016e)
BlimHKE 32,000 t ICES (2016a)
BlimBSS 11,920 t ICES (2018b)
BlimNEP 5,557 t













0 e Varian (2010)
Maintain
crews
Wagemin fleet year 25,246 e
Mean wage of a French
seaman actualized data
from 2013 for 2016 -
INSEE (cat 692a)
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2.6 Management strategies
In order for the results to be displayed in two dimensions, we restricted our analy-
sis to the joint management of two species, chosen for their historic importance in the
Bay of Biscay demersal fishery, namely European hake and common sole. We recog-
nize that it is a simplification of current management in the Bay of Biscay since many
other stocks are actually under TAC regulation in the region. However, this stylized
application has been beneficial both in terms of development and presentation of the
approach as outputs were easily tractable and conveyable, and trade-offs between dif-
ferent objectives being made transparent.
In the remainder of the paper, a management strategy St will refer to a couple of
target fishing mortalities F targ for the 2 stocks under TAC management in the model,
namely hake and sole, associated with TAC recommendations. Let FtargSOL be an ele-
ment of ISOLand FtargHKE an element of IHKE, then St is an element of ISOL × IHKE.
For simulation purposes this 2D space was discretized in a grid of 20×20 which amounts
to 400 simulated strategies. Based on preliminary analyses, the results presented here
correspond to ISOL = IHKE = [0.1; 0.8].
Additional strategies corresponding to status-quo targets (i.e. (FtargSOL ;FtargHKE) =
(FSOL2016 ;FHKE2016) = (0.42; 0.27)) and single-species FMSY reference points (FMSYSOL =
0.33 and FMSYHKE = 0.28, (ICES, 2015c)) were also simulated. Simulated F targ strate-
gies were also compared to the stocks’ MSY ranges defined by ICES (2015c) as the
fishing mortality ranges resulting in long-term yield no less than 95% of MSY.
Strategies maximizing economic yield of the hake and sole fishery were identified
among the simulated strategies. Dynamic maximum economic yield (MEY) refers to





GV Li,s,t − Ci,s,t, (2.21)
with δ being the discount factor, and Ci,s,t the costs of individual i at time t associated
to the harvest of species s, which were estimated as a fraction of total costs Ci,t =
Cvari,t + Ccrewi,t + Cfixi,t + Cdepi,t equal to the share of species s in the gross value of





Dynamic MEY was identified for discount factors of 0 and 5%. A static MEY was also
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calculated as the maximal value of the fishery’s net profit at the end of the simulation
period.
Strategies ensuring that the TAC of the two species can be simultaneously caught
given the joint production formed what we called the operating domain of the fishery.
Each strategy was simulated over a 10-year period, and in order to account for
uncertainties on the recruitment of dynamically modelled stocks, 200 replicates were
run for each strategy 4.
2.7 Results














Figure 2.3 – Operating domain of the fishery defined as the domain where at least
95% of the quota for both species can be simultaneously caught given joint production
constraints. The triangle shows the FMSY reference points of the 2 species and the
black rectangle their FMSY ranges.
Source: output from IAM model
4. Increasing the number of replicates from 100 to 200 did not impact the results at the scale at
which we present them
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Figure 2.3 displays in grey the operating domain of the hake and sole fishery in the
Bay of Biscay. If production of hake and sole for the modelled vessels was completely
joint, i.e. every harvester fishing hake with one unit of effort of a given metier would also
fish sole with the same unit of effort of this metier and vice versa, then the operating
space would reduce to a line. In our model representation of the Bay of Biscay demersal
fishery, it is not exactly a line, but is closer to a segment: the modelled vessels are not
able to fully consume their quotas if the TACs are based on target fishing mortality
rates greater than 0.77 for sole and 0.68 for hake. At this point, the vessels are not
constrained by the quotas but by the maximal effort limit Emax (which truncates the
theoretical perfect joint-production line into a segment). The operating space is not
strictly uni-dimensionnal: some latitude around the perfect joint-production line exists.
This room for manoeuvre is due to the fact that production of the two species is not
perfectly joint: some vessels do catch both species jointly whereas others either only fish
one species or do not fish both using the same metier. In the latter case, fishing opera-
tors are able to target both species separately and fully use their quotas on both species.
As shown on Figure 2.3, the single-species FMSY reference points fall within the
operating domain, which means that they are achievable targets given the joint pro-
duction observed in the fishery. Figure 2.3 also shows that MSY ranges intersect with
the operating domain, although they also include combinations that are unreachable.
2.7.2 Biological viability
We then proceed to the identification of biologically viable strategies. As shown on
Figure 2.4, Norway lobster is the most vulnerable species among the 4 dynamically
modelled stocks. Ensuring that its spawning biomass does not fall below Blim with a
probability of 95% restrains the operating domain presented in Figure 2.3 to the dark
green domain on Figure 2.4, which corresponds to target fishing mortality rates below
0.6 for sole and 0.47 for hake.
2.7.3 Fleets’ viability
The economic viability of the biologically viable operating domain (i.e. the dark
green domain in Figure 2.4) was then evaluated. For each segment we calculated its
probability to meet the 3 viability constraints described in Section 2.4.1. A segment
was considered viable in a given strategy if its probability of viability was greater than
80%. Figure 2.5 shows the number of viable segments for each strategy with respect to
































Figure 2.4 – Probability of biological viability of the operating domain by stock and
aggregated for all stocks.
Source: output from IAM model
profits over the simulation period, increases with fishing mortality targets. In 2016, all
44 segments had a positive gross operating surplus, which means that setting fishing
mortality targets lower than 0.31 for sole and 0.26 for hake will jeopardize the short-
term viability of initially viable segments. Regarding long-term viability, 41 segments
showed a positive net operating surplus in 2016. Thus, setting fishing mortality targets
higher than 0.39 for sole and 0.31 for hake will enable more segments to meet long-term
viability objectives than in 2016.
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Figure 2.5 – Number of viable fishing segments regarding the three economic con-
straints: short-term viability, long-term viability, and the ability to maintain fishing
crews. The solid lined rectangle refers to the 2 species’ FMSY ranges and the dashed
lined rectangle shows the maximum viability space.
Source: output from IAM model
The ability to maintain crews in the fishery shows a somewhat different evolution.
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The number of segments able to maintain their crews first increases with fishing mor-
tality targets, until all segments are able to provide a sufficient FTE wage to their
crews. Then, as fishing mortality targets increase above 0.52 for sole and 0.31 for hake,
the decrease in labour productivity (i.e. the crew share per fishing hour) leaves some
segments unable to guarantee the minimum FTE wage to their crews.
Interestingly, harvesting both stocks within their MSY ranges is relatively compat-
ible with short-term economic viability and crew maintenance objectives since both
criteria are always met by more than 41 segments within those ranges. However, tar-
geting the lower end of the operating MSY ranges (FtargSOL = 0.27 and FtargHKE = 0.21
) will prevent 17 segments from meeting long-term economic objectives, whereas fishing
at its upper end (FtargSOL = 0.48 and FtargHKE = 0.42) allows 43 segments to reach
long-term economic viability.
In no strategy can the three sustainability criteria be met simultaneously for all
segments. However, with fishing mortality targets between 0.48 and 0.52 for sole and
of 0.31 for hake (dashed-lined rectangle in Figure 2.5), all segments meet the short-
term viability and crew wage constraints, and 42 over 44 segments generate sufficient
profits to ensure the renewal of their capital. Targeting fishing mortality rates in those
ranges therefore ensures that the fleets’ viability at least improves compared to 2016.
This domain of fishing mortality targets will be further referred to as the "maximum
viability space".
On Figure 2.5 strategies that maximize economic yield from the hake and sole fishery
are also identified. Maximizing the net present value of the fishery over a 10-year period
leads to high harvest rates on both species (FtargSOL = 0.73 and FtargHKE = 0.48 for
δ = 5%, and FtargSOL = 0.65 and FtargHKE = 0.36 for δ = 0), which fall out of the
biologically viable domain. This suggests the prevalence of short-term over long-term
profits since the fishery’s profits at the end of the simulation period are maximized
under much lower harvest rates (FtargSOL = 0.44 and FtargHKE = 0.26 ). In other words,
within a 10-year time frame, it is more profitable to highly fish now than to reduce
fishing to increase tomorrow’s profits. It is worth noting that the fishing mortality
target which maximizes the fishery’s net profits at the end of the simulation period is
lower than FMSY for hake but higher for sole.
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Figure 2.6 – Time series of predicted TACs for identified strategies: single-species FMSY ,
Status quo F2016, Maximum viability, and MEY.
Source: output from IAM model
2.7.4 From target reference points on fishing mortality to
TAC advice
Of particular interest for decision-makers are the TACs associated with the rec-
ommended fishing mortality targets. Mean predicted TACs between 2017 and 2025 for
sole and hake for some strategies are represented on Figure 2.6. The maximum viability
strategy corresponds to FtargHKE = 0.31 and FtargSOL = 0.48, and the dynamic MEY
strategy is the dynamic MEY with a discount rate of 5%.
In the first year the harvest control rule applies, the higher the fishing mortality
target, the greater the resulting TAC. However, this correlation inverts in the longer
term as more conservative strategies lead to more abundant stocks, and hence higher
TACs. In the case of sole and hake, benefits from short-term restrictions on fishing
mortality targets can be expected after 5 to 6 years, when the less conservative strat-
egy (dynamic MEY) starts resulting in lower TACs than more conservative ones. In the
long-term, all identified strategies result in higher TACs than in 2016 although some
lead to lower catches in the short-term (MSY for sole and MSY, status quo and final
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MEY for hake). In addition to these trends, inter-annual variations in TACs can also be
quantified. In the status-quo, MSY and final MEY strategies, year to year variations in
TACs never exceeded 15%, a threshold commonly requested by the fishing industry to
stabilize catch possibilities in EU multi-annual management plans (Penas, 2007). The
dynamic MEY strategy, however, led to TACs on sole and hake respectively increasing
by 66% and 31% between 2016 and 2017. In the maximum viability strategy, the TAC
on sole increased by 22% in the 1st year of implementation (Table 2.2).
The maximum viability strategy features as an intermediate strategy, neither too
conservative to ensure the economic viability of the greatest number of segments during
the entire projection period, nor too bold, so as not to impede the reproductive capacity
of any single stock. Consequently, it allows for catches to be maintained at quite high
levels over time, without deviating too much from the MSY strategy. Indeed, at the
end of the 10-year projection period, catches of sole and hake in the maximum viability
strategy are expected to be respectively 95% and 97% of those in the MSY strategy. It
is also the strategy with the second highest NPV, after the MEY strategy as shown in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 – Summary table of selected strategies, compared in terms of the Net Present
Value (NPV) of the hake and sole fisheries (calculated with a discount rate of 5%)
and the maximum inter-annual absolute TAC variation. The dynamic MEY strategy






2016 0.27 0.42 13 25.2
Maximum
viability 0.30 0.48 22 26.9
Dynamic
MEY 0.36 0.65 66 28.6
Final MEY 0.26 0.44 14 24.9
MSY 0.28 0.33 13 24.2
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2.8 Discussion
2.8.1 Towards operational eco-viable TAC advice for mixed
fisheries
The approach presented here lays the foundations for more integrated advice for
mixed fisheries under output controls.
First, it allows identifying the set of management strategies that are technically
achievable in mixed fisheries with joint production. This is what we called the operat-
ing domain of the fishery, namely the set of fishing mortality targets ensuring that at
least 95% of each TAC is consumed. Outside of this domain, quotas that are not fully
consumed may create an incentive to continue fishing and discard over-quota catches
of limiting species, undermining the monitoring and enforcement of catch regulations.
The importance of limiting the mismatch between expected catches and TACs has also
emerged in recent mixed fisheries advice (Ulrich et al., 2017). The operating domain
is case specific : it depends on the structure of the fleet, and on the selectivity and
catchability of the different metiers. Its extent will also depend on technical flexibili-
ties: fisheries with productions which are joint in fixed proportions will show a narrower
operating domain than fisheries with limited technical interactions. Flexibility offered
by management can also broaden the operating space: in a system where individual
quotas are tradeable, individual harvesters may have more possibilities to balance their
catches with available quotas. Moreover the operating domain can change over time as
fishing practices may adapt to changes in incentives resulting from external economic
drivers (e.g. changes in input costs or in demand and fish prices), regulations, ecological
factors and technical change.
Second, the application of the eco-viability approach allows evaluating how alterna-
tive management strategies perform in meeting predefined constraints, be they biolog-
ical, economic or social. Those constraints are defined by thresholds on key variables
of the model. Consequently, the type of constraints that can be accounted for in the
evaluation will depend on the model’s complexity. The present application considered
a biological constraint applied to four stocks and three economic constraints (positive
gross and net profits, and minimum crew wage) for the 44 fleets segments. Sustain-
ability constraints could expand further upstream (e.g. preservation of the ecosystem’s
good environmental status) or downstream (e.g. ensuring the viability of the down-
stream fish supply chain), and range from fine-scale (e.g. ensure the economic viability
of individual harvesters) to broad-scale (e.g. maintain global fish supplies) constraints.
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In the best case, management strategies that simultaneously meet all constraints can
be identified and form the eco-viable space. In remaining cases, the transparent evalu-
ation of the strategies regarding the various constraints can still assist decision-makers
in assessing trade-offs and identifying compromise strategies. It is important to high-
light that increasing the number of constraints does not increase the computing time.
However, it makes it more difficult to identify eco-viable management strategies.
Not only can the present framework help in the decision of management targets
(here in the form of targeted fishing mortality) but it also provides the time series of
TAC recommendations associated to those targets, thus giving more visibility to fishing
firms and the opportunity to adjust their fishing strategies.
2.8.2 Its application to the Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fish-
ery
We were unable to identify management strategies ensuring that the viability con-
straints proposed for this application were simultaneously met by all stocks and all
segments over the 10-year simulation period. This did not result from the biological
constraint of maintaining all stocks above their limit biomass reference points. Rather,
our results show that it is not possible for all fleet segments to cover the depreciation
of capital, thereby suggesting overcapacity in the fishery. Moreover, eco-viability was
undermined by a tension between the interests of crews and capital owners. Indeed,
generating sufficient profits to reach long-term economic viability implied harvesting
stocks at a point where labour productivity was too low to ensure crews the minimal
FTE wage. In our analysis, the share rate was assumed constant but vessel owners
have proven to adapt crew shares to external factors (Guillen et al., 2017) in order to
maintain crews when profits are low and to increase their share when profits increase
again. Considering such adaptive share rates in the model might resolve the observed
trade-off between crews’ and capital owners’ surplus. In addition, imposing the average
wage of a French seaman as a minimum requirement is actually more demanding than
maintaining current standards. Therefore, a more accurate estimation of the opportu-
nity cost of labour in the fishery might also make eco-viable strategies emerge.
The possibility for individual vessels to alter their catch composition is also limited
in the current version of the model since metier catchabilities are considered constant
and individual harvesters are assumed to fish as they did in the reference year. Al-
lowing more flexibility in fishing effort allocation (e.g. with a non-null coefficient α in
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equation 2.4 that is a weighted combination of profitability and tradition as suggested
by Marchal et al. (2013)), will broaden the operating domain and possibly allow eco-
viable strategies to emerge. The extent to which joint productions can be altered in
the Bay of Biscay demersal fishery has not been specifically investigated but insights
from other fisheries show that given the right incentives fishers are often able to change
their fishing practices to avoid undesirable catches (Abbott et al., 2015; Little et al.,
2015; Reimer et al., 2017).
We noted that single-species MSY reference points were achievable targets in the
particular case of the hake and sole fishery in the Bay of Biscay. However, this result
should not question the necessity to assess whether current management targets (by
default FMSY for data rich European stocks) are in line with technical limitations in
other mixed fisheries or when more stocks are considered in the reconciliation process.
Maximizing the net present value of the hake and sole fishery over the 10-year
simulation period with a discount factor of 5% led to harvest rates well above those
that maximize the fishery’s net profits after 10 years. This shows that long-term gains
from fishing at low harvest rates are offset by short-term profits from fishing at high
harvest rates. The difference between dynamic and static MEY should decrease as the
projection horizon increases since short-term profits will weigh less in the calculation
of the NPV. Moreover, whereas the stock of hake reached equilibrium at the end of
the simulation period as evidenced by TACs levelling-off in Figure 2.6, the stock of
sole was still in a transition phase. Consequently, harvest rates associated to MEY
might also decrease with a longer projection horizon as long-term profits from fishing
at low harvest rates are still expected to increase after 10 years. It is worth noting that
maximizing the fishery’s net profits after 10 years requires to harvest hake below and
sole above their respective FMSY reference points. The fact that fishery-wide reference
points (Multispecies MSY or MEY) can lead to the under- or over-exploitation of
individual stocks has already been highlighted by many authors (Guillen et al., 2013;
Voss et al., 2014; García et al., 2016; Hoshino et al., 2018; Tromeur and Doyen, 2018).
Finally, we observed that the dynamic MEY is sensitive to the value of the discount
rate, and, as expected, the higher the discount rate, the higher the associated harvest
rates.
2.8.3 Limitations and perspectives
In this work, we illustrated how to reconcile fishing mortality targets for two stocks
at the heart of technical interactions, through the identification of operating and vi-
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able domains. Four main limitations of the approach warrant further research that was
beyond the scope of the work presented here.
First, joint production in fisheries rarely is limited to two species. There is thus a
need to generalize this approach to an unlimited number of stocks the catch of which
technically interacts. Indeed, with operating and viable spaces dimensioned by the
number of controls (here the number of stocks under TAC regulation), this method-
ology would quickly lack operationality for fisheries with more than three interacting
stocks. The issue of dimensionality could be tackled through an optimized exploration
of eco-viable strategies, similar to the approach developed by Gourguet et al. (2013),
rather than through the exhaustive screening of all possible controls as done here.
Second, as highlighted earlier, the operating and viability domains presented here
are likely to be overly constrained by rigid assumptions on how fishers adapt to reg-
ulations, in the model. Enabling more dynamic effort and/or quota allocation and
investigating whether this provides more room for viability will be the focus of future
work.
Third, in highly diversified mixed fisheries, the issue of "secondary species" that are
caught as bycatch when targeting more valuable species often arises. Many of these are
considered data-limited stocks (DLS) for which the lack of data prevents the calibration
of stock dynamics models. So far, the integration of those species in mixed fisheries
bio-economic models has been inconsistent: some consider that their landings remain
constant (Guillen et al., 2013), some assume that their biomass remains constant and
calculate catches using a Baranov production function (García et al., 2016) (which is
equivalent to our constant LPUE hypothesis when the output elasticity for biomass in
the Baranov equation equals 1), some scale the income from those species as a pro-
portion of the revenue of the target species (Ulrich et al., 2002; Guillen et al., 2013;
Gourguet et al., 2013). Different approaches to model the income derived from those
species are likely to result in different economic outcomes for the modelled fleets, and
ensuing viability evaluations. For instance, the income from stocks modelled with a
constant LPUE will always increase with fishing effort and never show any stock effect.
If this is the case, the income of fleets that mostly depend on those species may be
overestimated under high fishing pressure (and conversely underestimated under low
fishing pressure) which might wrongly bias the advice regarding harvest of the main
stocks. Assuming the income associated to minor species is proportional to the income
of the target species could resolve this bias, but is not straightforward to implement in
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fisheries like the mixed demersal fishery of the Bay of Biscay, where there is no unique
target species. Progress in this space is likely to result from the systematic identifi-
cation of the circumstances under which each approach bears more relevance, leading
to model each species or group of species accordingly. For instance, as assumed in our
analysis, a constant biomass of the stock is only -if at all, given natural variability-
relevant if the modelled fleets do not account for much of the total landings of the
stock, and thus to the fishing mortality exerted on the stock.
Finally, setting acceptability constraints should be the result of discussions with
all stakeholders in the fishery, from fishers to consumers, fisheries managers, scientists,
fish processors, harbour managers, etc. The involvement of stakeholders was beyond
the scope of this work, more designed to be a proof of concept than actual alternative
advice for the management of the Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fishery.
2.8.4 Articulation with current ICES mixed fisheries advice
The ICES Working Group on Mixed Fisheries Advice (WGMIXFISH-Advice) has
been developing the FCube methodology to provide mixed fisheries TAC advice since
2009 (ICES, 2009), with first implementation in the North Sea demersal fishery in 2012
(ICES, 2017b). In its latest report, WGMIXFISH-Advice also extended its advice to
the Celtic Sea and Iberian Waters mixed fisheries (ICES, 2017b). An application of
the framework is also under way in the Bay of Biscay. The FCube approach provides
short-term mixed fisheries catch forecasts under different scenarios of quota uptake
(e.g. fishers stop once they reach their most constraining quota, or once they have con-
sumed all quotas), assuming constant metier catchabilities and effort allocation among
metiers (ICES, 2017b; Ulrich et al., 2011, 2017). In the FCube approach, biological sus-
tainability is ensured a priori by restricting fishing mortalities to stock-specific MSY
ranges, and economic viability is not assessed. FCube is only used to provide short-
term mixed fisheries catch forecasts. Regarding the issue of catch-quota imbalance,
FCube identifies the combination of fishing mortalities within the MSY ranges that
minimizes the difference in catches summed across all stocks between the “min” and
“max” scenarios. In our approach, we assumed that fishers would stop fishing once they
have reached their most constraining quota, which corresponds to the “min” scenario
in the FCube framework and the full implementation of the landing obligation. We
also assumed constant catchabilities and effort allocation among metiers but our pro-
jections were run over a 10-year period to assess the bio-economic viability of various
harvest scenarios. Because intergenerational equity is an intrinsic feature of viability
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approach, the approach can be used to advise yearly tactical TAC decisions as well as
to inform on longer term consequences of short-term decisions, which is the horizon at
which sustainability must be assessed. We adopted a more exhaustive approach than in
FCube to the catch-quota imbalance question, by simulating all possible combinations
and identifying the set of satisfying quota uptake where all quotas would be at least
consumed by 95%. We thus feel that the present approach could effectively be applied
to other European fisheries with technical interactions based on an operating model
calibrated with ICES stock assessment models and DCF fleets economic data.
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Abstract
Models of markets for individual quotas have been developed to inform about the
expected outcomes of market-based approaches to the allocation of fishing rights. How-
ever, these models have mostly concerned single-species fisheries and are not suited to
represent the interactions between quota markets in multi-species fisheries where quo-
tas for jointly harvested species are traded on separate markets. In this work, we present
a process-based simulation model of perfectly competitive ITQ (Individual Tradable
Quotas) lease markets for multi-species fisheries. The theoretical equilibrium of such
markets is first presented using linear programming. Then, an iterative algorithm mim-
icking Walras’ tâtonnement process is used to represent the convergence towards the
equilibrium of quota markets in a simulation context. An application of the latter model
to the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery highlights some
of the economic incentives provided by competitive ITQ markets in a multi-species
fishery. Typically, we expect economically rational fishers to redirect their fishing effort
towards species with low demand on the quota market, hence increasing TAC uptakes
for the fishery. We also show that ITQs create an economic incentive to redirect fishing
effort towards species that are not currently under quota such as squids, frostfish and
ocean jackets.
3.1 Introduction
In the 1970’s, individual catch shares were suggested as a means to regulate access
in a fishery and increase economic efficiency (Christy, 1973), the latter being enhanced
by quota transferability (Moloney and Pearse, 1979). Active markets for quota shares
would indeed ensure their reallocation to harvesters who can derive the highest profit
from them (Grafton, 1996). Ever since, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have
been given attention and implemented in several jurisdictions as a method to restrict
access and enhance economic efficiency (see reviews from Thébaud et al. (2012) and
Hoshino et al. (2019)). In multi-species fisheries, transferable fishing rights have also
been suggested as a flexibility mechanism to reconcile fishing possibilities on jointly
caught species and prevent discarding or illegal landings (Sanchirico et al., 2006). In
these fisheries, quota markets shall also convey signals on quota availability and create
an economic incentive to redirect fishing effort towards species with low demand on the
quota market (Holland and Herrera, 2006). Yet, several multi-species fisheries managed
with ITQs have experienced surprisingly low levels of Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
uptake (Knuckey et al., 2018; McQuaw and Hilborn, 2020). Paying attention to how
ITQ markets shape the composition of catch in multi-species is likely to shed some
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light on this phenomenon.
Theoretical developments on ITQ markets have primarily focused on their applica-
tion in single-species fisheries. They have been used to address questions such as pro-
duction externalities (Boyce, 1992), initial allocation of harvest rights (Heaps, 2003),
rent distribution (Boyce, 2004; Grainger and Costello, 2012; Hatcher, 2014a), market
power (Anderson, 1991, 2008), discarding and highgrading (Anderson, 1994; Vester-
gaard, 1996; Hatcher, 2005a), or compliance (Hatcher, 2005b). Except for a few papers
challenging the assumption of Walrasian or competitive equilibrium (e.g. Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1985) or Binmore and Herrero (1988)), markets for quota units have
generally been assumed to develop through Walras’ "tâtonnement" process and eventu-
ally reach equilibrium where demand equals supply (Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Squires
et al., 1995; Heaps, 2003; Hatcher, 2005a; Péreau et al., 2012). Far less attention has
however been given to the formation of quota prices in multi-species fisheries, where
quotas for jointly caught species are traded on separate markets. Theoretical devel-
opments in this area typically investigated the impact of the cost of selective fishing
(Singh and Weninger, 2009; Hatcher, 2014b) or the compliance with potential discard
policies or illegal landing schemes (Hatcher, 2014b; Thébaud et al., 2017) on the quota
markets of multi-species fisheries.
With integrated ecological-economic models of fisheries being increasingly used as
decision-support tools (Nielsen et al., 2018), the modelling of economic dynamics, and
among them those of quota markets, has gained interest within the field of applied
fisheries science. When representing the exchange of individual catch shares, simula-
tion models of multi-species fisheries have dealt with the determination of the lease or
selling value of quotas following either process-based or empirical approaches. Newell
et al. (2005) proposed an empirical model of quota price for New Zealand ITQ mar-
kets. This econometric model relates quota price to fundamental variables such as the
export price of fish, fishing costs, the demand for quota, and environmental variability,
and has been calibrated for simulation purposes in other fisheries (Fulton et al., 2007;
Kaplan et al., 2014). Among process-based models, the most widely used has been the
one developed by Little et al. (2009) and taken up by subsequent work (Fulton et al.,
2007; Marchal et al., 2011; Toft et al., 2011). In this model, the lease price of quota
for a given species is exogenously set as the mean marginal profit from harvesting that
species across individual harvesters. Because of the multi-species nature of the catch,
the marginal profit of harvesting a particular species is a function of the ex-vessel price
of this species, its relative proportion in the catch and the marginal cost per unit of
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all fish caught. This expression of the lease price of quota is essentially an attempt to
extend theoretical results established for single-species ITQ markets (in particular the
link between the lease price of quota and marginal profit) in a multi-species context.
The quota lease price model proposed by Little et al. (2009) therefore captures some
basic features of ITQ markets without explicitly modelling the underlying mechanisms.
In particular, the process of market price formation is not explicitly represented and as
a consequence calculated lease prices do not correspond to market clearing price. For
instance, all species would have a strictly positive lease price of quota, even if demand
for quota relative to supply is low. More recently, Bailey et al. (2019) proposed another
process-based model of ITQ trading in multi-species fisheries. In the latter, fishers es-
timate a reservation price for each species, which is the benefit of owning an additional
unit of quota for that species (given the associated catch) multiplied by the probability
of needing quota (given expected catch and current quota holdings). The reservation
price being a function of the probability of needing quota implies that lease prices
will increase with quota scarcity. However, this model does not aim to represent the
formation of a market price for quota leases. Instead, individual reservation prices are
used to match askers and bidders and transactions are made at the asker’s reservation
price. This review highlights that the explicit representation of mechanisms underlying
the dynamics of ITQ markets in applied simulation models of multi-species fisheries is
still largely at its infancy.
The objectives of the present work are twofold: to describe the theoretical equilib-
rium of perfectly competing ITQ lease markets given joint productions in multi-species
fisheries, and to develop a simulation model that explicitly represents the convergence
towards such equilibrium. First, linear programming and duality methods are used to
derive theoretical quota lease prices and fishing activities at the economic optimum.
In a second part, a process-based simulation model of ITQ markets mimicking Walras’
tâtonnement process of price formation is presented, followed by its numerical appli-
cation to a multi-species fishery managed under ITQs, the Australian Southern and
Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Two scenarios of fishing effort allocation at the in-
dividual level are considered : one where fishers are able to freely allocate fishing effort
among different metiers they can practice and one where their effort is constrained to
previously observed patterns. The latter scenario reflects the fact that fishing practices
can be constrained by factors exogenous to the model such as seasonality in resource
availability or access to fishing grounds. Particular attention is given to the compo-
sition of landings in both cases to shed light on possible shift towards species with
under-caught TACs and species not currently under quota.
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3.2 Equilibrium of multispecies ITQ markets
3.2.1 The model
We consider a fishery composed of nv vessels practising nm metiers to capture ns
species. In this section, we also introduce the term "activity" to refer to the practice of
a metier by a vessel. Each vessel is able to practise several activities, but an activity
can only be practised by one vessel (the same metier practised by several vessels corre-
sponds to distinct activities). The number of activities is noted na and in the general
case nv ≤ na ≤ nv × nm. The time frame is the fishing season and in this context,
the number of vessels, their activities, catch and costs per unit of effort and ex-vessel
prices of fish are exogenous. The fishery is under TAC and ITQ management. TACs
are exogenous and, on the short term, the transfer of quota is ensured by the lease of
quota units on separate markets for the different species.
Let us note X the vector (na) of fishing effort per activity, B the matrix (nv × na)
whose elements indicate whether a vessel is able to practise an activity (Bv,a = 1 if
vessel v is susceptible of practising activity a and Bv,a = 0 otherwise), A the matrix
(ns × na) of catch per unit of effort by species and activity, C the vector (na) of costs
per unit of effort per activity, P the vector (ns) of ex-vessel price per species, Π the
vector (na) of profits per unit of effort by activity (Π = PA−C), Q the vector (ns) of
TACs per species, and E the vector (nv) of maximum fishing effort per vessel.
The equilibrium of perfectly competing ITQ markets is approached as a linear
programming problem maximizing the fishery’s profits under TAC and capacity con-




s.t. AX ≤ Q (3.1.1)
BX ≤ E (3.1.2)
The dual of the latter problem allows the determination of the quota lease prices and
vessels’ quasi-rents. Let us call L the vector (ns) representing the dual variables associ-
ated to the quota constraint 3.1.1 (i.e. the lease price of quota units in an ITQ system)
and R the vector (nv) representing those associated to the capacity constraint 3.1.2
(i.e. the vessels’ quasi-rents, or short-term profits).
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s.t. LA+RB ≥ Π (3.2.1)
3.2.2 Market equilibrium
Let us call X∗, L∗ and R∗ the solutions of the primal and dual problems. Applica-
tion of the complementary slackness theorem gives the following relations.
Between primal constraints and dual variables:
(As.X∗ −Qs)L∗s = 0 ∀s ∈ {1..ns}. (3.3.1)
(Bv.X∗ − Ev)R∗v = 0 ∀v ∈ {1..nv}. (3.3.2)
Between dual constraints and primal variables:
(L∗A.a +R∗B.a − Πa)X∗a = 0 ∀a ∈ {1..na}. (3.3.3)
Given that B.a has only one non-null coefficient Bva,a = 1, where va is the vessel
susceptible of practising activity a, Equation 3.3.3 also writes as:
(L∗A.a +R∗va − Πa)X
∗
a = 0 ∀a ∈ {1..na}. (3.3.3′)
Quasi-rent
Dual variables Ra being non-negative, Equation 3.3.2 can be written as:Bv.X
∗ < Ev =⇒ R∗v = 0
R∗v > 0 =⇒ Bv.X∗ = Ev .
The latter conditions mean that only vessels employed at their full capacity at the
optimum generate positive short-term profits.
Equilibrium lease price of quota units
Dual variables Ls being non-negative, Equation 3.3.1 can be written as:As.X
∗ < Qs =⇒ L∗s = 0
L∗s > 0 =⇒ As.X∗ = Qs ,
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which means that only the species the TAC of which is binding at the optimum have
a non-null lease price. Such species will also be referred to as binding or constraining
species in the remainder of the text.
Primal variables Xa being non-negative, Equation 3.3.3′ can be written as:L
∗A.a +R∗va > Πa =⇒ X∗a = 0
X∗a > 0 =⇒ L∗A.a +R∗va = Πa ,
which means that the profits of an active activity at the optimum just cover the
lease of quotas and the quasi-rent of the associated vessel.
Given that Π = PA− C, the latter relations also write as:
L
∗A.a +R∗va + Ca > PA.a =⇒ X∗a = 0
X∗a > 0 =⇒ L∗A.a +R∗va + Ca = PA.a .
From these equations can be derived the lease price of quota for a species s whose














(Ps − L∗s)Asa −R∗va − Ca
 . (3.4)
One can note from Equation 3.4 that the lease price of quota for species s at the
optimum depends not only on its ex-vessel price but also on that of jointly caught
species. As a consequence, the equilibrium lease price of quota of a binding species
can exceed its ex-vessel price provided that ex-vessel prices of jointly caught species
(diminished by their own quota lease price) are sufficiently high. The vessels’ quasi-rents
also appear in the expression of equilibrium quota lease prices. This highlights that the
lease price of quota for a binding species approaches the marginal profit deduced from
quota costs associated to jointly harvested species of the marginal vessel catching this
species (i.e. the one that is indifferent between fishing or remaining in port).
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3.3 The convergence towards ITQ market equilib-
rium
We now turn to the process which leads to the determination of equilibrium prices,
and present a process-based model of the convergence towards the equilibrium of per-
fectly competitive ITQ lease markets. The model mimics Walras’ tâtonnement process
to determine the clearing lease price of quota units for jointly harvested species.
3.3.1 The tâtonnement algorithm
To the extent possible, we keep the notations introduced in Section 3.2. Nonetheless,
exempted from the dimensionality constraint imposed by linear programming, activ-
ities are replaced by their vessel-metier combination to facilitate the writing of some
equations. In the following sections, X is the vector (nv) of fishing effort per vessel, A
the array (ns×nv×nm) of catch per unit of effort by species, vessel and metier, C the
matrix (nv × nm) of costs per unit of effort per vessel and metier, P the vector (ns)
of ex-vessel price per species, L the vector (ns) of quota lease price per species, Π the
matrix (nv × nm) of profits per unit of effort by vessel and metier (here, including the
costs of leasing quota), Q the vector (ns) of TACs per species, and E the vector (nv) of
maximum fishing effort per vessel. The superscript ∗ refers to the value of the variable
at equilibrium.
As represented in Figure 3.1, the tâtonnement algorithm progresses as follows:
1. Quota lease price are attributed an initial value.
For each iteration it of the "tâtonnement" process (for the sake of clarity, it
subscripts will be omitted in the following equations):
2. Individual harvesters decide on a fishing strategy by allocating their fishing effort
to metiers.
— Building on previous fleet dynamics models (review by van Putten et al.
(2012) and Girardin et al. (2017)), the effort allocation is modelled as a
function of a weighted average of the metiers’ profitability and past effort
allocation, with the weight given to profit attractiveness as opposed to habit
being measured by the coefficient α. The profitability of metier m for vessel
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[As,v,m × (Ps − Ls)]− Cv,m, (3.5)
Relative profitabilities Π (i.e. centred on the profitability of the vessel’s least
profitable metier) are used in the effort allocation function to avoid negative
coefficients: Πv,m = Πv,m−minm(Πv,m). Following Marchal et al. (2011), the
Schedule effort given 
quota prices (2) 
Calculate aggregate 
demand for quotas (3) 
Set initial quota prices (1) 
Adjust quota prices to 
aim  for clearing 
markets (4)  
Yes 
Is demand for 
quota different 
than TAC for all 
species? 
No 
Trade quotas (5) 
Calculate resulting efforts 
and landings (6) 
Tâtonnement 
algorithm 
Figure 3.1 – Steps of the "tâtonnement" algorithm.
The algorithm keeps searching for quota clearing prices until the deviation of total demand for quota
from the TAC is smaller than a tolerance level ε for all species under TAC or that a maximal number
of iterations itmax has been reached.
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proportion of effort the harvester of vessel v allocates to metier m, pXv,m,




+ (1− α)× X0v,m∑
mX0v,m
, (3.6)
with X0v,m being the historical effort of vessel v allocated to metier m.
When α = 1, effort allocation is entirely profit-driven 1, with the metier
profitability being not only determined by its efficiency at catching fish
but also the costs of leasing in quota to land the catch (Equation 3.5).
The case α = 0 is also considered as a baseline scenario against which
the α = 1 scenario will be compared. It corresponds to a scenario where the
allocation of fishing effort is exogenously set as that in a reference period and
represents a case where no effort shift is possible among metiers. Realized
effort allocation is likely to lie between these two scenarios with possible
operational constraints such as seasonality in resource availability or access
to fishing grounds constraining the response of fishers to economic incentives.
— Given the planned fishing effort allocation, the harvester of vessel v assesses
whether it is profitable to go fishing. If its average profitability per unit
of effort is positive, then the vessel will operate at its maximum effort Ev,






( pXv,m × Πv,m) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(3.7)




(As,v,m × pXv,m ×Xv). (3.8)
4. Quota prices are then adjusted for the next iteration to aim for clearing markets
for each species:




with λ the step coefficient of the convergence. 2
1. One can note that allocating effort proportionally to the metiers’ profitabilities does not exactly
correspond to a profit-maximizing effort allocation, which would lead to the entire effort being allocated
to the most profitable metier. Rather, this model can reflect a profit-maximizing allocation under
uncertainties, where the probability to choose a metier is proportional to its expected profitability.
2. The value of the step coefficient is determined empirically to achieve a satisfying compromise
between the precision of convergence and computing time. Precision will be greater for low values of
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Steps 2 to 4 are iterated until total demand for quota is close enough to the TAC





< ε ) or after itmax iterations.
3.3.2 Implementation considerations
Quota lease prices are attributed a quasi-null value before entering the tâtonnement
phase. The advantage of initiating quota prices at a null value is that at they will have to
increase for markets to clear (at least for those who will clear given joint productions).
However, given the form of the quota price adjustment function given in Equation 3.9,
one cannot start with a null value. Therefore, quota lease prices were initiated at 0.1%
of the species ex-vessel price.
Because of the discrete nature of the quota demand function (ensuing from vessels
either remaining at port or fishing at their full capacity), market equilibrium is never
reached perfectly and demand for quota for binding species will oscillate around the
TAC 3. In order to avoid TACs to be overshot due to the imperfect market equilibrium,
quota distribution is explicitly represented in the model following the convergence pro-
cess (Step 5 in Figure 3.1). Similar to the approach proposed by Little et al. (2009),
quota for species s is allocated in priority to individuals with the highest incentive







Vessels are thus ranked by decreasing order of marginal profit on each market and
quotas distributed according to this order until offer (for binding species) or demand
(for non-binding species) expires.
As a result of this allocation, individual harvesters may not exactly hold the quota
portfolio they demanded at equilibrium. To reconcile the multiple species’ quota con-







) and final landings are deduced from these efforts (Step
6 in Figure 3.1).
λ but at the cost of increased convergence time.
3. The extent of the oscillations around the TAC is related to the number of participants in the
market. Typically, they are more important in thin markets where each participant potentially captures
a higher share of the TAC.
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3.3.3 Numerical application to the Australian Southern and
Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery
Description of the fishery and quota system
The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) is a
multi-sector and multi-species fishery that operates in Australian federally-managed
waters as well as some state waters under specific arrangements. The fishery is divided
in four sectors represented by different gear types targeting specific group of species,
namely the Gillnet Hook and Trap Sector (GHTS), the Commonwealth Trawl Sec-
tor (CTS), the Great Australian Bight Trawl Sector (GABTS), and the East Coast
Deepwater Trawl sector (ECDWTS). The present application focuses on the first two,
at the heart of technical interactions. During the 2015 fishing season (May 2015-May
2016), 106 vessels from 12 fleets were operating in these sectors. Vessels in each fleet
can target various species or species assemblages using the same gears. These differ-
ent activities correspond to different metiers listed in Table 3.1. One can see that some
fleets (e.g. trawlers) have a more diversified fishing activity than others (e.g. gillnetters).
Management in the fishery primarily relies on output controls with TACs being de-
termined for 25 stocks in the selected sectors and allocated as individual transferable
quotas. As shown by Figure 3.2, the TAC of many stocks were under-caught in 2015,
with only the TAC of key economic stocks (e.g. flathead, orange roughy (Eastern and
Southern stocks), school whiting, gummy shark, blue-eye trevalla and pink ling) or
choke species (e.g. the rebuilding TAC for school shark constraining catches of gummy
shark) being caught above 75% (AFMA, 2016). Full TAC uptake is extremely rare
in the fishery partly due to frictions in quota markets and stocks with TAC uptakes
above 75% are generally considered as constraining. The eleven stocks with TAC up-
take above 75% in 2015, as identified in Figure 3.2, will therefore be referred to as the
originally constraining stocks in the remainder of the text.
Model calibration
The model was calibrated based on economic and catch data from 2015. Catches
and fishing effort (number of fishing days) at the vessel and metier level were calcu-
lated from SESSF logbook data. Ex-vessel price in 2015 for the various species were
obtained from the Australian Fisheries Statistics (Mobsby, 2018). Cost structures were
estimated per main gear type (trawlers, Danish seiners, gillnetters, and liners) based
on the 2015 economic survey (Bath et al., 2018) and personal communications from
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Table 3.1 – List of fleets and metiers for the Commonwealth Trawl Sector (CTS) and





CTS Shelf trawlers East Trawl (TW)
East
Flathead
Mixed trawlers East Pink ling








Mixed trawlers West Trawl (TW)
West
Blue grenadier















Mixed bottomliners Blue-eye trevalla
Mixed scalefish






Mixed auto-longliners Pink ling
Mixed scalefish
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES),
and used to calculate costs per unit of effort at the vessel and metier level as described
in Appendix C.5. Maximal efforts E were assumed to be the vessels’ maximal observed
effort over the period 2010-2015. TACs and associated uptake levels were retrieved from
AFMA (2016).
Metiers were defined as combinations of a fishing gear and targeted species or group
of species and derived from a clustering analysis of individual shots based on their
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Figure 3.2 – Levels of TAC uptake in the Commonwealth Trawl and Gillnet Hook and
Trap sectors of the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Stocks within
the framed area have a TAC uptake greater than 75%.
Source: AFMA (2016)
species composition. Fleets, on the other hand refer to groups of vessel having a similar
fishing strategy. A multivariate statistical approach was also used to define fleets by
clustering vessels based on their annual effort allocation among metiers. Further details
on these analyses are provided in Appendix D.
A value of 0.1 for the convergence multiplier λ allowed convergence of the algorithm
in a reasonable number of iterations (1000 in the present case).
Results
When fishers allocate their fishing effort based on profitability, quota lease markets
clear for several but not all species in the fishery (Table 3.2). To be precise, indicated
TAC uptake levels correspond to those observed once all quotas have been allocated
and individual fishing efforts adjusted to the most constraining quota (i.e. after step
6 in Figure 3.1). The difficulty for vessel owners to meet their quota demand on all
species simultaneously explains why the TAC of some species with positive quota lease
prices at equilibrium (i.e. species for which the quota lease market clears) is not entirely
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Table 3.2 – Quota uptake and lease prices of quota at equilibrium (model output)
under the profit-driven effort allocation scenario (α = 1). Bold highlighting indicates











Flathead 6.18 91 0.00
Gummy Shark 6.29 99 1.01
Pink Ling 5.73 100 0.31
School Whiting 3.05 100 0.52
Orange Roughy East 5.59 100 1.90
Blue eye Trevalla 9.06 98 0.01
School Shark 5.99 100 0.43
Ocean Perch 5.08 100 7.16
Oreos 3.50 100 1.06
Orange Roughy South 5.59 94 1.33
Blue Grenadier 1.30 33 0.00
Silver Warehou 1.15 13 0.00
Mirror Dory 3.15 100 1.50
Royal Red Prawn 4.01 26 0.00
Saw Shark 1.91 43 0.00
Jackass Morwong 3.36 38 0.00
Silver Trevally 4.49 18 0.00
Ribaldo 3.50 21 0.00
Gemfish West 2.43 35 0.00
John Dory 8.66 92 0.00
Deepwater Shark West 3.64 34 0.00
Elephantfish 0.80 30 0.00
Redfish 3.43 49 0.00
Deepwater Shark East 3.64 42 0.00
Gemfish East 2.43 70 0.00
Smooth Oreo 3.50 1 0.00
Orange Roughy West 5.59 40 0.00
Blue Warehou 3.06 3 0.00
Orange Roughy Cascade 5.59 0 0.00
caught. The conclusions from Section 3.2.2 are nevertheless illustrated in this numerical
application: the lease price of non-binding quotas are null and that of binding quotas
captures the revenue from jointly captured species, which can lead to quota lease prices
exceeding ex-vessel prices (e.g. ocean perch).
Under this scenario, markets clear for almost all species that were identified as con-
straining in the reference year (Figure 3.2). The only exception is flathead for which
the market does not fully clear with a resulting TAC uptake of 91%. The TAC of mirror
dory yet becomes constraining in this scenario.
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B
Figure 3.3 – Fishery’s landings composition under the two scenarios of effort allocation:
status-quo (α = 0) and profit-driven (α = 1)
A- Landings per species
B- Landings aggregated per species category
Light colourings relate to the tradition-based scenario and dark colourings to the profit-driven sce-
nario. Species have been grouped into three categories: species for which the TAC was considered as
constraining in the reference year, species that were not constraining in the reference year and species
not under quota.
Source: model output
Let us now compare the composition of landings that would be obtained if fishers
allocate their fishing effort based on profitability compared to when they keep fishing
as they did in the reference year. Compared to the status-quo scenario, a profit-driven
effort allocation leads to landings of originally non-binding species (in yellow) increase
by 34% and those of species not under TAC (in black) increase by 121%, with only a
slight decrease of 1% in landings of originally binding species (in red) (Figure 3.3-B).
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Although overall landings of originally non-binding species and species not under
quota increase from the status-quo to the profit-driven scenario, it is not necessarily
the case at the species level, as shown by Figure 3.3-A. One can note that among origi-
nally non-binding species or species not under quota, those that can be targeted in the
model (i.e. having a metier specifically targeting them - cf list of metiers in Table 3.1)
generally see their landings increase. It is for instance the case of blue grenadier, jack-
ass morwong, squids, ocean jackets and frostfish for which landings are respectively
multiplied by 1.55, 1.51, 1.68, 2.33 and 8.25. There is however no generic pattern con-
cerning by-product species (i.e. those that are not specifically targeted) as four see
their landings increase and eight see their landings decrease from the habit-based to
the profit-driven scenario.
Danish seiner















































































































Figure 3.4 – Relative and absolute landings by the fleets harvesting flathead under
status-quo and profit-driven effort allocation scenarios.
A- Proportion of species weight in the fleets’ landings
B- Absolute landings per species per fleet
Constraining species are represented in colored scale, non-constraining species in gray scale and species
not under quota in black. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of active vessels in each fleet.
Source: model output
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Figure 3.5 – Effort allocation of the eastern mixed trawler fleet in the two effort allo-
cation scenarios: status-quo (α = 0) and profit-driven (α = 1).
Source: model output
The landings of originally constraining species (in red) remain fairly stable between
both scenarios (Figure 3.3-A). Yet, the decreasing demand for flathead is worth ex-
panding upon as it illustrates the incentive provided by ITQ markets to avoid species
with high demand on the quota market. Figure 3.4-A shows that mixed trawlers con-
siderably reduce the proportion of flathead in their catch between the status-quo and
profit-driven effort allocation by shifting fishing effort towards other target species.
Whereas nearly half of their fishing effort is dedicated at targeting flathead in the
status-quo scenario, this activity only represents 15% of their time at sea when effort
is allocated based on profitability (Figure 3.5). In this latter scenario, effort shifts to
metiers targeting non-constraining species such as jackass morwong or blue grenadier,
or species not under quota such as squids, ocean jackets or frostfish. The three other
fleets harvesting flathead do not have more profitable activities to switch to and show
a similar landings composition between both scenarios (Figure 3.3-A). Given the orig-
inally large contribution of mixed trawlers to flathead landings (Figure 3.3-B), their
effort shift in the profit-driven scenario releases enough quota for more Danish seiners
to operate in the fishery (16 compared to 13 vessels), which partly compensates for the
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trawlers effort shift and decrease in fleet size (loss of 2 vessels).
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Fishing incentives under perfectly competitive ITQmar-
kets
In a fishery under ITQ, the quasi-rent of a vessel is not only determined by the value
of its catch and its technical efficiency, but also depends on the cost of quota associated
with the catch. If quota markets in a multi-species fishery are perfectly competitive,
species with low demand for quota gain in attractivity compared to traditionally tar-
geted species for which the shadow value of quota is high. In other words, perfectly
competing ITQ markets generate an economic incentive to redirect fishing effort to-
wards non-binding species. The results of our simulations highlight that if fishers can
respond to such incentives, the fishery’s TAC uptake would be improved compared to
what results from current fishing practices.
It is also worth highlighting here that profit-driven fishing behaviour is also expected
to redirect fishing effort towards species not under quota regulation, especially if they
can be targeted. Problematic if putting the sustainability of unregulated stocks at
risk, governance leakage, or spillover effects, complicate the design of quota systems
in multi-species fisheries, where assigning quotas on all species would reveal extremely
costly if even possible (Squires et al., 1998). Despite the issue not being new in the
economics literature, it has not been quite addressed by management as leakages have
been pointed at in multi-species fisheries where catch limits only apply on a few target
species (Asche et al., 2007; Hutniczak, 2014).
3.4.2 Observations from multi-species ITQ markets
As outlined in our theoretical section, quota markets for jointly harvested species
may not simultaneously clear. As a consequence, the equilibrium lease price of quota
of binding species is a shadow value of their associated catch and that of non-binding
species is null. Whether this is actually observed in multi-species ITQ markets is worth
investigating. McQuaw and Hilborn (2020) report lease quota prices exceeding ex-
vessel prices for several choke species in the US West Coast groundfish trawl fishery.
In contrast, Holland (2013) noted that quota prices for binding species would not rise
above ex-vessel price in the British Columbia groundfish fishery. Interviews with mar-
ket participants from this fishery highlighted that prices of quota units higher than
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ex-vessel prices had a social stigma and was considered as gouging, hence preventing
quota prices to fully reflect the value of quota. Another likely explanation suggested
by Holland (2013) for not observing quota prices rising above ex-vessel price is the
existence of barter or basket trades (i.e. quotas for multiple species being traded in a
single transaction) that could be used to mask the price of the binding species. Basket
trades are common in other multi-species fisheries as noted by Innes et al. (2014b) in
the Australian Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery or Knuckey et al. (2018) in the SESSF.
In New Zealand, quota prices are capped by their deemed value which is again likely
to prevent quota price to fully express the implicit value of limiting quota (Hatcher,
2014b). However, Newell et al. (2005) noted that only 1% of the observed lease prices
approached the level of the deemed value. Although they did not see quota prices for
species without a binding TAC constraint drop to zero, they found a significant positive
relationship between the demand for quota and quota price. Preliminary analyses of
lease markets in the SESSF have shown similar relationship, with non-binding quotas
also having a positive value on lease markets. Instead of the fishery’s rent being only
captured in the quota prices of constraining species, it is more evenly spread across
species, with nevertheless more value attributed to constraining species.
3.4.3 Perspectives for process-based simulation models of multi-
species ITQ markets
The present work advances the explicit representation of processes underlying ITQ
market dynamics in simulation models of multi-species fisheries. However, as just noted,
quota markets in multi-species fisheries feature more complex dynamics than that
modelled, hence highlighting the need for further work in this domain. In this regard,
we could mention three topics upon which research and modelling efforts could focus
for a better representation of the dynamics of multi-species ITQ markets. First, because
of the inherently uncertain nature of the catch in multi-species fisheries, fishers have a
limited ability to anticipate the quota portfolio that they will need to cover their fishing
season. In such context, the option value associated to holding a quota unit should be
considered when estimating its market price. Second, basket trading tends to develop
as multi-species ITQ markets mature and synergies among species establish since they
can diminish transaction costs or reduce the risk of not obtaining the necessary quota
compared to when engaging in several single-species transactions (Iftekhar and Tisdell,
2012; Tisdell and Iftekhar, 2013; Innes et al., 2014b). Yet, very little is known on how
the value of a basket of quotas is determined, which hinders the representation of this
trading practice in simulation models. Finally, there has also been multiple evidence of
70
3.5. Conclusion
social networks developing in non-centralized quota markets (van Putten et al., 2011;
Ropicki and Larkin, 2014; Oostdijk et al., 2019; Vasta, 2019), and influencing quota
price formation (Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009; van Putten et al., 2011; Ropicki and
Larkin, 2014). On one hand, the development of long-term trading relationships can
foster trades as it reduces transaction costs associated to the search of trading partners
(Connor and Alden, 2001; Innes et al., 2014a). On the other hand, trading habits could
be seen as an obstacle to the optimal reallocation of fishing possibilities expected under
ITQs as participants engaged in satisfying relationships have less incentives to search
for the optimal deal.
3.5 Conclusion
This piece of work presents a process-based simulation model of perfectly com-
petitive ITQ lease markets in multi-species fisheries where jointly caught species are
traded on separate lease markets. It explicitly models Walras’ tâtonnement process as
a means to determine the market lease value of quota for multiple species, and is easily
implementable in integrated fisheries simulation frameworks increasingly used to assess
ex-ante management measures. Its application to the Australian Southern and Eastern
Scalefish and Shark Fishery highlights some economic incentives that perfectly func-
tioning quota markets provide in a multi-species context, such as encouraging fishers
to increase their catch of species for which the TAC is not binding, hence leading to
an increased uptake of catch opportunities. Our results also point to a risk of leakage
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management
Abstract
Over the past decade, efforts have been made to factor technical interactions into
management recommendations for mixed fisheries. Anticipating joint productions is a
particularly challenging task which involves a good understanding of their environmen-
tal but also human determinants. Using an integrated ecological-economic simulation
model, we explore the extent to which fishers are likely to alter the species composition
in their catch in a mixed fishery managed with Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQs),
the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. We show that a
significant part of joint productions is determined by the choices fishers make when
deciding on when and where they go fishing, and that overlooking the incentives for
fishers to alter the species mix in their catch strongly underestimates the flexibility of
catch composition in the fishery. These results highlight the importance of capturing
the mechanisms underlying fishing choices when advising TAC decisions in mixed fish-
eries. We also show the hierarchy of species in this fishery, with harvest targets set for
primary commercial species determining most of its socio-economic performance. We
finally discuss the implications of those results for the management of mixed fisheries.
4.1 Introduction
There is now wide recognition that traditional single-species approaches, still the
basis for most tactical management decisions in fisheries, fall short of addressing the
complexities observed in mixed fisheries, where a variety of species are simultaneously
caught in unselective fishing operations. The issue with setting management targets at
the stock level in fisheries with technical interactions is twofold: first the objectives are
unlikely to be met for all stocks simultaneously, leading to situations of over-quota dis-
cards or lost catch opportunities (Ulrich et al., 2011, 2017; Patrick and Benaka, 2013),
and second, they do not address the performance of the fishery per se, particularly
in its economic and social dimensions (Dichmont et al., 2008; Rindorf et al., 2017a;
Hoshino et al., 2018).
Economists were probably the first to argue that knowledge about the technological
structure of a multi-output fishery is critical to successful regulation (Squires, 1987;
Kirkley and Strand, 1988; Jensen, 2002). Particularly relevant to the regulator tasked
setting catch limits in a mixed fishery is information about jointness in inputs and sub-
stitutability between outputs. In firm production analysis, a technology is said to be
non-joint in input quantities when the production of single outputs can be represented
as independent functions of inputs. Non-joint technologies in mixed fisheries represent
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one end of the regulator’s spectrum where catch limits on individual species can be
set independently as they relate to independent production processes. Although there
is little chance for the regulator of a mixed fishery to effectively face this situation,
as their production has generally been shown to be non-separable in inputs (Jensen,
2002), catch limits in mixed fisheries are still mostly set using single-species approaches,
i.e. as if their catch was the result of independent production processes.
As highlighted by Pascoe et al. (2007), rejecting the assumption of separable pro-
duction does not necessarily mean that the outputs are produced in fixed proportions
(which could be referred to as purely joint production and would represent the other
end of the spectrum); they can be substitutable to some extent. In this regard, the
analysis of production functions in mixed fisheries has often evidenced fishery-specific
(Kirkley and Strand, 1988; Jensen, 2002; Pascoe et al., 2007, 2010) and sometimes
fleet-specific (Pascoe et al., 2007) levels of substitutability between species, hereby in-
validating the assumption of purely joint production that is sometimes made when tak-
ing into account technical interactions in management advice of mixed fisheries(Ulrich
et al., 2017). There is today a critical need for the science guiding the management of
mixed fisheries to fully grasp the reality of their operation, which lies somewhere along
the gradient between a collation of independent production processes and a purely joint
production.
The extent to which multi-species catch composition is flexible at the individual
level is the result of: (1) the possibility for fishers to alter their catch composition by
changing their fishing practices (i.e. how they allocate their fishing effort among metiers
using different gears and/or targeting different species in specific areas or periods (EU,
2008, 2010)) and (2) their incentive to do so. The possibility for fishers to change
what they catch is constrained by the technology available to them and the ecosystem
in which they operate. Consequently, margins in selectivity can be classified as either
technical, which relates to improving the selectivity of fishing gears or practices, or
institutional which pertains to providing incentives to fish more selectively, be they
market or social-based (Pascoe, 2010; Abbott et al., 2015).
The present work explores the extent to which institutionally-driven incentives, here
the lease value of quota units, can interact with technical constraints to determine the
effective response in terms of output substitution. An integrated ecological-economic
model representing the dynamics of the fishery and able to simulate different fish-
ing behaviours and incentives was used to investigate the potential flexibility of catch
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composition resulting from changes in fishing practices in a fishery managed under Indi-
vidual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and
Shark Fishery. We present the outcome of different scenarios in terms of Total Allow-
able Catch (TAC) uptake and economic performance of the fishery and discuss some
implications for management such as the possibility to simultaneously reach single-
species reference points and whether management could rely on target reference points
only set for some species.
4.2 The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish
and Shark Fishery (SESSF)
The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) is a
multi-sector and multi-species fishery that operates in Australian federally-managed
waters as well as some state waters under specific arrangements, exploiting from shal-
low to deep-water fishing grounds. The SESSF is currently the largest Commonwealth
fishery in terms of volume caught, and the second most valuable, accounting for 20%
of the gross value of production of Australian federal fisheries (Patterson et al., 2017).
Around 30 species of shark and scalefish are commercially harvested in the area, with a
dozen accounting for more than 75% of the fishery’s Gross Value of Production (GVP).
Management in the fishery primarily relies on output controls on the key commercial
stocks and several by-product species. TACs are currently determined for 34 stocks
based on single-species target and limit reference points and allocated as individual
transferable quotas (ITQs). Introduced in 1992, ITQs brought flexibility in the fishery
(Connor and Alden, 2001) and a growing activity in the quota lease market indicates
falling transactions costs facilitating the reallocation of quota units (Knuckey et al.,
2018). The fishery is commonly divided in 4 sectors represented by different gear types
targeting specific group of species, namely the Gillnet Hook and Trap Sector (GHTS),
the Commonwealth Trawl Sector (CTS), the Great Australian Bight Trawl Sector -
GABTS), and the East Coast Deep-Water Trawl Sector (ECDWTS). In this work,
we focus on the first two since the latter two do not interact with other sectors and
are managed independently. In 2015, there were 123 active vessels in the two sectors
considered, with 110 of these vessels landing more than 1 ton and employing a total of
340 crew members (estimation based on personal communication from the Australian
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences - ABARES)
The fishery is characterized by consistent quota latency, with the TACs of many
species being regularly under-caught (Knuckey et al., 2018). The present work inves-
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tigates whether there are technical impediments to fully catching the TACs of these
species due to the multi-species nature of the catch. We do so by exploring the ex-
tent to which the joint production of 3 selected pairs of scalefish species is flexible,
given the possibility for fishers to operate in different metiers characterized by different
species composition. These pairs, referred to as sub-fisheries in the remainder of the
text, represent various types of joint production summarized in Table 4.1 and are the
following:
— flathead (Neoplatycephalus richardsoni and four other species) and john dory
(Zeus faber) (sub-fishery A): flathead is found in continental shelf and upper-
slope waters in the eastern part of the fishery with most of its commercial catch
coming from trawlers and Danish seiners at depths between 50 and 200m on the
continental shelf (Patterson et al., 2017). Similarly, john dory inhabits coastal
and continental shelf waters with most of its catch taken in 50–200 m depth.
John dory is generally not a targeted species with most of its catch being taken
in the eastern part of the fishery when targetting flathead or catching a mix of
species on the continental shelf.
— flathead and jackass morwong (Nemadactylus macropterus - eastern stock) (sub-
fishery B): like flathead, jackass morwong is found in southern and eastern con-
tinental shelf and upper-slope waters, with greater abundance in the shallower
part of the range, at depths between 100 and 200m (Patterson et al., 2017). In
the eastern part of the fishery, flathead and jackass morwong are therefore at
the heart of technical interactions, with jackass morwong mostly coming as a
by-product of trawl and Danish seine operations targeting flathead. It is however
possible for trawlers to target jackass morwong in specific areas, hence giving
them the possibility to increase the proportion of jackass morwong in their catch.
— flathead and pink ling (Genypterus blacodes - eastern stock) (sub-fishery C): pink
ling mostly occurs at depths between 200 and 1000m and is frequently targeted
by trawlers, and longliners between 300 and 700m on the continental slope. As
a consequence, flathead and pink ling are almost never caught during the same
fishing operations, although they can be harvested by the same vessels. It is for
instance the case of trawlers operating in the east who can either target flathead
or pink ling depending on the fishing area. Danish seiners are restricted to shallow
fishing grounds and hence do not catch pink ling, and longliners operate too deep
to catch significant amounts of flathead.
These four species do not have the same economic contribution to the fishery, with
flathead and pink ling being primary commercial species (respectively accounting for 44
and 11% of CTS and GHTS scalefish GVP in 2015 (Patterson et al., 2017)) and jackass
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morwong and john dory secondary commercial species (respectively 1 and 2% of GVP).
Table 4.1 – Selected pairs of species at the heart of technical interactions in the Aus-
tralian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Their commercial impor-
tance is indicated in parenthesis. Whether it is possible to target each species and/or
simultaneously catch them in "mixed" metiers was deduced from the metier identifica-
tion described in Appendix D
Sub-
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C Flathead(primary)
Pink Ling
(primary) Yes No Yes
4.3 Methods












ITQ market module 
Economics 
Figure 4.1 – Flow chart of the IAM model. Details of the different modules can be
found in Appendix A.
Simulations were run with the integrated multi-species and multi-metier individual-
based model IAM (Nielsen et al., 2018) which has been previously described in (Merz-
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ereaud et al., 2011; Bellanger et al., 2018; Macher et al., 2018; Briton et al., 2019).
The equations of the model relevant for the present study are provided in Appendix A.
The present work builds on the version described in Briton et al. (2019), which models
the dynamics of mixed fisheries under output controls, with TACs set according to a
harvest control rule (HCR) conditioned by fishing mortality targets specified as model
inputs. For the purpose of the present work, this version was augmented with a module
simulating the trading of individual quotas. As represented in Figure 4.1, the dynam-
ics of the stocks are modelled in the biological module with catch information from
the catch module. Stock dynamics include: age-based, age- and sex-based (Methot and
Wetzel, 2013) or global surplus production (Fox, 1970) models. The stock abundance
calculated by the biological module is then used to set the following year’s TACs in the
Harvest Control Rule module. Quotas are then allocated to individual operators who
can decide to lease in/out quota in the ITQ market module. The resulting re-allocation
of quota then constrains individual fishing effort in the short-term behaviour module,
which determines the catch of various species (catch module) and a suite of economic
indicators for individual operators (economic module). As a result of the reallocation
of quota in the ITQ market module, only profitable vessels remain active in the fishery.
The ITQ market module models the formation of quota lease prices in purely com-
petitive markets and their subsequent trading among market participants. Briton et al.
(in prep.a) formally describes the model based on an iterative algortithm mimicking
Walrasian "tâtonnement" process and provides a numerical application to the Aus-
tralian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. Its implementation into
IAM is detailed in Appendix A. As the model iteratively searches for market clearing
prices, the lease price of quota units for which supply of quota (i.e. the TAC) ex-
ceeds demand for it (i.e. expected catches) is null by construction. The null lease price
therefore creates an economic incentive to redirect fishing effort from species with con-
straining TACs towards those with excess TAC.
The short-term behaviour module allows for individual fishing practices to evolve
towards what is profitable for vessel owners. Based on previous fleet-dynamics models
(van Putten et al., 2012; Girardin et al., 2017), the allocation of fishing effort among
various metiers is modelled as a function of a weighted average of two factors: the
historical allocation, and the expected profitability of allocating effort to a particular
metier. At the beginning of each annual fishing season, individual harvesters estimate
the profitability of the metiers they practice (ProfPUE∗) based on the information
available to them at the time, i.e. their past catch rates and costs but the current quota
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lease prices. At time t, the expected profitability ProfPUE∗i,m,t of metier m operated
by individual i is simply its expected profits per unit of effort, i.e. the difference between
expected income from fishing and operating costs (including variable costs such as fuel,


















with cshri the crew share of individual i, Ls,i,m,t−1Ei,m,t−1 the landings per unit of effort of
species s by individual i in metier m in the previous year, ps the ex-vessel price of
species s and qps,t its lease price estimated by the ITQ market module. CvarUEi,m,t−1
represents the variable costs per unit of effort for individual i in metier m in the
previous year, and Cfixi and Cdepi individual fixed and depreciation costs. Relative
profitabilities ProfPUEc (i.e. centred on the profitability of the individual’s least prof-




Following Marchal et al. (2011), the proportion of effort pEi,m,t allocated by indi-








with E0i,m being the original effort of individual i allocated to metier m. When α = 0,
individuals are assumed to operate according to past habits, whereas when α = 1,
effort allocation is entirely profit-driven.
As described in Briton et al. (2019), individuals stop fishing once they have reached
their most constraining quota, which sets their annual fishing effort Ei.
Among the many indicators provided in the model output, we focus on the following
selection for the purpose of this analysis:
— the number of active vessels Nbvt in the sub-fishery at time t, i.e. the number of
vessels catching at least one of the two species and which remained active in the
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with δi,t = 1 if Ei,t > 0 and 0 otherwise. Si(sp1, sp2) = {i, Li,sp1 > 0∨Li,sp2 > 0}
is the set of individuals i in the sub-fishery (sp1,sp2), namely those landing at
least one of the two species (Li,sp1 > 0 or Li,sp2 > 0).
— the annual tonnage of landings Lt in the sub-fishery, i.e. the annual amount





with Si,m(sp1, sp2) = {(i,m), Li,m,sp1 > 0 ∨ Li,m,sp2 > 0} the set of individuals i
and metiers m in the sub-fishery (sp1,sp2),
— the annual total wages of crews Waget in the sub-fishery, calculated as a propor-




(cshri ×GV Li,m,t), (4.5)
with GV Li,m,t the gross value of landings of individual i in metier m at time t
and cshri the share of the revenue of individual i distributed to its crew.





with NOSi,m,t the net operating surplus of individual i, metier m at time t:
NOSi,m,t =(1− cshri)×GV Li,m,t





with Cvari,m,t the variable costs of individual i in metier m at time t and Cfixi
and Cdepi the fixed and depreciation costs of individual i. The latter two are
allocated to metier m based on its share of fishing effort Ei,m,t
Ei,t
.
These four indicators are used to quantify the socio-economic performance of the
fishery and relate to different benefits that can be derived from fisheries. Concerning
the production sector itself, the number of active vessels gives information about em-
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ployment levels, net economic returns measure the surplus of capital owners, and wages
measure the surplus of crew members. The sub-fishery’s landings can be used to proxy
the economic activity of the post-harvest sector (e.g. auction halls, processing plants,
fishmongers) (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010). The amount of fish landed also directly affect
food supply and therefore has implications for the wider society.
4.3.2 Model calibration
Biological parameters
The SESSF Harvest Strategy uses a tier-based approach conditional on data avail-
ability to assess stock status and recommend catch levels (Dowling et al., 2016; AFMA,
2017). Tier 1 assessments provide the highest quality assessments based on the esti-
mation of age- and occasionally sex-based population dynamics. Outputs from those
assessments were used to calibrate the dynamics of the Tier 1 stocks in IAM. Tiers
3 and 4 simply use indicators such as fishing mortality and catch rates to estimate
stock status, without a population dynamics model being fitted to data. Consequently,
important stocks in those tiers were modelled with a surplus production model whose
parameters were either retrieved from Pascoe et al. (2018b) or specifically estimated
for this work. Overall, 16 stocks were dynamically modelled (i.e. with either an (sex-
and) age-based or surplus production model), accounting for 75% of the fishery’s value
in 2015, 4 with age-based dynamics, 6 with age- and sex-based dynamics and 6 with a
surplus production model (Table C.1). Biological parameters are provided in Table C.2.
Landings of the remaining stocks (also referred to as "static" stocks) were calculated
assuming constant landings per unit of effort.
Annual stock recruitment was modelled using a Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment re-
lationship with parameters specified in Table C.2. Uncertainties in the stock-recruitment
relationship of the stocks were modelled as deviations from the stock-recruitment re-
lationship. Formally, the observed recruitment N0,t was calculated as:
N0,t =
4hR0SSBt




2 R̃t ∼ N(µR;σ2R) (4.8)
with h the steepness parameter, R0 the unfished equilibrium recruitment, SSB0 the
unfished equilibrium spawning biomass and Rt the deviation from the recruitment re-
lationship drawn from a normal distribution of mean µR (representing recruitment
shifts) and standard deviation σ2R. Bias in the estimation of the mean associated to
the lognormal distribution is corrected by subtracting the factor σ
2
R
2 in the exponent
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(Methot and Taylor, 2011).
Stock-specific reference points were also calculated from stock assessment outputs:
FMSY the fishing mortality rate maximizing yield at equilibrium and F20 the fishing
mortality rate associated to an equilibrium biomass equal to 20% of its virgin value. The
latter is the limit reference point specified by default in the Commonwealth Harvest
Strategy Policy (DAFF, 2018b). Details about the calculation of both reference points
are provided in Appendix C.1.
Fleet and metier characterization
Multivariate clustering analyses of catch composition at the haul level were carried
out to define metiers by sector following the workflow developed by Deporte et al.
(2012) to define metiers in European fisheries. Some clusters were then aggregated
based on expertise from industry members to adequately describe fishing activity in
the fishery. The same methodology, but this time based on the vessels’ effort alloca-
tion among metiers, was used to define fleets within sectors. Both catch composition
and effort data were extracted from SESSF logbooks. Details about these analyses are
provided in Appendix D. A total number of 12 fleets and 29 metiers were identified in
the fishery and given in Table 4.2. Figure 4.2 illustrates the fleets’ fishing strategies by
showing the proportion of fishing effort dedicated at targeting various species or groups
of species. Fleets are not used per se in the model since vessels are represented indi-
vidually, but are used to aggregate and present model outputs at a meaningful scale.
Catches and fishing days were aggregated at the vessel and metier level to calibrate
the model.
Economic parameters
Ex-vessel price for the various species in 2015 were obtained from Australian Fish-
eries Statistics (Mobsby, 2018). Cost structures were estimated at the fleet level based
on the economic survey carried out in 2015 (Bath et al., 2018) and personal com-
munications from ABARES, and details about the economic calibration are given in
Appendix C.5. The maximal annual fishing effort of individual i (Emaxi) was assumed
to be its maximal observed effort over the period 2010-2015.
The model endogenously determines equilibrium quota lease prices only for the
species explicitly under TAC management in the simulated scenario. As described in
Section 4.3.3, we looked at the joint management of pairs of species, with the control of
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the catch of other species not being explicitly represented in the model. As explained in
Chapter 3, when fishers are assumed to allocate fishing effort based on the profitability
of the various metiers (i.e. α > 0 in Equation 4.2), fishing effort tends to shift towards
metiers catching more of the unregulated species because of the lower quota costs
associated to those metiers. In order to avoid unrealistic effort shifts towards species
not explicitly under TAC management in the simulated scenarios, we exogenously set
non-null quota lease prices for the latter. This was done using data on quota lease


















































Figure 4.2 – Effort dedicated at targeting various species by fleet in the Australian
Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery.
Primary target species are represented in colour scale, secondary target species in grey scale and
black colouring refers to fishing effort allocated to "mixed" metiers, i.e. without a particular target
species identified. The sub-fisheries (A: Flathead - John Dory, B: Flathead - Jackass Morwong and C:
Flathead - Pink Ling) in which each fleet operates are indicated right to the plot.
Source: logbook data aggregated by fleet and metier as defined in Appendix D
4.3.3 Exploring flexibility in joint productions
For each sub-fishery described in Section 4.2, we compared achievable catch com-
positions under two fishing behaviour scenarios: habit- (α = 0 in Equation 4.2) and
profit-driven (α = 1) effort allocation. To do so, we simulated a set of combinations
of fishing mortality targets used in the HCR to set annual TACs for the two species
of interest. Simulations were run over a 10-year projection period and 100 replicates.
The HCR is very simple and calculates annual TACs by applying a fishing mortality
target F targ to the current stock abundance (a detailed description of the HCR can be
found in Appendix A). As in Briton et al. (2019), we identified the operating domain,
defined as the subset of fishing mortality target combinations allowing the catch of at
least 90% of both TACs.
In addition to identifying the operating domain, we also calculated average per-
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formance indicators for the sub-fishery of interest, namely Nbv, L, Wages and NER
respectively being the average through time and across replicates of Nbvt, Lt,Wagest,
and NOSt defined in Section 4.3.1.
4.4 Results


























































(C) Flathead - P.Ling
Figure 4.3 – Operating domains for three pairs of species (Flathead - John Dory,
Flathead - Jackass Morwong and Flathead - Pink Ling) under two scenarios of fishing
effort allocation: habit- (α = 0) and profit-driven (α = 1). The operating domain refers
to the set of fishing mortality target combinations that allow at least 90% of the TACs
of both species to be caught. Fishing mortality rates associated to single-species MSY
are also represented.
Source: output from IAM model.
Starting with the operating domains (i.e. sets of achievable fishing mortality tar-
gets) resulting from a habit-driven effort allocation, one can see that whereas those
of sub-fisheries A (Figure 4.3A) and B (Figure 4.3B) are narrow, that of sub-fishery
C (Figure 4.3C) is wider. A linear operating domain under this hypothesis illustrates
that all vessels catch both species at the annual level (but not necessarily with the
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same metiers), and as they operate under constant effort allocation among metiers,
their fishing effort is constrained by the quotas of both species. A wider operating
domain indicates that there are vessels in the fishery that only catch one of the two
species, hence not being constrained by the TAC of the other one. This is the case
in sub-fishery C as longliners only operate on the continental slope, targeting species
such as pink ling or blue-eye trevalla, and therefore do not catch flathead present at
shallower depths. This situation first requires that both species can be fished indepen-
dently, i.e. by different metiers, but also that some fleets only participate in one of the
two fisheries for economic (not competitive with other fleets), operational (unsuitable
gear) or regulatory (exclusion from fishing grounds) reasons.
The extension of the operating domain under the profit-driven effort allocation
shows that there is flexibility in achievable catch compositions in all three cases.
Whereas it could be easily intuited for sub-fishery C since flathead and pink ling are
caught by different metiers operating at different depths, such flexibility is more sur-
prising for species that share the same habitat such as flathead, john dory (A) and
jackass morwong (B). In the latter cases, fishers have nevertheless the possibility to
alter the ratios in which they catch co-occuring species by fishing in different areas or
at different times within the same habitat. In this case, the greater the targetability of
each species, the greater the flexibility in achievable catch ratios. Indeed, whereas both
the ratios of john dory and jackass morwong to flathead can increase when switching
effort from metiers targeting flathead to more mixed metiers, that of jackass morwong
to flathead can also increase when more fishing effort is allocated to targeting jackass
morwong. As a result, there is more room for manoeuvre in the latter case, illustrated
by a greater expansion of the operating domain in Figure 4.3B than in Figure 4.3A
when allowing for effort shifts between metiers.
Interestingly, our simulations reveal that changes in fishing practices can bring
single-species reference points such as FMSY within the set of achievable targets. This
is for instance the case of jackass morwong and pink ling being potentially harvested
at MSY in the profit-driven effort allocation scenario (Figures 4.3B and 4.3C). In
the 3 cases studied here, changes in fishing practices go towards higher harvest rates
of john dory, jackass morwong and pink ling relative to flathead, as illustrated by
operating domains extending towards the upper part of quadrant. This is a consequence
of most of the fishing effort of the fleets catching flathead (mainly trawlers and danish
seiners in the east) currently being dedicated at targeting flathead (Figure 4.2), hence
constituting a significant amount of effort that can potentially shift towards metiers
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catching more of the other species (john dory, jackass morwong and pink ling) like
mixed metiers or specific targeting of the latter.
4.4.2 Socio-economic performance
Figure 4.4 presents the socio-economic implications of choosing specific manage-
ment targets within the achievable set under the profit-driven fishing behaviour. We
specifically show the number of active (profitable) vessels in the sub-fishery as well as
the sub-fishery’s landed weight, total wages, and net economic returns averaged over
the 10-year projection period and across replicates.
One can notice very different patterns between sub-fisheries A (Figure 4.4A) and
B (Figure 4.4B) on one side and sub-fishery C (Figure 4.4C) on the other side. In-
deed, socio-economic indicators for sub-fisheries A and B are mostly driven by the
fishing mortality target chosen for flathead, which is the key economic species of both
sub-fisheries. This is illustrated by quasi vertical isolines for most indicators in Fig-
ures 4.4A and 4.4B, meaning that for a given harvest rate for flathead, the choice of
the management target for either jackass morwong (B) or john dory (A) makes little
difference to the fishery’s socio-economic performance. One can also see that in these
two sub-fisheries, the number of active vessels as well as the the sub-fishery’s landings
and crew wages are maximized under the highest harvest rates of flathead. Net eco-
nomic returns, however, are maximized under lower harvest rates, a well-known result
in fisheries economics (Gordon, 1954).
On the other hand, the performance of sub-fishery C is clearly dependent on the
targets imposed on both species as shown by Figure 4.4C. This is a consequence of
both flathead and pink ling being economically important for the fishery. Similarly
to sub-fisheries A and B, the number of active vessels, total landings and wages in
sub-fishery C are maximized at the highest harvest rates of both species, whereas the
maximum of NER is reached under lower harvest rates of both species.
It is important to remember that the indicators’ values displayed on Figure 4.4
are 10-year averages starting from the reference year and not long-term equilibria.
This partly explains why sub-fishery’s landings can be maximized under higher fishing
mortality rates than the equilibrium FMSY reference points. Another reason for landings
to be maximized under fishing mortality rates higher than the single-species reference
points is that landings presented here are not only those of the two species of focus


































































































































































(B) Flathead - J.Morwong
Figure 4.4 – Fishery indicators in the profit-driven (α = 1) fishing behaviour scenario
for the three sub-fisheries.
From top to bottom: the number of active vessels in the sub-fishery, and the sub-fishery’s landings,
total crew wages and net economic returns (NER) averaged over the 10-year simulation period and
across replicates. The blank squares show the fishing mortality rates in the reference year (2015),
dashed lines the singles-species FMSY reference points and the solid lines (when within the operating
domain) the F20 limit reference points.
Source: output from IAM model
SESSF currently have catches and fishing mortality below that which would deliver
MSY, overall MSY in the SESSF inevitably leads to harvesting some key stocks above
their individual MSY, and sometimes above their limit reference point F20.
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(C) Flathead - P.Ling
Figure 4.4 – Fishery indicators in the profit-driven (α = 1) fishing behaviour scenario
for the three sub-fisheries, continued
4.5 Discussion
Our simulations show that there is significant flexibility in catch composition hid-
den in the choices that fishers make, and that changes in their use of already available
options could allow the reconciliation of single-species objectives that cannot be simul-
taneously met under current fishing practices. Interestingly, such flexibility is not only
observed for species that can be caught independently from each other, but also for
species that spatially co-occur. The extent to which changes in fishing practices can
extend the space of achievable catch compositions in the latter case is constrained by
the possibility for fishers to increase or decrease the proportion in which they catch
the different species by fishing in different areas or at different times within the same
habitat. This is a strong message to bring to the attention of the scientific community
90
4.5. Discussion
providing TAC advice for mixed fisheries. In Europe for example, the ICES Working
Group on Mixed Fisheries Advice (WGMIXFISH-Advice) provides the European Com-
mission with alternative harvest rates within ranges around MSY so that TACs can
better match the ratios in which individual species are currently caught (ICES, 2017b;
Ulrich et al., 2017). By doing so, ICES has taken the path of accommodating man-
agement objectives to current fishing practices. However, this work shows that there
is also room for fishing practices to adapt to the regulation, hence suggesting that
appropriate approaches for the management of mixed fisheries are likely going to lie
between traditional single-species approaches, simply ignoring mixed fisheries interac-
tions, and those assuming that species are caught in absolutely fixed proportions. In
this regard, TAC advice in mixed fisheries would benefit from an improved accounting
of the mechanisms shaping joint productions.
Although our simulations suggest that catch composition in the SESSF is quite
flexible, we would argue that the light grey operating domains in Figure 4.3 provide
a rather optimistic estimation of such flexibility. First, they result from fishers only
allocating their effort based on the profitability of the metiers. Fishers are however
likely to be constrained by external factors such as seasonality in species availability or
weather conditions restricting access to certain fishing grounds. Exogenous constraints
on the time allocated to each metier could be imposed to reflect known constraints
pertaining to non-modelled processes. Limited demand on the market of some species
may also restrict what fishers catch, which could be addressed by accounting for market
dynamics in the model and will be the object of future work. Finally, these operating
domains result from perfectly functioning quota markets where all lessees find a leaser
at equilibrium. However, frictions in quota markets caused by operators trading quotas
in a context of uncertainty in what will be caught and without perfect information on
quota supply and demand can limit the malleability of fishing practices (Innes et al.,
2014a; Ropicki and Larkin, 2014). All these reasons could contribute to the perpetua-
tion of fishing habits observed in many fisheries worldwide (Holland and Sutinen, 1999;
Hutton et al., 2004; Marchal et al., 2009, 2013; Girardin et al., 2017), which could be
accounted for by specifically estimating the parameter α driving fishing dynamics in
the fishery, as done by Marchal et al. (2013) for the French deepwater trawlers in the
North Sea. However, such estimation based on past realizations has a limited ability
to capture the full potential of a system’s adaptability. Another way to explore possi-
ble futures of a fishery, while acknowledging that fishers tend to adhere to habits for
reasons that are difficult to capture in a model, would be to consider the cases α = 0
and α = 1 as bounding scenarios for its likely evolution.
91
Chapter 4 – Flexibility of joint production in mixed fisheries and implications for
management
Estimating the flexibility in achievable catch compositions also requires a good
understanding of the production technology, without under- nor over-estimating the
control fishers have over their catch composition. When defining metiers based on a
statistical analysis of the fishing output, as we did, one faces the risk to miss potential
options if they have not (or rarely) been exerted by fishers over the considered time
period, but also that of over-estimating their control over the catch composition if a
diversity in the latter is the result of environmental variability rather than an a fisher’s
intention. Both risks can be mitigated by calling on the industry’s professionals to
complement or reduce the set of metiers produced by statistical methods. In our case,
we addressed the second issue by soliciting fishermen’s expertise to filter out statistical
clusters that did not result from a targeting intention, and merge them into a "mixed"
metier as described in Appendix D. The spatio-temporal resolution at which catch data
is available can also prevent an adequate determination of joint productions since catch
composition can be the result of spatially and temporally fine-scaled decisions (Mateo
et al., 2017). However, we do not believe it to be the case here as our clustering analysis
was applied to catch data at the haul level. Finally, mixed fisheries being very dynamic
systems, where fishing strategies regularly evolve in response to species availability,
market demand or management regulations, it is important to regularly update analy-
ses aiming at defining fishing strategies and their resulting catch. This would call for an
institutional set-up for the drafting of advice which incorporates regular re-assessment
of the structure of metiers in a fishery, involving expert input from the fishing industry.
Given a potentially important part of joint productions being born by fishers’
choices (as suggested by this work but also highlighted by several empirical studies
before us such as Branch and Hilborn (2008), Abbott et al. (2015) or Little et al.
(2015)), we can only emphasize the need to pursue research aiming at better under-
standing fishing behaviour in mixed fisheries (drivers as well as limitations), but also to
start using this knowledge to advise on the management of those fisheries through its
implementation in decision-support modelling frameworks. In this regard, we support
the conclusion drawn by Ulrich et al. (2011) that both metier and operator entities
should be represented in integrated models of mixed fisheries since they respectively
materialize the technical and behavioural determinants of joint productions. Whereas
omitting the metier level is likely to under-estimate the flexibility in catch composition
resulting from changes in fishing practices, representing a fishery as a set of indepen-
dent metiers without accounting for their joint operation by individual operators is
likely to over-estimate that same flexibility.
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This work also shows a hierarchy among species in a mixed fishery, with the harvest
targets imposed on the primary commercial species determining most of the fishery’s
production, employment and economic surplus. Secondary species only have a marginal
influence on the overall performance of the fishery. This has practical implications for
management as it justifies setting targets that align with socio-economic management
objectives in priority for the primary commercial species. In this context, we could
imagine the management of secondary species being "only" subject to ecological objec-
tives and subsequent to decisions made for the primary species, with catch limits being
set within the achievable range associated to a given catch limit on the primary species,
and capped by a limit reference point pertaining to stock conservation or wider ecolog-
ical objectives. Although not tested, we can reasonably expect these conclusions drawn
for the SESSF to apply to other mixed fisheries constituted of a few key commercial
species and a suite of secondary species.
4.6 Conclusion
This work advances the on-going development of management approaches specifi-
cally addressing the complexities faced in mixed fisheries. In particular, our simulations
suggest that mixed fisheries are likely to feature an important latent flexibility in their
catch composition, and that changes in fishing practices can broaden the space of
achievable outcomes. Accounting for the behavioural determinants of joint productions
is therefore critical to the provision of relevant TAC advice in mixed fisheries. Moreover,
our results suggest that a hierarchical approach to management may be appropriate for
mixed fisheries, with target reference points meeting socio-economic objectives being
set for the key commercial species, and secondary species being managed so as to steer
clear of ecological limit reference points.
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CHAPTER 5
FROM FISH STOCKS TO FISHERS AND CONSUMERS:
ECO-VIABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN SOUTHERN AND
EASTERN SCALEFISH AND SHARK FISHERY
This chapter is in preparation for submission to Fisheries Research as:
Briton, F., Thébaud, O., Macher, C., Gardner, C., Mobsby, D., Little, L.R. From fish
stocks to fishers and consumers: eco-viability in the Australian Southern and Eastern
Scalefish and Shark Fishery.
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Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery
Abstract
While Maximum Sustainable Yield or Maximum Economic Yield are largely advo-
cated as desirable targets for fisheries management, the analysis of trade-offs associated
with achieving such objectives is generally absent from scientific advice to management.
This work applies the eco-viability approach to a multi-species fishery, the Australian
Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery, characterized by technical and eco-
nomic interactions among harvested stocks. We identify output controls on two key
species of the fishery (flathead and pink ling) that ensure its biological and economic
viability, but also maintain the consumer’s demand for fish. We highlight several trade-
offs related to the distribution of benefits between vessel owners, fishing crews and con-
sumers. Specifically, we show that maximizing the economic returns to vessel owners,
which is the current management target in the fishery, does not maximize benefits to
the society as it impedes the surplus of fishing crews as well as that of consumers.
5.1 Introduction
Since the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem
in 2001, Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) has been adopted by many
jurisdictions worldwide as the new standard for managing fisheries. EBFM recognizes
that harvested fish stocks are not independent resources, and that their connections in
the socio-ecosystem should be accounted for when managing fishing activities (Leslie
and McLeod, 2007; Marasco et al., 2007).
Technical interactions have long been put forward as a critical obstacle to successful
output management in multispecies fisheries. First, they complicate the use of single-
stock target reference points in mixed fisheries, simply because species cannot always
be caught in the proportions prescribed by their respective targets (Vinther et al.,
2004; Ulrich et al., 2011, 2017). Even in jurisdictions where policy objectives have been
formulated at the fishery level, thereby acknowledging its multispecies nature, the com-
plexity and additional data requirements of the models needed to operationalize such
objectives have often impeded their application in practice (Dichmont et al., 2010; Pas-
coe et al., 2015; Hoshino et al., 2018) . Second, increasingly adopted discard mitigation
policies (Karp et al., 2019), and discard bans in their strictest form, have been difficult
to implement in mixed fisheries because of technical interactions. Indeed, the prospect
of fisheries "choking" on species with low catch possibilities (Schrope, 2010; Patrick and
Benaka, 2013) triggered important resistance to implementing effective discard policies
in these fisheries (Fitzpatrick et al., 2019).
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The growing awareness among scientific advisory bodies and management agencies
that technical interactions can hinder the successful implementation of policy objec-
tives in multispecies fisheries has motivated their representation in the models used to
evaluate the impact of management decisions. The representation of multi-species eco-
nomic interactions in such models has however been more sporadic (for a recent review
of fisheries ecological-economic models see (Nielsen et al., 2018)). Economic interac-
tions can concern the output from fishing, i.e. the captured fish, with various species
acting as substitute or complementary products on markets (Sharma et al., 2003; Bose,
2004). They can also pertain to the activity’s inputs. For instance, in fisheries managed
with Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQs), quota costs associated to harvesting a species
depend on the price of quota of jointly caught species. By affecting revenues and costs,
interactions in the economic sphere orient fishing strategies (van Putten et al., 2012),
upon which ultimately depend the ecological and socio-economic outcomes of the fish-
ery. Economic interactions are therefore important to account for in the design and
ex-ante evaluation of regulation measures in multi-species fisheries.
EBFM aims to embrace the four pillars of sustainable development, namely eco-
logical, economic, social and institutional (De Young et al., 2008). However, progress
in EBFM has so far been biased towards its ecological aspects, resulting in poorly de-
fined objectives and management processes on its human dimensions (economic, social
and institutional) (Symes and Phillipson, 2009; Link et al., 2017; Stephenson et al.,
2017). Management objectives relating to the human dimensions are generally stated
in aspirational terms in national (DFO, 2016; NOAA, 2016; DAFF, 2018b) and in-
ternational (EU, 2009) policies, but have minor effect on management of individual
fisheries.Hornborg et al. (2019) also highlighted that the inclusion of the human di-
mension in EBFM has primarily addressed economic sustainability, with less attention
given to social and institutional components. Even the economic dimension is far from
being addressed comprehensively as focus has generally been put on the industry’s
economic performance, to the expense of wider societal economic benefits such as the
surplus of the downstream sector or that of consumers.
In addition to properly defining management objectives, EBFM requires the de-
velopment of methods to embrace a variety of objectives in the management process.
Particularly well-suited to the purpose, the eco-viability approach has been used to
advise on the sustainable management of renewable resources, with nearly half of its
applications being fisheries case studies as highlighted by a recent review from Oubra-
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ham and Zaccour (2018). Fundamentally different from optimization approaches which
seek solutions optimizing an (multi-)objective function, eco-viability looks for solu-
tions that are "good enough", i.e that maintain the system within acceptable bounds.
This echoes Simon’s theory of satisficing (versus optimal) decision-making (Simon,
1956). The multi-dimensional nature of sustainability has been well recognized by eco-
viability studies of fisheries. All recognized the need to ensure its ecological viability,
either through constraints on stock abundance (most frequently chosen) or levels of
bio-diversity (Cissé et al., 2013, 2015). Explicit conservation constraints on by-catch
species from the fishery have also been proposed by Gourguet et al. (2016), hereby
accounting for the ecological impacts from fishing beyond that on harvested resources.
Economic viability has also been given particular attention, although with different
interpretations across case-studies. Some related it to the profitability of fishing fleets,
either directly measured by the generated profits (Gourguet et al., 2013) or its ex-
pression in the lease price of quota in ITQ fisheries (Péreau et al., 2012), while others
also accounted for economic constraints imposed on the remuneration of fishing crews
(Briton et al., 2019; Maynou, 2019), or the depreciation of physical capital (Briton
et al., 2019). Finally, social constraints have sometimes been considered, such as meet-
ing food security requirements (Eisenack et al., 2006; Hardy et al., 2013; Cissé et al.,
2013, 2015), maintaining some level of fishing activity as a proxy for employment in
the fishery (Péreau et al., 2012; Gourguet et al., 2013), or answering the demand of
recreational fishers for "trophy" catches (Thébaud et al., 2014).
The work presented here builds on previous modelling work carried out by Briton
et al. (2019) looking for catch limits on jointly caught species allowing for the French
demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay to remain within an eco-viable space. The con-
straints considered there pertained to ensuring the viability of exploited stocks as
well as the ability of the fleets to be economically profitable by accounting for the
depreciation of the fishing capital and the opportunity cost of labour. Advancing in
the comprehensive representation of sustainability in the eco-viability framework, the
present application to the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fish-
ery (SESSF) also explicitly accounts for the need to maintain affordable fish for the
consumer when managing the fishery, and this through an upper limit on the price of
fish.
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5.2 The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish
and Shark Fishery (SESSF)
The Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF) is a
multi-sector and multi-species fishery that operates in waters under federal jurisdic-
tion as well as some state waters under specific arrangements. The SESSF is currently
the largest federal fishery in terms of volume caught, and the second most profitable,
accounting for 20% of the gross value of production (GVP) of federal fisheries (Patter-
son et al., 2018). Around 30 species of shark and scalefish are commercially harvested
in the area, with a dozen accounting for more than 75% of the fishery’s GVP. Manage-
ment in the fishery primarily relies on output controls on the key commercial stocks
and several by-product species. TACs are currently determined for 34 stocks and al-
located as individual transferable quotas. Catch limits are complemented by several
input controls such as limited entry, gear restrictions, spatial closures and trip limits
for certain species. The fishery is commonly divided in four sectors represented by dif-
ferent gear types targeting specific group of species, namely the Gillnet Hook and Trap
Sector, the Commonwealth Trawl Sector, the Great Australian Bight Sector, and the
East Coast Deep-Water Trawl Sector. The two latter were not included in the present
work as they do not interact with other sectors and can thus be managed independently.
Like other federal fisheries, management in the SESSF is subject to the objectives
and directives of the recently revised Commonwealth Harvest Strategy Policy. The
objective of this policy is the "ecologically sustainable and profitable use of Australia’s
Commonwealth commercial fisheries resources (where ecological sustainability takes pri-
ority)" (Department of Agriculture and Water and Resources, 2018). Fisheries are to
be managed towards their Maximum Economic Yield (MEY), which is defined as the
"[maximization of] net economic returns to the Australian community" (Department of
Agriculture and Water and Resources, 2018). Although the policy specifically states
that fisheries management should benefit the whole Australian community, catch limits
have so far been set so that rents from the fishery are private and the profits of the
commercial fishery are maximized. Nonetheless, the desire to account for the broader
society’s interests in the valuation of fisheries economic returns has been recognized
(Vieira, 2013) and recent academic work carried out by Pascoe et al. (2018b) pro-
posed to include consumer surplus and non-market costs associated with by-catch in
the estimation of MEY. Unlike other Australian fisheries, fish caught in the SESSF
are primarily destined to the national market which makes the accounting of consumer
surplus in the valuation of the fishery’s economic returns particularly relevant.
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5.3 Methods

















Figure 5.1 – Flow chart of the IAM model. Details of the different modules can be
found in Appendix A
Simulations were run with the multi-species and multi-metier individual-based bio-
economic model IAM which has been previously described in (Merzereaud et al., 2011;
Bellanger et al., 2018; Macher et al., 2018; Briton et al., 2019). The present work builds
on the version described in Chapter 4, which models the dynamics of mixed fisheries
managed with Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQs) on several stocks. For the purpose
of the present work, the version described in Briton et al. (in prep.b) was augmented
with a module simulating the endogenous response of fish prices to the amount of fish
landed. A flow chart of the model is presented in Figure 5.1 and the details of the mod-
ules already described in the publications mentioned above are provided in Appendix A.
The model is composed of an operating model representing the dynamics of the fish-
ery, the latter being divided into its resource, harvest and economic components. Linked
to the operating model, the management procedures module models the management
of the fishery with stock-specific Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits determined by
a Harvest Control Rule (HCR) which applies a fishing mortality target F targ specified
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in input to the stock’s abundance calculated by the biological module 1. The following
options are currently available to model stock dynamics: a Fox global surplus produc-
tion model, an age-structured model, a sex- and age-structured model, and a constant
biomass model. TACs are then allocated in the form of individual quotas constrain-
ing individual fishing efforts in the short-term behaviour module. Over-quota discards
are not allowed in the model, and fishers must stop fishing once they have reached
their most limiting quota. The short-term behaviour module allows for individual har-
vesters to dynamically determine their fishing strategy, to be understood here as the
allocation of fishing effort among a set of metiers they can practise. Following Mar-
chal et al. (2011), effort allocation is modelled as a function of the weighted average
between the expected profitability and the effort historically allocated to each metier,
with the weight α given to profitability relative to habit being specified as a model
input. To enable such changes in individual fishing strategies, the ITQ market module
models the trade of quota units among operators. Briton et al. (in prep.b) compared
two extreme scenarios of fishing behaviour, namely entirely profit-driven (α = 1) and
entirely habit-based (α = 0), and highlighted the importance of modelling the fishers’
endogenous response in decision-support simulation tools. To progress along this path,
the present work focuses on the profit-driven fishing scenario (α = 1).
In the present version of the model, the price of fish dynamically responds to the
species’ landings calculated by the catch module. Own- and cross-price flexibilities are










with ps,t the price of species s at time t, Ls,t the landings of species s at time t and
βs,s′ the flexibility of the price of species s with regards to the landings of species s′.
Finally, the economic module calculates a variety of economic indicators at the
vessel level, with an exhaustive list provided in Bellanger et al. (2018). In order to
consider the MEY objective for fishery, while also considering some aspects usually not
factored in, such as the capacity to maintain crews, the present work pays particular
attention to the following indicators:
1. There is no observation uncertainty in the model in the sense that the HCR has perfect knowledge
on stock abundance
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— the individual gross operating surplus (GOS):







(CvarUEi,m × Ei,m,t)− Cfixi,
(5.2)
with cshri the crew share of vessel i, Ls,i,t the landings of species s by individual
i at time t, GV Li,t =
∑
s Ls,i,t × ps,t the gross value of landings of individual i
at time t, ps,t the ex-vessel price of species s at time t and qps,t its quota lease
price as determined by the ITQ market module (see Appendix A for a detailed
description of this module), CvarUEi,m the variable costs per unit of effort of
vessel i in metier m and Cfixi the fixed costs of individual i 2.
— the individual net operating surplus (NOS):
NOSi,t = GOSi,t − Cdepi − Copporti, (5.3)
with Cdepi and Copporti the depreciation and opportunity costs of capital of
individual i.
— Crew wages at the vessel level, with crews being remunerated a share of the
fishing income:
Wagei,t = cshri ×GV Li,t, (5.4)





with FTE the full-time equivalent number of crew.
Some indicators are also calculated at the fishery level, by summing vessel-level
indicators across all vessels operating in the fishery (here, participating in the flathead
and/or pink ling fishery), namely:











(Wagei,t −Wageopport × FTEi,t), (5.7)
2. In the absence of data on the vessels’ initial quota holdings, we assumed in the model that the
totality of quota required to operate had to be leased in.
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with Wageopport the wage of opportunity for fishing crews.
Model calibration for the SESSF
The model was calibrated on calendar year 2015. Details on the calibration of the
biological, catch and economic modules for the fishery can be found in Appendix C
and Briton et al. (in prep.b). The dynamics of fish markets were parametrized based
on own- and cross-price flexibilities estimated for the SESSF by Bose (2004) and only
significant coefficients were kept.
Stock-specific reference points were also calculated from stock assessment outputs:
FMSY the fishing mortality rate maximizing yield at equilibrium and F20 the fishing
mortality rate associated to an equilibrium biomass equal to 20% of its virgin value
(see Appendix C for a detailed description of their calculation).
5.3.2 Eco-viability framework
The present analysis builds on viability thresholds proposed by Briton et al. (2019),
with an additional constraint pertaining to satisfying the consumer’s demand for fish.
Viability constraints
The first sustainability requirement is to ensure the biological viability of harvested
stocks in the fishery by maintaining their biomass above a limit threshold Blim, below
which recruitment may be impaired. Depending on the representation of a stock s in
the model, its biological viability was calculated as:
VBIO(s) = 1 if
SSBs(t) ≥ Blims ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ] for age-based dynamics,Bs(t) ≥ Blims ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ] for global dynamics,
= 0 otherwise.
(5.8)
We used the limit reference point specified in the Harvest Strategy Policy, set at 20%
of the stocks’ virgin biomass, as the threshold Blim below which there is an unaccept-
able risk of recruitment failure (Department of Agriculture and Water and Resources,
2018). Estimations of virgin biomass from stock assessment reports were used to cal-
culate the limit reference points reported in Table 5.1.
Second, the fishing industry should be economically viable which requires fishing
vessels to be able to maintain their means of production, i.e. capital and labour. A
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would secure the renewal of capital (i.e. cover its depreciation) and ensure the remu-
neration of physical capital at its opportunity cost. The 10-year period was chosen
as it figures as a relevant time scale for the renewal of fishing capital. The long-term
economic viability of any vessel i was thus calculated as:
VLT (i) = 1 if NOS(i) ≥ 0,
= 0 otherwise.
(5.9)
In addition to the vessels’ long-term economic viability, we also considered their
capacity to regularly cover their operating costs, i.e. show a positive Gross Operat-
ing Surplus (GOS) every year. This constraint specifically ensures the regularity of
economic performance, a common request from the fishing industry. The short-term
economic viability of vessel i was calculated as:
VST (i) = 1 if GOS(i, t) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(5.10)
The last sustainability requirement for the fishing industry is to maintain fishing
crews in the fishery, which was ensured by maintaining their annual full-time equivalent
(FTE) wage above the opportunity wage of crews in the fishery (Wageopport). The crew
viability of vessel i was thus calculated as:
VCREW (i) = 1 if WageFTE(i, t) ≥ Wageopport ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(5.11)
The absence of wage statistics for the Australian fishing sector makes it difficult
to estimate the opportunity wage of fishing crew in the SESSF. Squires (1988) esti-
mated the opportunity cost of labour in the Pacific Coast Trawl fleet as the mean
wage earned in manufacturing, transportation, and retail trade sectors. We estimated
the opportunity wage of an Australian fishing crew using a similar approach based on
statistics provided in Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016) to be AU$ 68,600 in 2015.
This is above advertised wages found on the Internet in October 2019 and corrected
for wage inflation (between AU$ 50,000 and AU$ 55,000), as well as the minimum
wage for deckhands (which is not restricted to fishing deckhands) in Australian law as
found in FairWork (2019) (AU$ 43,700). A compromise value of AU$ 60,000 was conse-
quently chosen to represent the opportunity FTE wage of a crew member in the SESSF.
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The last sustainability constraint pertains to satisfying the consumer’s demand for
fish by preventing the cost of fish to exceed an upper acceptability threshold. Paying
attention to the consumer’s demand is particularly relevant in our case-study as the
recent review from Christenson et al. (2017) identified the price of fresh seafood and
availability of local fish as substantial barriers to seafood consumption in Australia.
Calculating changes in the cost of fish for the consumer is not straightforward as
it is a function of changes in the price of a set of products that have some level of
substitutability. In this case, indices measuring the evolution of the price of a fixed
basket of products, such as the Laspeyres or Paasche indices, are known to either
positively or negatively bias inflation in this area of expenditure. The Fisher price index,
calculated as the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, corrects the
positive and negative substitution biases respectively associated to these two indices,
and provides therefore a good (and in some cases, perfect) estimate of changes in the




PLt × PPt , (5.12)




s ps,t × Ls,tref∑




s ps,t × Ls,t∑
s ps,tref × Ls,t
,
(5.13)
with ps,t and Ls,t respectively being the price and landings of species s at time t, and
tref the reference year for the index, chosen here as the year of calibration, i.e. 2015.
The consumer’s satisfaction, or consumption viability was then calculated as:
VCONS = 1 if PFt ≤ PFmax ∀t ∈ [t0; tf ],
= 0 otherwise.
(5.14)
An upper threshold for the Fisher price index was estimated as the maximal value
of the index observed between 2000 and 2015 in the SESSF. The index’s time series
was reconstructed based on price and production data from the Australian Fisheries
Statistics (Mobsby, 2018), and adjusted for inflation with the Consumer Price Index for
"Food and non-alcoholic beverages" provided by Australian Bureau of Statistics (2019).
The maximal price index over that period was 1.2, which represents a 20% increase
compared to the reference year 2015.
Table 5.1 summarizes the viability constraints used in the study.
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Table 5.1 – Acceptability constraints
Aim Name Timescale Related entity Value
Stock
persistence Blim year Blue-eye trevalla 2,475 t
Blue grenadier 10,782 t
Flathead 4,620 t
Gummy shark 3,474 t
Jackass morwong (East) 1,410 t
Jackass morwong (West) 548 t
John Dory 874 t
Mirror Dory 2,678 t
Ocean Perch (offshore) 238 t
Orange roughy (East) 8,327 t
Pink ling (East) 1,534 t
Pink ling (West) 1,429 t
Redfish 2,401 t
School shark 7,215 t
School whiting 1,509 t










period vessel AU$ 0
Maintain
crews Wageopport year vessel AU$ 60,000
Satisfy
consumers PFmax year fishery 1.20
Eco-viability under uncertainty
De Lara and Doyen (2008) and De Lara et al. (2015) formalized the eco-viability
framework under uncertainty. In this case, viability is assessed probabilistically through
Monte-Carlo simulations covering the uncertainty range of the uncertain factor(s). Un-
certainties in the present case relate to the estimation of the stocks’ recruitment.
For each management strategy St described in the following section, probabili-
ties were calculated for each type of viability (PVBIO(St, s), PVST (St, v), PVLT (St, v),
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PVCREW (St, v), and PVCONS(St)) as:
PV (St) =
∑nrep
rep=1 V (St, rep)
nrep
, (5.15)
with the subscript rep referring to the replicate and nrep being the number of replicates.
Each management strategy was run across 100 replicates to account for uncertainties
in stock recruitments and projected over a 10-year period.
5.3.3 Simulation plan
Similarly to Briton et al. (2019), the integrated model IAM was used to identify
achievable and eco-viable fishing mortality targets in a mixed fishery. In Chapter 4 we
showed that the socio-economic dynamics of a multi-species fishery like the SESSF are
mostly driven by its key commercial species, thus suggesting that the latter are the
ones for which the allowed catch will be critical at meeting socio-economic objectives.
Therefore, this application will focus on the joint management of two key species in
the eastern part of the SESSF: flathead and pink ling.
We followed the same simulation approach as in Briton et al. (2019) by simulating
a 2D grid of combinations of fishing mortality targets (F targ) used to set annual TACs
on the two species of interest. A combination in this grid constitutes a particular
management strategy. Within the simulated grid, we identified the operating domain,
namely the area where both TACs are caught by at least 90%. Eco-viability and trade-
offs within the operating domain were then assessed.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Operating domain accounting for market dynamics
Figure 5.2 compares the space of achievable fishing mortality targets under 2 sce-
narios: one where the price of fish remains constant (results retrieved from Briton et al.
(in prep.b)) and one where it responds to the quantity of fish landed. The dynamics
on fish prices affect the economic incentives for fishers to harvest fish stocks. Indeed,
as landings increase, the price of fish decreases, which diminishes economic returns
compared to a situation where prices remain constant. As a consequence, it becomes
unprofitable for fishers to fully catch the TAC when it is set with a harvest rate above
0.18yr−1 for flathead and 0.16yr−1 for pink ling, resulting in the operating domain
shrinking on the top and right ends between the constant and dynamic price scenarios.
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Figure 5.2 – Comparison of operating domains under the constant (i.e. no price reponse
to changes in the quantities and composition of landings) and dynamic (i.e. the latter
responses are considered) fish prices scenarios. The operating domain for the constant
fish prices scenario is reproduced from Chapter 4. FMSY is the fishing mortality rate
maximizing yield at equilibrium for the stock and F20 the fishing mortality rate asso-
ciated to an equilibrium biomass equal to 20% of its virgin value.
Source: output from IAM model
Eventually, the operating domain reduces down to below the MSY reference point for
flathead and slightly above the F20 limit reference point for pink ling.
5.4.2 Eco-viability analysis
Biological viability
The number of biologically viable stocks in each scenario of the operating domain
is given in Figure 5.3. Among the 16 modelled stocks, only 15 can be maintained above
their limit biomass reference point throughout the projection period with a probability
of 90%. The only stock which always fails at meeting the constraint is redfish. Concerns
relative to this stock’s sustainability are not new since it is estimated to have been
overfished since the early 1990’s according to the latest stock assessment (Tuck et al.,
2017). In 2015, the stock was estimated at 4% of its virgin biomass, and depletion levels
after 10 years range from 9 to 11% (median values) throughout the set of our simulated
scenarios (data not shown). The present work was not designed to specifically address
the rebuilding issue of that stock, and therefore, the constraint pertaining to its viability
was released in the remainder of the study. The biologically viable domain refers to the
domain ensuring the viability of the 15 remaining stocks (with a probability of 90%).






















Figure 5.3 – Number of viable stocks (i.e. with a probability of remaining above their
limit biomass reference point above 90%) in the operating domain. FMSY is the fishing
mortality rate maximizing yield at equilibrium for the stock and F20 the fishing mor-
tality rate associated to an equilibrium biomass equal to 20% of its virgin value. The
black square indicates harvest rates in the reference year (2015).
Source: output from IAM model
of pink ling, one of the two stocks under TAC regulation in our simulations. As shown
by Figure 5.3, this stock’s biological viability is ensured with at least 90% probability
for harvest rates below 0.11yr−1. It is worth noting that both FMSY and F20 reference
points are not precautionary with regards to the stock’s sustainability when one starts
accounting for uncertainties around recruitment. Indeed, although the mean spawning
stock biomass of pink ling at MSY is estimated at 25% of its virgin biomass, which is
above the 20% limit reference point, there is more than 10% chance of the stock falling
below its limit reference point given the range of uncertainty on recruitment.
Socio-economic viability
Figure 5.4 shows the values taken by three economic indicators used to assess the
socio-economic viability of the fishery over the range of management strategies in the
operating domain. Values of these indicators that are robust to inter-annual variability
as well as recruitment uncertainties (second column of Figure 5.4) are used to assess
the viability of the fishery. Precisely, the guaranteed NER (Figure 5.4 A.2) and net
crew wages (Figure 5.4 B.2) (resp. Fisher Price Index (Figure 5.4 C)) with a prob-
ability of 90% correspond to the 10th (resp. 90th) quantile of the 10-year minimum
(resp. maximum) value. Positive guaranteed NER and net wages respectively indicate
that the fishery is able to remunerate its physical and human capital. As shown by
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Figure 5.4 – Socio-economic indicators within the operating domain.
First column displays expected values while second column displays values that are
guaranteed with a 90% probability.
A: Net Economic Returns (NER); B: Net wages; C: Fisher Price Index.
The thick black bounding delineates the eco-viable space, defined as the space ensuring
biological and economic viability of the fishery and price acceptability. Dashed lines
show stock-specific FMSY and F20 reference points. Specific scenarios within the eco-
viable space are also identified: the 2015 fishing mortality rates (black square),the one
maximizing the industry’s net economic returns (Max NER), and the one maximizing
the viable fleet size (Max Viab - see Figure 5.5) but which also maximizes net crew
wages and minimizes the price of fish.
Source: output from IAM model
























































































Figure 5.5 – Fleet economic viability within the operating domain.
The plots display the number of viable vessels with a probability of 90% - A: short-term
financial viability - B: long-term financial viability - C: crew viability.
The thick black bounding delineates the eco-viable space, defined as the space ensuring
biological and economic viability of the fishery and price acceptability. Specific scenarios
within the eco-viable space are also identified: the 2015 fishing mortality rates (black
square),the one maximizing the industry’s net economic returns (Max NER), and the
one maximizing the viable fleet size (Max Viab) but which also maximizes net crew
wages and minimizes the price of fish (see Figure 5.4).
Source: output from IAM model
probability of 90% throughout the operating domain as both indicators, namely guaran-
teed NER and net wages, are positive. When interested in maintaining the consumer’s
demand for the fishery’s products, one can look at the maximum price index expe-
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rienced throughout the simulation period, shown on Figure 5.4 C.2. As expected, it
decreases as harvest rates increase, as a result of higher TACs and thus landings. A
guaranteed Fisher price index below the acceptable threshold value of 1.20 indicates
that consumers’ demand is ensured with a probability of 90% throughout the projection
period. Unlike the fishery’s economic viability, constraints pertaining to its biological
(Figure 5.3) and consumption viability restrict the operating domain to the eco-viable
space identified by the thick black lining on Figure 5.4. Within the eco-viable space, the
biological and consumption viability of the fishery are guaranteed with a probability
of 90%.
Economic viability is also assessed at the vessel level in Figure 5.5. Higher harvest
rates, and thus TACs, in the operating domain allow more vessels to be active in the
fishery (Figure 5.5 A). As detailed in Appendix A, individual harvesters who decide
to lease in quota are those that expect positive NOS given the market lease values of
quotas. However, as their expectations are based on the previous year’s catch rates
and fish prices, economic results may differ from the expected value. This explains
why some active vessels do not meet the short- or long-term profitability constraint
(Figures 5.5 B and C in comparison to Figure 5.5 A). Nonetheless, the number of viable
vessels with regards to each constraint is correlated to the number of active vessels and
the number of vessels simultaneously meeting the three viability constraints is maximal
at the upper right corner of the eco-viable space (Max Viab scenario).
5.4.3 Trade-offs within the eco-viable space
The eco-viability framework allows to identify a safe operating space for the fish-
ery. When the latter is not reduced to a single point, it does not completely solve the
manager’s problem, who is left with a set of options. In this context, knowledge of po-
tentially conflicting aspirations within viable options can guide management decision.
Several trade-offs pertaining to the distribution of benefits between vessel owners, crew
members and consumers can be considered. Whereas the surplus to vessel owners (i.e.
the fishery’s expected NER) is maximized at the upper left corner of the eco-viable
space (Max NER scenario - Figure 5.4 A.1), that of consumers (proxied by the in-
verse of the expected Fisher price Index) and crews (i.e. expected net crew wages) are
maximized at its upper right corner (Max Viab scenario - Figures 5.4 B.1 and C.1).
As already highlighted, this is also where the number of economically viable vessels is
maximized (Figure 5.5).
These trade-offs are also represented on the radar plot in Figure 5.6 for the set
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Figure 5.6 – Socio-economic trade-offs within the eco-viable space.
Variables have been scaled to the maximal value within the eco-viable space. The
low price index refers to the inverse of the expected Fisher price index shown in Fig-
ure 5.4 C.1 and is used as a proxy for the surplus of consumers, NER is the expected
NER as shown in Figure 5.4 A.1, Net Wages are the expected net crew wages as shown
in Figure 5.4 B.1 and the viable fleet size is the number of vessels simultaneously meet-
ing the three viability constraints and is deduced from Figure5.5.
Source: output from IAM model
of scenarios mentioned above. On this figure, the variable "Viable fleet size" refers to
the number of vessels simultaneously meeting the three fleet viability constraints (with
a probability of 90%), and all variables have been normalized relative to their maxi-
mum value within the eco-viable space. The inverse of the expected Fisher price index
(referred to as "Low price index") was used as a proxy for the consumer surplus. Max-
imizing the fishery’s profits to an expected NER of AU$16.9M is expected to increase
the cost of fish by 11% compared to 2015, generate AU$10.9M of wages and sustain an
economically viable fleet of 26 vessels. Maximizing consumer surplus, crew surplus and
fleet size would decrease the cost of fish by 7% relative to 2015, generate AU$11.9M of
net wages, allow a viable fleet of 31 vessels but generate profits of AU$14.4M, that is
86% of its maximal value.
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5.5 Discussion
5.5.1 Definition of sustainability thresholds
The identification of thresholds separating safe from risky evolutions of the system
is a critical, and certainly not trivial, step in the eco-viability approach. Regarding a
stock’s biological viability for instance, there is no real consensus emerging from the sci-
entific literature on how to define reference points for recruitment overfishing. Haddon
et al. (2012) traced the emergence of B20 as a limit reference point for Australian federal
fisheries back to Beddington and Cook (1983), but mostly the report from Restrepo
et al. (1998). They note that despite the lack of empirical basis for this value, actually
being a proxy for the 0.5BMSY reference point, it has been adopted for the manage-
ment of Australian federal fisheries. This limit reference point is therefore more likely
to represent a value people have agreed on at some point in time, rather than a viabil-
ity threshold stricto sensu. Some good practices identified by Sainsbury (2008) could
be considered to refine the biological thresholds used in viability analyses of the fishery.
Also linked to biological reference points, we noted that Fmsy is not always a pre-
cautionary target in the sense specified by the Harvest Strategy Policy. Indeed, it can
drive a stock below its limit reference point B20 more than 1 year out of 10 if uncer-
tainties around recruitment are accounted for. This is something we observed for the
eastern stock of pink ling in the SESSF and it is not the unique observation of the kind
as it has also been reported for hoki in New Zealand, which contributed to BMSY not
being chosen as a management target for this stock (Punt et al., 2014).
The work presented here is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to incorporate a
constraint pertaining to the prices to consumers in a fishery’s eco-viability analysis.
The two facets of the constraint, namely the indicator chosen and its threshold value,
can be discussed. Regarding the indicator, we used the fishery’s Fisher price index as a
proxy for consumer surplus. The fishery’s price index only partially reflects consumer
surplus, which can be compounded by multiple drivers of changes in the availability and
price of substitute and complementary products external to the fishery (e.g. imported
fish (Ruello, 2011) or Australian farmed salmon). However, such external effects were
out of scope of the present work which aimed at assessing the impact on consumers
on management decisions made for the fishery, thus legitimating the use of a fishery-
focused proxy. As the maximal observed value of the fishery’s Fisher price index over
the past 15 years, the considered threshold on price allows identifying TAC decisions
that maintain consumer surplus within recent baselines. However, the present value
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shall not be interpreted as an acceptable threshold of loss of consumer surplus, whose
definition is ultimately a political decision that goes beyond the task of the scientist.
5.5.2 From sustainability to trade-offs
A large scale European project working on the definition of fisheries management
objectives encompassing the multiple dimensions of sustainability concluded that man-
agement objectives either take the form of constraints (referred to as "sustainabil-
ity objectives") or quantities to maximize (referred to as "maximization objectives")
Rindorf et al. (2017b). Importantly, the latter authors found a broad agreement among
stakeholder groups that maximization should only occur within the "sustainable area",
hereby highlighting the priority given to sustainability against the maximization of any
specific objective. The two-step approach that we used here also prioritized sustain-
ability constraints and could be used to operationalize prioritization of objectives. The
eco-viability approach allows the identification of a safe control space for the system,
respecting minimum standards with regards to the several pillars of sustainability (the
"sustainable area" from Rindorf et al. (2017b)). In this particular application, we show
that maximizing the fishery’s profits is not en eco-viable trajectory as it breaches both
the biological constraint on pink ling and the threshold imposed on the price of fish.
Our second step was to identify the options for maximizing particular quantities
and present the trade-offs associated with each objective. Not only is the knowledge of
potential trade-offs essential for being explicit with management decisions, but is also
useful to the wider society as it provides transparency to the compromises underlying
decision. In particular, we highlight a conflict between the surplus of vessel owners and
that of consumers. Our results echoes the work carried out by Pascoe et al. (2018a)
in the SESSF who showed that accounting for consumer surplus in the estimation of
MEY resulted in a net transfer of benefits from producers to consumers.
We also highlight a divergence of interests between vessel owners and crew members.
The extent to which both differ depends on the remuneration system of fishing crews. As
noted by Guillen et al. (2017), shared remuneration systems (also called lay systems)
have been commonly adopted in fisheries worldwide to make crews capture part of
the rent from fishing, hence bringing their incentives in closer alignment to that of
vessels owners. Such systems nevertheless vary in what is shared between vessel owners
and crews. In some cases, crews get a share of the revenue and costs are born by vessel
owners, which is the usual case in the SESSF. There are also situations where operating
costs such as fuel, bait, ice or the lease of quota are jointly born by crews and vessel
owners. Intuitively, the more costs are shared, the more the surplus of crews aligns
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with that of vessel owners. This is indeed what we see when simulating a remuneration
of crew indexed on the income from fishing minus variable costs (Appendix F). It is
nonetheless important to point out that both scenarios assume a constant rate for crew
shares, which does not capture adjustments that can be made by vessel owners to align
their remuneration to the labour market.
5.5.3 Market dynamics in multispecies fisheries: what is the
added-value for management advice?
Using the same simulation approach as followed here, Briton et al. (in prep.b) deter-
mined achievable catch compositions for several species pairs in the SESSF and noted
significant room to manoeuvre in the proportions these species were caught. For the
purpose of the present work, IAM was augmented with the endogenous representation
of fish market dynamics in the SESSF. Not only does it allow consideration of the
surplus to consumers when evaluating management targets, but it also refined our es-
timation of the operating domain as presented in Section 5.4.1. Specifically, we show
that typical market dynamics, with prices decreasing with supply, lessen the economic
incentive to increase the landings of under-caught species, hence narrowing down the
operating domain obtained under the assumption of constant prices. In addition to
driving individual fishing strategies, market dynamics also determine overall economic
outcomes of the fishery. In particular, they exacerbate the divergence of interests be-
tween producers and consumers, as an increase in price favours the former at the
expense of the latter. These aspects being of notable interest to decision-makers, we
emphasize the value of adequately capturing market dynamics in the models used to
provide management advice. We would also like to highlight that these developments
rely on regularly updated market dynamics, which is currently lacking for this fishery
as their last estimation date back to Bose (2004).
5.6 Conclusion
Embracing the full spectrum of sustainability in the management of fisheries re-
quires a systematic accounting of its economic and social dimensions in what has mostly
been a biologically-focused process. We showed how the eco-viability approach can be
used to identify TAC decisions in mixed fisheries which meet a multitude of biologi-
cal, economic and social sustainability constraints. We also highlight specific trade-offs
within sustainable options. In particular, we show that maximizing the fishery’s prof-
its, which figures as the management target in the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and
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Shark Fishery, comes at a cost for crew members and consumers. Including the surplus
of crews and consumers in the estimation of Maximum Economic Yield would therefore
lead to different Total Allowable Catch decisions.
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The thesis worked at advancing the development of integrated approaches to sup-
port tactical decision-making in mixed fisheries under output-control. Such integrated
advice typically involves accounting for the interactions structuring the dynamics of
mixed fisheries, but also the various facets of their sustainability. To this purpose,
the thesis developed an approach involving eco-viability analyses to evaluate TAC-
setting options for mixed fisheries. The methodology relied on an integrated ecological-
economic model, IAM, and a set of acceptability constraints for the system represented.
The developed methodology was applied to two multi-species fisheries under TAC man-
agement: the French demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay (BoB) and the Australian
Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery (SESSF).
The first section of this concluding chapter summarizes the key results derived from
each Chapter of the thesis. The two following sections are dedicated at presenting the
methodological contributions of the thesis and discussing their implications for man-
agement and policy. The first concerns the representation of mixed fisheries dynamics in
models used to support tactical decision-making and the second relates to the integra-
tion of multiple dimensions in the advice provided for tactical management decisions.
These two sections also allow comparing how both aspects have been treated in the
two case-studies. Perspectives for future work are finally proposed.
6.1 Key results of the thesis
The second chapter of the thesis presents a first application of the developed
methodology to the BoB, with a particular focus on TAC-setting decisions for two
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key species of the fishery, common sole and European hake. The developed methodol-
ogy allowed identifying the set of achievable harvest rates, referred to as the operating
domain, given technical interactions between the two stocks. Specifically, we note that
the operating domain of the fishery intersects with MSY ranges of both stocks and that
MSY reference points are achievable targets. The biological viability assessment shows
that only a subset of the operating domain ensures the biological sustainability of the
four dynamically modelled stocks (common sole, European hake, Norway lobster and
European seabass). Assessment of economic viability at the fleet level highlights over-
capacity in the fishery as no management option allows all fleets to simultaneously
meet the three economic viability constraints, namely the ability to cover operating
costs, depreciation of fishing capital and opportunity cost of labour. We specifically
highlight a trade-off between the remuneration of fishing crews and that of capital
owners. Harvest rates above the upper bound of MSY ranges allow more fleets to cover
the depreciation of capital at a 10-year horizon, but hinder their ability to retain crews.
Yet, with TACs set around MSY for hake and in the upper range of sole’s MSY range,
we expect an increase in the number of economically viable fleets compared to 2016,
the starting year of projections.
The third chapter is specifically dedicated to ITQ markets in mixed fisheries. The
first part provides a theoretical analysis of perfectly competitive quota lease markets
at equilibrium in a context of joint production. Linear programming and duality the-
ory are used to derive quota lease prices at equilibrium. Lease prices for species the
TAC of which is binding are shadow prices capturing marginal profit associated to the
joint catch and vessels’ quasi-rent. In a second part, an iterative algorithm mimick-
ing Walrassian tâtonnement process is used to model the convergence towards lease
market equilibrium. Simulations drawn under two scenarios of fishing effort allocation
(status-quo and profit-driven) shed light on economic incentives provided by ITQ mar-
kets, namely effort shift towards species the TAC of which is not constraining but also
towards species not under quota.
In Chapter 4, simulations involving different types of joint production in the SESSF
highlight how assumptions of exogenous fishing behaviour, which typically underlies
mixed fisheries TAC advice in Europe, underestimate the space of achievable catch
compositions in a mixed fishery under ITQ, and even more so when species can be
individually targeted. The simulations also show a hierarchy of species in the fishery,
with socio-economic outcomes being mostly driven by key economic stocks. This result
suggests that a hierarchical approach to TAC-setting could be envisioned in fisheries
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where a few stocks represent most of the produced value. Harvest targets incorporat-
ing socio-economic objectives could be defined for key economic stocks, while managing
by-products and by-catch with reference points reflecting biological or ecological ob-
jectives.
The fifth chapter echoes the second in its application of a similar integrated assess-
ment of TAC-setting options to the SESSF. Building on methodological developments
carried out in Chapters 3 and 4, allocation of fishing effort, along with the response
of fish prices to landings, were endogenized in the model. This allowed accounting for
the surplus of consumers, alongside that of capital owners and crew members, in the
evaluation of management options. We notably point to trade-offs between the inter-
ests of capital owners on one side, and crew members and consumers on the other side.
This has important policy implications for a fishery whose management must aim at
“maximizing economic returns to the Australian community”, but where TACs are still
set so as to maximize those to capital owners. Typically, accounting for the surplus of
consumers and crew members in the calculation of Maximum Economic Yield (MEY)
would lead to setting higher TACs than those set to maximize the surplus of capital
owners.
6.2 The representation of mixed fisheries dynamics
in the models used to support tactical decision-
making in mixed fisheries
The thesis has contributed to improving the representation of mixed fisheries dy-
namics in the models used to provide TAC advice for fisheries. The same simulation
framework, namely the integrated ecological-economic model IAM, has been used to
represent the French demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay and the Australian South-
ern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery. The model has increased in complexity
throughout the thesis (Table 6.1) and conclusions drawn from developments undertaken
are deemed of general interest to scholars interested in the sustainable management of
a renewable resource, as well as to institutions in charge of advising TAC decisions in
mixed fisheries.
6.2.1 Modelling the biological dynamics of mixed fisheries
The first difference between the two applications lies in the representation of the
fisheries’ biological components in the model (Table 6.1). In the BoB model, the stocks
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Table 6.1 – Comparison of the models for the two studied fisheries: the French demersal
fishery in the Bay of Biscay (BoB) and the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish
and Shark Fishery (SESSF)









Age-based – Annual: 4
stocks (eastern school
whiting, jackass morwong
eastern and western stocks,
silver warehou)
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(hake northern stock)
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Annual: 6 stocks (flathead,
blue grenadier, pink ling




Annual :6 stocks (blue-eye
trevalla, gummy shark,
school shark, john dory,










710 vessels in 11 fleets 110 vessels in 9 fleets
Number
metiers
13 metiers 36 metiers
Allocation
fishing effort
Exogenous Endogenous with expected
profits and habit as drivers
Quota allocation Exogenous Endogenous through ITQ
markets
Fish prices Exogenous Endogenous through own-
and cross-species
price-quantity flexibilities
the dynamics of which were explicitly represented (hereafter referred to as dynamically
modelled stocks, as opposed to statically modelled stocks for which the catch per unit
of effort (CPUE) is assumed constant throughout the simulation period) were either
represented using an annual age-based model or a quarterly age-based model. In total,
four key stocks for the fishery were dynamically modelled, accounting for 40% of the
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fishery’s gross value of production (GVP). In the SESSF application, 16 stocks were dy-
namically modelled using either annual age-based, annual age- and sex-based or global
surplus production models, accounting for 80% of the fishery’s GVP. It is important to
try to limit the static representation of stocks in bio-economic models as stock effects
are simply not factored in, which leads to excessively optimistic or pessimistic antic-
ipations of economic impacts of variations in TACs. The biological calibration of the
model was mostly constrained by the availability of official stock assessments in both
regions. In the Bay of Biscay, five demersal stocks had been quantitatively assessed
by the EU Commission’s advisory body, the International Council for the Exploration
of the Seas (ICES) at the time of the study (ICES, 2017a). Among them, four were
used to calibrate IAM (common sole, Norway lobster, European seabass and northern
hake), leaving megrim as a static stock given its limited economic contribution for the
modelled vessels and the absence of concerns regarding the status of the stock (ICES,
2016b). The main limitation of this application was the absence of population dynam-
ics for anglerfish, an important stock for the fishery, and this despite (unsuccessful)
attempts to fit a global surplus production model to the data. In the SESSF Com-
monwealth Trawl Sector (CTS) and Gillnet Hook and Trap Sector (GHTS), (sex- and)
age-based population models derived from SS3 stock assessments were used to calibrate
population dynamics for 10 stocks. These models were complemented by surplus pro-
duction models for another 6 stocks, for which there was either no quantitative stock
assessment or one that did not relate to the models already implemented in IAM 1.
Although not as reliable to assess stock status as their age- or length-based counter-
parts, surplus production models have the advantage of being less data-demanding, and
therefore provide an interesting option to model data-limited stocks in bio-economic
models. In the SESSF application, surplus production models enabled the dynamic
representation of stocks accounting for 25% of the fishery’s GVP, which would have
otherwise been modelled as static stocks. Another option to model the catch of species
that cannot be dynamically represented could be to scale the catch or income of static
species on that of the dynamically modelled ones as in Ulrich et al. (2002); Gourguet
et al. (2013); Guillen et al. (2013) or estimate non-linear responses of CPUEs to fishing
effort as in Pascoe et al. (2015).
1. For instance, school shark assessment is based on a close kin mark recapture (CKMR) model
that provides an estimate of absolute abundance without modelling the dynamics of the stocks and
the impact of fishing (Thomson et al., 2020). Another example is gummy shark that is assessed using
a quantitative stock assessment model but relying on different equations that those already coded into
IAM (Pribac et al., 2005; Punt et al., 2016b)
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6.2.2 Modelling fishing activity
The two applications also differed in their representation of fishing activity, both in
terms of the scale at which it is represented and the modelling of underlying dynamics.
They both involved vessel-based models, which is not common among decision-support
models that generally work at the fleet level. Representing individual vessels allowed
taking account of intra-fleet heterogeneity in fishing abilities. Agent-based models also
make the representation of other facets of behavioural diversity possible, such as diver-
sity in motivations, livelihoods or social interactions (Wijermans et al., 2020).
In both applications, fishing activity was modelled as the allocation of effort among
metiers in which vessels can operate, depending on the fleet they belong to. As shown
in Table 6.1, more metiers (relative to the number of fleets) were represented in the
SESSF than in the BoB model. Whereas metiers in the BoB were an aggregation of
EU’s Data Collection Framework (DCF) typology (level 5) reflecting the main fishing
strategies in the area (Macher et al., 2015), those in the SESSF were specifically de-
fined in the thesis through a multi-variate clustering of catch data at the haul level.
Along with inputs from industry members, this quantitative analysis allowed the iden-
tification of existing targeting strategies in the fishery, from the more to less frequent
ones. The resolution at which metiers were defined in the SESSF allowed exploring the
question of vessel-level flexibility in joint production across the fishery. Carrying out
similar analyses in the BoB would likely involve refining the scale at which metiers are
defined in the model in order to effectively match that at which fishing decisions are
being made. In this regard, recent work from Mateo et al. (2017) involving a multi-
variate clustering analysis of catch data in the Celtic Sea shows that DCF’s metier
typology, based on gear type and dominant species in the catch, fails at capturing the
clear spatial structure of the catch composition in the area.
Identification of achievable catch compositions in mixed fisheries being pivotal to
their regulation by output controls, it was also deemed necessary to propose a model
accounting for mechanisms by which fishers can alter the proportions in which they
catch different species. Particularly relevant to the regulator charged to set TACs in
a mixed fishery are information about targeting, avoidance or discarding behaviours,
in order to prevent major “choke” or discard situations (Ulrich et al., 2011). These
topics were addressed in the thesis by modelling how individual harvesters allocate
their fishing effort among multiple metiers. Building on reviews of the drivers of fishing
behaviour (van Putten et al., 2012; Girardin et al., 2017), effort allocation was mod-
elled as a weighted average between so-called habit-based and profit-driven allocations.
124
6.2. The representation of mixed fisheries dynamics in the models used to support tactical
decision-making in mixed fisheries
Whereas there is nothing novel in the modelling approach, its potential for inclusions
in existing advisory frameworks is worth highlighting. This model has the notable ad-
vantage of representing allocation of effort at the metier- and annual-level, which is the
resolution at which catch and effort data is usually available, and thus that at which
models used to support TAC advice are developed (e.g. FCube in the European con-
text (ICES, 2016c)). The thesis focused on the simulation of two extreme scenarios of
fishing behaviour (entirely habit-based or profit-driven) that provide bounds between
which the fishery is likely to operate.
6.2.3 Modelling ITQ markets in multi-species fisheries
The modelling of ITQ markets in multi-species fisheries remains a largely under-
explored topic despite their implementation in a number of multi-species fisheries world-
wide (Sanchirico et al., 2006). A few models can be found in the literature (e.g. Newell
et al. (2005); Little et al. (2009); Bailey et al. (2019)), yet none of them has explicitly
represented the mechanisms underlying the formation of quota lease or sale prices. The
thesis presents an iterative algorithm mimicking Walrassian tâtonement process as the
mechanism determining general equilibrium lease prices for quotas on jointly harvested
species. This model was developed in Chapter 3 and implemented into IAM for SESSF
simulations in Chapters 4 and 5. The model captures core properties of ITQ markets,
such as the allocation of quotas to the most efficient vessels, but also some specifically
emerging in multi-species fisheries, such as the economic incentive to redirect fishing
effort towards more catch of species the TAC of which is not binding, or of species not
under quota regulation.
As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the algorithm can be embedded in broader
simulation frameworks of multi-species fisheries. Nonetheless, the computing time of the
iterative approach proposed can reveal costly for its deployment within regular advisory
procedures. Moreover, the quality of convergence of this model being correlated to the
number, as well as diversity (in terms of catch and costs) of market participants, models
working with fleets as operating units might not support such process-based modelling
approach.
6.2.4 Modelling fish price dynamics
In Chapter 5, simulations include own- and cross-species ex-vessel price flexibilities,
to enable representation of market responses to changes in the composition of land-
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ings, accounting for possible substitution or complementation effects among species.
Accounting for such market dynamics allows broadening the scope of economic assess-
ment, still mostly centred on the fishing industry (Hornborg et al., 2019), by considering
the impact of TAC decisions on consumers aside from that on producers. It can also
highlight inconsistencies between policy objectives (e.g. MEY in Australian federal fish-
eries) and those pursued by management in practice (e.g. maximizing the returns to
capital owners).
Dynamics in fish prices also directly impact the income from fishing and are there-
fore important drivers of harvesting strategies. In a mixed fishery, they will typically
influence targeting decisions as shown in Chapter 5. Indeed, with ex-vessel prices de-
creasing with the amount of fish landed, there is less incentive for fishers to land more
fish. This for instance diminishes the economic incentive provided by ITQ markets to
redirect fishing effort towards more catch of non-binding species. Therefore, in an at-
tempt to determine plausible multi-output production sets in a mixed fishery, it appears
important to also account for dynamics in its output markets.
6.3 Integrating biological, economic and social con-
siderations in the advisory process
The thesis proposed an approach to integrate biological, economic and social con-
siderations when advising TAC decisions in mixed fisheries. This step-wise approach,
refined through the course of the thesis, allows the visualization of different domains
and their interactions as illustrated in Figure 6.1. First, the operating domain de-
lineates achievable harvest rates given technical interactions among jointly captured
stocks (Figure 6.1A). Among technically feasible options, those ensuring biological
sustainability define the biologically viable domain. Socio-economic viability at the
fishery- (SESSF), fleet- (BoB), or vessel-level (SESSF) is assessed in a third phase and
the intersection between biologically and socio-economically viable domains defines the
eco-viable space (Figure 6.1B). Finally, the evaluation of management options across
multiple dimensions allows the identification of trade-offs that are yet present among
eco-viable options, or that prevent emergence of the latter (Figure 6.1C).
6.3.1 Assessing eco-viability
A common eco-viability framework accounting for biological, economic and social
constraints was developed and applied in the two case studies, with yet some variants
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(A) Identification of operating domain
(B) Viability assessment
(C) Evaluation of trade-offs
Figure 6.1 – Developed methodology for an integrated TAC advice for mixed fisheries
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(Table 6.2). In both applications, biological sustainability constraints aimed at preserv-
ing the stocks’ reproducing capacity and took the form of lower bounds on (spawning)
stock biomasses. In the BoB application, these thresholds were the limit biomass refer-
ence points determined by ICES experts and in the SESSF the policy’s limit biomass
reference point B20 (namely 20% of the virgin (spawning) stock biomass) was used.
Overall, biological viability assessment has relied on indicators and reference points
that have often been considered in eco-viability studies of fisheries (Oubraham and
Zaccour, 2018).
The thesis has however contributed to refining economic and social dimensions of
eco-viability frameworks. Whereas most eco-viability applications to fisheries have in-
terpreted economic viability as maintaining positive fishery profits (Oubraham and
Zaccour, 2018), economic viability in the thesis has been decomposed into three con-
straints pertaining to the remuneration of both physical and human forms of capital.
The remuneration of physical capital engaged in the fishery was addressed at two time
scales. First, a short-term constraint on the operators’ gross profits (annual for the
SESSF and bi-annual for the BoB) assessed the ability of producers to cover their
annual operating costs (fixed and variable). Second, a long-term constraint on the op-
erators’ net profits assessed their ability to cover capital costs in addition to operating
costs. The remuneration of human capital is also critical to the fisheries’ economic
viability, which was addressed by an annual constraint on the Full Time Equivalent
(FTE) wage of fishing crews. In the BoB, the minimum wage threshold was defined as
the average wage of a French seaman for the year of calibration. In the SESSF, closer
attention was given to estimating the opportunity wage of Australian fishing crews. To
my knowledge, the work carried out in this thesis has been the only one, with that of
Maynou (2019), accounting for the opportunity cost of labour in a fishery’s eco-viability
assessment.
The SESSF application also considered an additional social constraint limiting in-
creases on prices paid by fish buyers due to changes in landings. Constraints pertaining
to maintaining consumer surplus have, to my knowledge again, never been considered
in eco-viability frameworks. The consideration of this constraint was motivated by the
fact that management in the SESSF aims at maximizing profits of the fishing industry
despite the fishery’s production being primarily destined to the Australian market. This
constraint took the form of an upper bound on the Fisher price index of the fishery. The
value of the threshold was fixed at the maximal observed value over the past ten years,
hereby assuming that past situations were deemed acceptable. Further refinements to
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this first approach could for instance aim at estimating price thresholds that would
ensure that products of the fishery remain affordable for specific social groups.
Table 6.2 – Comparison of viability frameworks for the two studied fisheries: the French
demersal fishery in the Bay of Biscay (BoB) and the Australian Southern and Eastern
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Trade-offs between conservation and socio-economic objectives
Chapters 2 and 5 shed light on conflicts between conservation and socio-economic
targets in both contexts. For instance, both highlighted the biological risk of opting for
strategies maximizing the fishery’s profits. Maximizing the net present value of the hake
and sole fishery in the Bay of Biscay leads to both stocks being harvested above FMSY ,
with harvest rates increasing with the value of the discount factor. This is a direct
consequence of including short-term economic returns in dynamic versions of MEY 2,
making the latter less conservative than its value at equilibrium (Clark, 1973; Grafton
et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2010). In this case, economic returns
at equilibrium are maximized within MSY ranges for both species. With this issue of
2. Dynamic MEY aims at maximizing economic returns along a trajectory, rather than at a specific
point in time, often its value at equilibrium.
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inter-temporal compensation in mind, both the average and minimal Net Economic
Returns (NER) over the 10-year projection period were given attention in the SESSF
application (Chapter 5). It turns out that both are maximized at harvest rates that
hinder the biological sustainability of the pink ling stock. Such an outcome is actually
not unusual in a multi-species context, where the fishery’s economic optimum can lead
to the over-exploitation of some stocks in the species mix (Pascoe et al., 2015; Tromeur
and Doyen, 2018).
Trade-offs related to the distribution of benefits: inter- but also intra-
generational justice
Matters of inter- and intra-generational equity in the distribution of benefits were
also given attention in the thesis. As highlighted by Martinet and Doyen (2007) or
Doyen et al. (2017), inter-generational justice is inherent to eco-viability since all gen-
erations are imposed the same set of constraints. This ensures that there is no sacrified
generation with regards to viability constraints. Yet, inter-annual variability in the
flow of benefits remains and some generations are better off than others. In this re-
gard, guaranteed outcomes (i.e. the minimal value of an indicator over the projection
period) reported in Chapter 5 provide information on what can be ensured to the most
disadvantaged generation. In SESSF simulations, both guaranteed and 10-year average
economic indicators display similar patterns. This means that there is no trade-off be-
tween the fishery’s average performance and that of the most disadvantaged generation.
The thesis also highlights several trade-offs pertaining to intra-generational equity
in the distribution of benefits derived from common goods. First, conflicts between the
interests of vessel owners and crew members were identified in both fisheries. In the
BoB, the ability of fishing segments to ensure the long-term renewal of their physical
capital conflicts with their ability to retain crews. As a consequence, the number of
segments able to remunerate both their physical and human capital is maximized un-
der lower harvest rates than those maximizing the number of segments only able to
remunerate their physical capital. These results highlight the importance of account-
ing for the remuneration of crews in economic viability assessments as it can come to
clash with other economic constraints for the fleets. One could however discuss the as-
sumption of a constant crew share throughout the simulation period as there has been
evidence of vessel owners adapting crew shares in order to maintain crews in difficult
times (Guillen et al., 2017). Considering such adaptive share rates in the model could
thus help reconcile the different facets of the fleets’ economic viability. In the SESSF,
the distribution of benefits between capital owners and crew members does not impede
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the vessels’ economic viability. This is perhaps explained by the fact that the fishery
harvests the two considered stocks below or at their respective MSY, and therefore does
not reach the tipping point of labour productivity identified in the BoB around MSY
for hake and slightly above MSY for sole. However, distributional concerns emerge at
the scale of the fishery as maximizing the surplus of capital owners (i.e. fishery’s NER)
is associated to a loss in that of fishing crews (i.e. fishery’s net wages), and vice-versa.
This is the joint result of the fishery’s NER being maximized under lower harvest rates
than those maximizing the fishery’s income (a classic bio-economic result due to the
linear increase of fishing costs with effort) and crew remuneration being indexed on
fishing revenues.
Second, the inclusion of fish market dynamics in the SESSF application has revealed
another distributional issue, namely that between producers and consumers. Indeed,
maximizing the fishery’s NER comes at a cost for the consumer that exceeds the
considered price constraint, hence excluding this management option from the eco-
viable space. Among eco-viable options, maximizing the sub-fishery’s NER is expected
to increase the cost of fish by 11% compared to the reference year, whereas a decrease
of 7% in the cost of fish would induce NER to be only 86% of its potential maximum.
Using the fishery’s price index as a proxy for consumer surplus shed light on this
trade-off. Yet, this does not enable consumer surplus to be directly compared to that
of capital owners or crew members. A full analysis of such trade-offs would require
estimating variations in consumer surpluses associated with variations in fish prices.
6.3.3 Contributions of the approach to advisory procedures
in both European and Australian federal contexts
In Europe, the FCube methodology is becoming the new standard of ICES for the
provision of mixed fisheries TAC advice to the European Commission. Used in the
North Sea for the first time in 2012, it has subsequently been applied to the Celtic
Sea and Iberian waters and an application to the Bay of Biscay is currently under
development (ICES, 2017b). In its current version, the advice provided by FCube in-
forms on the expected consequences in terms of TAC under- or over-catch of various
fishing behaviour scenarios (e.g. stop fishing at the most constraining quota, fish until
all quotas are consumed, stop at the quota of a given species, etc. . . ). It also identifies
the set of fishing mortality rates within MSY ranges that minimizes the mismatch be-
tween TACs and expected catches given existing technical interactions, hereby guiding
the election of harvest rates within these recently introduced ranges in mixed fisheries
multiannual management plans (EU, 2016, 2018b, 2019a). To date, ICES mixed fish-
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eries advice has mostly focused on the mismatch between TACs and expected catches,
which would correspond to the "operating domain" step from the approach developed
in the thesis (Figure 6.1A). What the latter essentially allows is an assessment of TAC
options that goes beyond likely TAC under- or over-catch to include an evaluation of
their biological, economic and social outcomes. Furthermore, ICES current advice for
mixed fisheries builds on exogenously specified joint productions that do not capture
the fleets’ potential to reconcile catch opportunities and mitigate choke effects.
In the SESSF, despite an explicit fishery-wide MEY objective, there has not yet
been an effort to reconcile TACs for jointly caught species. The first contribution of
the present work has therefore been to factor technical interactions in the TAC ad-
vice. Second, the eco-viability approach allowed confronting a MEY target to a set of
viability constraints spanning multiple dimensions. The current objective of the Har-
vest Strategy Policy for Australian federal fisheries being "the ecologically sustainable
and profitable use of Australia’s Commonwealth commercial fisheries resources (where
ecological sustainability takes priority)" (DAFF, 2018b), the maximization of economic
returns must take place within ecologically sustainable bounds. This objective aligns
closely with the philosophy of the proposed approach which aims at identifying a safe
space for the fishery within which management options can be envisioned. This safe
space could be restricted to an ecologically viable space to meet this first policy require-
ment. Yet, including socio-economic constraints of the type that have been proposed
in this work can ensure that society as a whole benefits from the exploitation of fish
resources, which is another requirement of the present policy.
6.4 Perspectives
The thesis has broadened the dimensions and processes considered when providing
TAC advice for mixed fisheries. Several perspectives can be suggested both for research
and uptake by advisory bodies and decision-makers.
6.4.1 Modelling human behaviour under uncertainty
Precautionary management requires taking account of our limited understanding
of the system when making decisions for the future. It therefore involves accounting
for possible uncertainties on the processes represented in the models used to inform
decision-making. In both thesis’ applications, modelled uncertainties related to the
stocks’ recruitment, yet other types of uncertainties could be considered (Holland and
Herrera, 2009). These could relate to key economic parameters such as fish or fuel prices,
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or catch composition, which is particularly relevant in a multi-species context. Not
only is it critical for models to account for these uncertainties, but it is also important
that they capture the effect that these uncertainties can have on individual decisions.
Modelling human behaviour under uncertainty would indeed increase model realism.
How catch or market uncertainties shape fishing choices or quota trading practices for
instance would be particularly relevant developments to consider in a multi-species
fishery’s context.
6.4.2 Tackling the curse of dimensionality
Integrated ex-ante assessments carried out in the thesis have illustrated their appli-
cability and usefulness in the restricted context of the joint management of two species.
However, multi-species technical interactions and resulting TAC-setting issues usually
involve more species, hence questioning the applicability of the approach in a more
generic context. The curse of dimensionality associated with increasing the number of
catch limits to be reconciled involves two main challenges. The first one relates to com-
puting requirements as the time required to screen all possible TAC combinations is
an exponential function of the number of stocks considered. A possible solution to this
first issue could be to use optimization algorithms in order to efficiently identify search
for solutions satisfying the set of viability constraints. Previous eco-viability studies in-
volving a large number of control variables have for instance used genetic optimization
routines to identify scenarios maximizing the probability of eco-viability, i.e. the proba-
bility that the system simultaneously meets all viability constraints given uncertainties
in the model (Hardy et al., 2013; Cissé et al., 2013, 2015; Gourguet et al., 2013, 2016)
. Single-objective (in these case the probability of eco-viability) optimization is how-
ever only useful when eco-viable solutions exist. More adapted to the alternative case,
multi-objective optimization (also referred to as multi-criteria optimization or Pareto
optimization) methods would allow identifying Pareto optima in regards to the mul-
tiple viability requirements (Emmerich and Deutz, 2018). The second challenge that
emerges relates to the difficulty to process, analyse and convey information involving
many dimensions. Again, the strategy could be to focus on the analysis and communi-
cation of scenarios performing well overall, or on certain aspects, in order to shed light
on particular trade-offs.
6.4.3 Better accounting of ecological dimensions of EBFM
One could legitimately argue that eco-viability studies in the thesis have taken a
rather anthropocentric view on the sustainability issue. Aiming at ensuring the via-
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bility of a fishery, an intrinsically human-oriented activity, the eco-viability framework
proposed here does not really touch on the viability of the ecosystem in which it is
embedded. Calling upon the continuance meaning of sustainability, ecological sustain-
ability can be interpreted as the persistence through time of the processes critical to the
functioning of an ecosystem. Because of their ability to integrate processes happening
at and across various scales, system-level indicators are being given notable attention
in the transition towards EBFM (Tam et al., 2017; Fu et al., 2019; McQuatters-Gollop
et al., 2019). Moreover, recurrently emerging patterns in these indicators might facili-
tate the identification of perturbed states, and thus viability thresholds for ecosystems
(Link et al., 2015; Libralato et al., 2019).
There are mainly two ways in which such indicators and thresholds could be used in
an eco-viability framework. The first option could be to have the ecosystem dynamics
underlying these indicators explicitly represented in the model. By increasing model
complexity one might however step back in terms of reliability for tactical decision-
making. The second option could be to quantitatively relate the value of identified
ecosystem indicators to existing variables of the model. Ultimately, calling on the ex-
pertise of ecologists and ecosystem modellers will be critical to identify the option that
bears the most potential.
6.4.4 Beyond eco-viability
Eco-viability analyses aim at identifying management options that meet a set of
sustainability constraints. Yet, when eco-viable options do not exist, reporting on each
dimension individually can help diagnose underlying conflicts. Notably, shedding light
on conflicts that cannot be resolved with considered management levers can help iden-
tify those that may restore a system’s viability.
Eco-viability assessment may also be not quite sufficient to comprehensively advise
management when eco-viable options exists. Evaluating eco-viable options across mul-
tiple dimensions, as was done in the thesis, is one way to help decision-makers elicit
among them.
A similar approach to eco-viability analysis could also be envisioned to reconcile
aspirations rather than pure viability concerns. It may for instance be viable, but not
acceptable, for the fishing industry to generate profits that are just positive. In this
regard, one could define two strata of constraints, starting from those related to the




(B) Diverging aspirations and distance from
eco-satisfaction
Figure 6.2 – From eco-viability to eco-satisfaction
diversity of aspirations regarding the use of common resources, different satisfactory
domains are likely to emerge and their intersection would define the eco-satisfactory
domain (Figure 6.2A). Even if the latter space is reduced to an empty set, visualizing
individual domains would help appreciate the extent to which aspirations are conflicting
(Figure 6.2B). The mathematical distance between non-intersecting spaces could for







DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE IAM MODEL
A list of the mentionned model’s variables and associated subscripts is given in
Table A.1.
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Table A.1 – IAM variables and associated subscripts, continued
(b) Variables
Variable Signification Unit
N Number of individuals ∅
N0 Recruitment ∅
B Biomass kg
K Carrying capacity kg
r Growth rate yr−1
w Individual weight kg
wL Individual weight in the landings kg
Mat % of mature individuals ∅
MatWt Mature weight kg
SSB Spawning Stock Biomass kg
F Fishing mortality rate yr−1
FLw Mortality rate from landings in weight yr−1
FDw Mortality rate from discards in weight yr−1
D Discard rate ∅
δ
Weighting coefficient for the calculation of
F
∅
M Natural mortality rate yr−1
Z Total mortality rate (F +M) yr−1
E Fishing effort day
q Catchability year−1.day−1
L Landings kg
LPUE Landings per unit of effort kg.day−1
p Ex-vessel price €.kg−1 or AU$.kg−1
qp Lease price of quota €.kg−1 or AU$.kg−1
GV L Gross value of landings € or AU$
cshr Crew share ∅
rtbs Return to be shared € or AU$
Crep Repair costs € or AU$
Cfix Fixed costs € or AU$
opersc Other crew costs € or AU$
Cdep Depreciation costs € or AU$
Copport Opportunity cost of capital € or AU$
CvarUE Variable costs per unit effort €.day−1 or AU$.day−1
GOS Gross operating surplus € or AU$
NOS Net operating surplus € or AU$
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Table A.1 – IAM variables and associated subscripts, continued
Variable Signification Unit
FTE
Full-time equivalent number of crew
members ∅
Wage Wages €or AU$
WageFTE Wages per FTE €or AU$
NWage Net Wages €or AU$
F targ Fishing mortality target for the HCR yr−1
TAC Total Allowable Catch kg
Q Individual quota kg
A.1 Biological module
A stock is either modelled using annual age-based, or age- and sex-based dynamics,
a surplus production model, or a static model which assumes that the total biomass of
the stock remains constant.
Annual age-based dynamics are a simplified version of the age- and sex-based dy-
namics with only one gender. Both aim at incorporating stocks assessed with Stock
Synthesis 3 (SS3) and use the equations provided in Methot and Wetzel (2013) given
below.
Annual age- and sex-based dynamics are governed by:
Ns,g,a+1,t+1 = Ns,g,a,t e−Zs,g,a,t a ∈ [Amin;Amax − 1]
Ns,g,Amax,t+1 = Ns,g,Amax−1,t e−Zs,g,Amax−1,t +Ns,g,Amax,t e−Zs,g,Amax,t
(A.1)
where Ns,g,a,t stands for the number of individuals from stock s of age a and gender
g at time t, which experience a total mortality Zs,g,a,t equal to the sum of natural
mortality Ms,g,a and fishing mortality Fs,g,a,t. The fishing mortality applied to the
stock is the sum of the fishing mortalities by vessel i and metier m (Fs,g,a,i,m,t) and
the fishing mortality exerted by non-explicitly modelled fleets (Fs,g,a,t,OTH): Fs,g,a,t =∑
i,m Fs,g,a,i,m,t +Fs,g,a,t,OTH . Amin (resp. Amax) is the age of the youngest (resp. oldest)
modelled age class.
Fishing mortalities at age by vessel and metier (Fs,g,a,i,m,t) are proportional to in-
dividual fishing efforts by metier, assuming a constant catchability rate:
Fs,g,a,i,m,t = qs,g,a,i,m × Ei,m,t. (A.2)
141
Appendix A – Detailed description of the IAM model





withMats,g,a being the proportion of mature individuals of age a and gender g in stock
s and ws,a their mean weight. Mats,g,a for the non-spawning gender is equal to zero.
Recruitment can be modelled with Hockey-stick or Beverton-Holt stock recruitment
relationships.
Beverton-Holt relationships calculate recruitment N0,t as follows:
N0,t =
4hR0SSBt




2 R̃t ∼ N(µR;σ2R), (A.4)
with h the steepness parameter, R0 the unfished equilibrium recruitment, SSB0 the
unfished equilibrium spawning biomass and Rt the deviation from the recruitment re-
lationship drawn from a normal distribution of mean µR (representing recruitment
shifts) and standard deviation σ2R. Bias in the estimation of the mean associated to
the lognormal distribution is corrected by subtracting the factor σ
2
R
2 in the exponent
(Methot and Taylor, 2011).
Recruitment using Hockey-Stick relationships is given by:
N0,t =
a× SSB × e
R̃t if SSB < SSB∗
a× SSB∗ × eR̃t if SSB ≥ SSB∗ ,
(A.5)
with a the slope of the curve, SSB∗ the SSB at the breakpoint and Rt being drawn
from a normal distribution of mean −σ
2
R
2 to account for bias in the lognormal distribu-
tion and standard deviation σ2R.
The surplus production model is that of Fox (1970) with the dynamics of stock
biomass being governed by:




with Bs,t being the biomass of stock s at time t, rs its growth rate, Ks its carrying
capacity, and Fs,t the fishing mortality exerted on the stock at time t. Similarly to
age-based dynamics, the fishing mortality is the sum of fishing mortalities exerted
by modelled (∑i,m Fs,i,m,t) and non-modelled vessels (Fs,t,OTH): Fs,t = ∑i,m Fs,i,m,t +
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Fs,t,OTH
A.2 Harvest Control Rule module
The management procedures module mimics the process of estimating each year the
TAC for the following year so that the stock will be harvested at a fishing mortality
rate F targ. It is a multi-step process:
1. Projection of :
— the numbers at age (N∗s,g,a,t+1) for year t+1 given a mean recruitment Rmean
and equation A.1 for (sex- and) age-based dynamics.
— the biomass (B∗s,t+1) for year t + 1 following equation A.6 for surplus pro-
duction dynamics.






(ps,g,a × Fs,g,a,t) (A.7)
with δg,a = 1 if age a of gender g is accounted for in the calculation of F , and 0
otherwise
3. Calculation of fishing mortalities at age to reach F targ (for (sex- and) age-based
dynamics):












×N∗s,g,a,t+1 × (1− e−Ftargs,g,a+Ms,g,a)] for (sex-) and age-based dynamics
= (1− ds)× F targs ×B∗s,t+1 for surplus production dynamics,
(A.9)
which are used to set the TAC:
TACs,t+1 = L∗s,t+1 (A.10)
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Schedule effort given quota 
prices (2) 
Calculate aggregate demand 
for quotas (3) 
Set initial quota prices (1) 
Adjust quota prices to 
aim  for clearing markets 
(4)  
Yes 
Is demand for 
quota different 
than TAC for all 
species? 
No 
Trade quotas (5) 
Figure A.1 – Flowchart of the ITQ market module
A.3 ITQ market module
This module simulates a walrassian tâtonnement process to determine market clear-
ing lease prices for quota units. As summarized in Figure A.1, it builds on an iterative
algorithm which progresses as follows:
1. Quota lease prices are given an initial value. 1
For each iteration it of the tâtonnement process (for the sake of clarity, it sub-
scripts will be omitted in the following equations when not necessary):
2. Fishers decide on a fishing strategy by allocating fishing effort among their various
1. Quota lease prices are attributed a quasi-null value before entering the tâtonnement phase. The
advantage of initiating quota prices at a null value is that at they will have to increase for markets to
clear (at least for those who will clear given joint productions). However, given the form of the quota
price adjustment function given in Equation A.15, one cannot start with a null value. Therefore, quota
lease prices were initiated at 0.1% of the species ex-vessel price.
144
A.3. ITQ market module
metiers.
— The effort allocation is modelled as a function of a weighted average of
the metiers’ expected profitability and past effort allocation, as detailed in
Section A.4. The expected profitability of metier m for individual harvester


















if crews are remunerated as a share of the fishing income, and












− Cfixi + Cdepi + Copporti
Ei,t−1
(A.12)
if crews are remunerated as a share of the fishing income - variable costs
(the "return to be shared").
cshri represents the crew share of individual harvester i, Ls,i,m,t−1Ei,m,t−1 the previ-
ous year’s landings per unit of effort of species s by individual i in metier
m, ps,t−1 the ex-vessel price of species s in the previous year and q̃ps,t its
lease price in the current iteration. CvarUEi,m,t−1 represents the variable
costs per unit of effort in the previous year for individual i in metier m,
and Cfixi+Cdepi+Copporti
Ei,t−1
the vessel’s fixed and capital costs per unit of ef-
fort. Relative profitabilities ProfPUE∗c (i.e. centred on the profitability
of the vessel’s least profitable metier), are used in the effort allocation




The proportion of effort individual harvester i allocates to metierm (pEi,m,t)
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with E0i,m being the historical effort of individual harvester i allocated to
metier m and α the weight given to profitability in the allocation of effort.
— Given the planned fishing effort allocation, individual harvester i assesses
whether it is profitable to go fishing. If its average profitability per unit
of effort, ProfPUE∗i,t =
∑
m(pEi,m,t × ProfPUE∗i,m,t), is positive, then the
individual harvester will operate at its maximum effort Emaxi , otherwise it







3. Once fishing efforts are set, the biological and catch modules are called to estimate
individual demands for quota on species s for the current iteration (L∗i,s,t,it).
4. Quota prices are then adjusted for the next iteration to aim for clearing markets
for each species:








with TACs,t being the total allowable catch for species s at time t and λq a fixed
multiplier. 2
Steps 2 to 4 are iterated until total demand for quota is close enough to the TAC





< ε ) or after itmax iterations.
5. Once quota markets have reached equilibrium, quota prices are set at their equi-
librium value (qps,t = q̃ps,t,equ.) and quotas for all species are traded. In a multi-
species context, all quota markets may not clear which requires the trading pro-
cess to be explicitly modelled as all leasers may not find a buyer. Individual net
demands for quota (Demand) are calculated by deducing initial quota holdings
(Holdings) from expected catches at equilibrium (L∗):
Demands,i,t = Holdingss,i,t − L∗s,i,t. (A.16)
Similar to the approach proposed by Little et al. (2009), priority is given to trades
between participants with the highest incentive to lease out or rent quota. The
incentive to take part in a trade is measured by | ProfPUE∗i |. For each species,
quota leasers are ranked by decreasing order of profitability and quota lessors by
2. The value of the multiplier is determined empirically to achieve a satisfying compromise between
the precision of convergence and computing time. Precision will be greater for low values of λ but at
the cost of increased convergence time.
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increasing order of profitability. Trades are conducted by order of priority under
the limit of what is available or needed, i.e min(−Demands,lessor, Demands,leaser),
and so until offer or demand expires. Some quota may also be hold by external
investors which are grouped into an additional market participant. Currently,
external investors are given priority in trades but this could easily be modified. 3
A.4 Short-term behaviour module
The short-term behaviour module determines fishing effort at the metier level for
each individual harvester. It is a 2-step process:
1. determination of the fishing strategy, i.e. the allocation of fishing effort among
various metiers
2. reconciliation of effort against quota constraints on several species
First, the allocation of fishing effort among several metiers is modelled as a func-
tion of a weighted average between habit and expected profitability. At the beginning
of each year, individual harvesters estimate the profitability of the metiers they prac-
tice (ProfPUE∗) based on the information available to them at the time, i.e. their
past catch rates and costs but the current quota lease prices. At time t, the expected
profitability ProfPUE∗i,m,t of metier m operated by individual i corresponds to its














Cfixi + Cdepi + Copporti
Ei,t−1
(A.17)
if crews are remunerated as a share of the fishing income, and












− Cfixi + Cdepi + Copporti
Ei,t−1
(A.18)
3. In the version in Chapters 4 and 5, all quota shares were assumed to be owned by external
investors as information on individual quota holdings was not available.
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if crews are remunerated as a share of the fishing income - variable costs (the "return
to be shared").
cshri represents the crew share of individual harvester i, Ls,i,m,t−1Ei,m,t−1 the landings per
unit of effort of species s by individual i in metier m in the previous year, ps,t−1 the
ex-vessel price of species s in the previous year and qps,t its lease price estimated by
the ITQ market module (Section A.3). CvarUEi,m,t−1 represent the variable costs per
unit of effort for individual i in metier m in the previous year, and Cfixi+Cdepi+Copporti
Ei,t−1
the individual’s fixed and capital costs (depreciation and opportunity) per unit of
effort. Relative profitabilities ProfPUE∗c (i.e. centred on the profitability of the vessel’s
least profitable metier), are used in the effort allocation function to avoid negative
coefficients: ProfPUE∗ci,m,t = ProfPUE
∗
i,m,t −minm(ProfPUE∗i,m,t)









with E0i,m being the original effort of individual i allocated to metier m and α the
weight given to profitability against habit when allocating effort.
Second, individual fishing efforts at the metier level (Ei,m,t) reconciling the various
quota constraints are determined in a 2-step process:
1. Calculation of the effort Ei,m,s,t required to catch the quota Qi,s,t for each individ-
ual harvester i, metier m and stock s, which can be formulated by the following
problem:





Ei,m,s,t = λi,s,t × Ei,t0 × pEi,m,t.
(A.20)
with Li,m,s,t the landings of stock s at time t by individual i in metier m as
calculated by the catch module (Section A.5).
2. Effort reconciliation at the metier level so that each fisherman stops fishing with
metier m either when its most constraining quota is exhausted or when he has
reached the upper limit Emax, i.e.:




Individual landings by metier for species with (sex- and) age-based dynamics are
given by:
Li,m,s,g,a,t = (1− ds,g,a)wLs,g,a
Fi,m,s,g,a,t
Zs,g,a,t
Ns,g,a,t (1− e−Zs,g,a,t), (A.22)
with ds,g,a the proportion of discarded individuals of gender g, age a and stock s, and
wLs,g,a the individual weight at age in the landings of stock s.
Landings of stocks modelled with a surplus production model are given by:
Li,m,s,t = (1− ds) × Fi,m,s,t ×Bs,t (A.23)
Those for static stocks are given by:
Li,m,s,t = LPUEi,m,s × Ei,m,t, (A.24)
LPUEi,m,s being the landings of stock s per unit of effort for individual harvester i
using metier m.
A.6 Fish market module
This module models the response of fish prices to changes in the species’ landings











where Ls,t refers to the landings of species s at time t and βs,s′ the flexibility of the
price of species s with regards to the landings of species s′.
A.7 Economic module
This module calculates for each individual harvester i a variety of economic outputs,





CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL IAM FOR THE BAY OF
BISCAY DEMERSAL MIXED FISHERY
B.1 Biological module
The list of stocks and dynamics used to represent them in the model is provided in
Table B.1. The calibration of population dynamics models (Table B.2) was based on
the following stock assessments:
— European hake: ICES (2017a) - Section 9
— Norway lobster: pers. comm. Spyros Fifas and ICES (2017a) - Section 11
— Common sole: ICES (2017a) - Section 7
— European seabass: ICES (2017a) - Section 14
1. This stock is assessed by ICCAT (see ICCAT (2017) for further information)
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Table B.1 – Modelled stocks in the Bay of Biscay


















(Lophius spp) VIIb-k, VIIIabd X 3 static
European seabass




(Sepia officinalis) VIIIab NA static
European pilchard
(Sardina pilchardus) VII, VIIIabd 2 static
Inshore squids nei
(Loliginidae) VIIIab NA static
Albacore
(Thunnus alalunga) 27 X NA
1 static
Pollack




VIIa-c, e-k, IXa 5 static
Whiting
(Merlangius merlangus) VIII, IXa X 5 static
Meagre
(Argyrosomus regius) VIIIab NA static
John dory
(Zeus faber) VIIIab NA static
European conger
(Conger conger) 27 NA static
Atlantic mackerel
(Scomber scombrus) 27 X 1 static
European anchovy
(Engraulis encrasicolus) VIII X 1 static
Megrims
(Lepidorhombus spp) VIIb-k, VIIIabd X 1-5 static
Rays VIII, IX X 3-6 static
Blue whiting









Table B.2 – Biological parameters
Species Parameter Age














0.07 0.28 0.55 0.41 0.42 0.56 0.56
F weighting
coeff. δa
0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Weight at age
wa (kg)




0.32 0.83 0.97 1 1 1 1





















0.01 0.18 0.57 0.93 1.03 0.68 0.71 0.65 0.65
F weighting
coeff. δa
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Weight at age
wa (kg)





0 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1










































0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
F weighting
coeff. δa
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Weight at
age wa (kg)





0 0 0 0 0.04 0.21 0.51 0.75 0.89 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Discard rate
Da






Species Parameter Morph Sem.
Age







M1 S1 13.77 5.06 2.13 2.54 1.55 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 12.45 4.48 1.86 2.15 1.28 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 11.22 3.92 1.60 1.76 1.02 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S4 9.87 3.44 1.36 1.44 0.82 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2 S1 0.00 11.60 4.88 2.38 2.35 0.86 0.40 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 27.44 10.33 4.28 2.03 1.95 0.71 0.34 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 24.82 9.04 3.70 1.68 1.57 0.57 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S4 22.32 7.92 3.20 1.38 1.26 0.46 0.22 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M3 S1 0.00 5.61 2.36 2.96 1.96 0.31 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 0.00 5.03 2.08 2.54 1.63 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 11.74 4.41 1.80 2.13 1.32 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00







M1 S1 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
S2 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.39 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
S3 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
S4 0.09 0.13 0.29 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
M2 S1 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
S2 0.00 0.13 0.18 0.35 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36
S3 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
S4 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
M3 S1 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.33 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
S2 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.30 0.45 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36
S3 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.33 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32






















Species Parameter Morph Sem.
Age









M1 S1 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.37 0.85 1.19 1.42 1.63 1.86 2.10 2.32 2.53 2.71 2.87 3.00 3.11
S2 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.61 1.22 1.70 2.10 2.49 2.89 3.27 3.62 3.93 4.20 4.43 4.63 4.80
S3 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.76 1.32 1.70 2.01 2.32 2.65 2.97 3.27 3.53 3.76 3.95 4.11 4.26
S4 0.00 0.04 0.32 0.92 1.39 1.68 1.94 2.21 2.50 2.77 3.03 3.26 3.46 3.63 3.77 3.89
M2 S1 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.74 1.12 1.37 1.58 1.80 2.04 2.27 2.48 2.67 2.83 2.97 3.08
S2 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.46 1.08 1.60 2.00 2.39 2.79 3.17 3.53 3.86 4.14 4.38 4.58 4.76
S3 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.60 1.20 1.61 1.93 2.24 2.57 2.89 3.20 3.47 3.70 3.91 4.08 4.22
S4 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.77 1.29 1.62 1.87 2.14 2.42 2.71 2.97 3.21 3.41 3.59 3.73 3.86
M3 S1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.61 1.04 1.31 1.52 1.74 1.98 2.21 2.43 2.62 2.79 2.94 3.06
S2 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.32 0.92 1.48 1.91 2.30 2.69 3.08 3.45 3.78 4.07 4.32 4.53 4.71
S3 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.45 1.06 1.53 1.85 2.16 2.49 2.81 3.12 3.40 3.65 3.86 4.04 4.19







M1 S1 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S4 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M2 S1 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S4 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
M3 S1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S3 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
S4 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F weighting
coeff. δa






Species Parameter Morph Sem.
Age












M1 - 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.01 2.11 3.35 4.67 6.01 7.29 8.48 9.54 10.5 11.3 12.0 12.6 13.1
M2 - 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.77 1.82 3.03 4.34 5.68 6.98 8.19 9.29 10.3 11.1 11.8 12.4 12.9








Appendix B – Calibration of the model IAM for the Bay of Biscay demersal mixed fishery
B.2 Fishing activity and catch module
Table B.3 provides the correspondance between represented metiers in the model
and DCF level 5 categories. Aggregation aimed at representing the main fishing activ-
ities in the fishery identified by Macher et al. (2015).
Table B.3 – List of metiers
Name DCF code
Demersal trawl Nephrops OTBNEP, OTTNEP
Demersal trawl Sole OTBSOX, OTTSOX







Pelagic trawl other species OTMxxx, PTMxxx
Danish Seine SDNxxx
Net Sole GTRSOX, GNSSOX
Net Hake GNSHKE
Net other species GNSxxx, GTSxxx
Longline Hake LLSHKE
Longline other species LLSxxx, LL_xxx
Other All not mentionned above
Effort and catch data at the vessel- and metier-level was retrieved from the SACROIS
database (Système d’Information Halieutique, 2018).
B.3 Economic module
Cost structures were estimated for each fleet segment from 2016 economic data
(Service de la Statistique et de la Prospective, 2016). Fixed costs (Cfix) are the ag-
gregation of repair costs Crep, crew costs in addition to wages Ccrewoth (vacation
and employer contribution calculated based on legislation in force in 2016), and other
fixed costs Cfixoth. Variable costs are the sum of fuel costs Cfuel and other variable
costs Cvaroth (ice, food supply ...). Crew share cshr was calculated as the propor-
tion of crew wages (calculated as crew costs Ccrew minus the additional crew costs
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mentioned previously) relative to the "return to be shared" (i.e. fishing income minus
variable costs). Depreciation costs were calculated according to the Perpetual Inven-
tory Method (PIM) as described in (Onlus, 2006). Vessel prices at construction time
were provided by DPMA.
Table B.4 provides the equations used to derive costs at the vessel level (indicated
by subscript i) from costs structures estimated at the fishing segment level (indicated
by subscript f). Cost structures at the fishing segment level are given in Table B.6.





CvarUEi = (Cfuelf + Cvarothf )× GV LiGV Lf ×
1
Ei
Fixed costs Cfixi = (Cfixothf + Crepf )× GV LiGV Lf + Ccrewothi





Ki = V Pf,V L × V Li
V Pf,V L = Vessel price per meter for vessels of fleet f and length
class V L
V Li = length of vessel i
Depreciation
costs
Cdepi = Cdephulli + Cdepmotori + Cdepeleci + Cdepotheri
with element k linearly depreciated over its life length nb_yrk,
and its price pk calculated as a fraction pKk of vessel value K:
Cdepk = pknb_yrk =
pKk×K
nb_yrk
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Table B.6 – Cost structures for the Bay of Biscay demersal fleets. Costs per fishing
segment are provided as a proportion of fishing income.
Source: Système d’Information Halieutique (2018) and SSP (Service de la Statistique et




nb_crew Ccrew Cfixoth Crep Cfuel Cvaroth
Bass longliners VL0010 1.45 0.42 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.14
VL1012 2.33 0.43 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.13
Danish seineurs VL1840 4.73 0.36 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.12
Demersal trawlers_
outBoB
VL1012 2.64 0.38 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.19
VL1218 3.41 0.37 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.16
VL1824 4.95 0.34 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.18
VL2440 7.50 0.29 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.15
VL40xx 18.26 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.13
Gillnetters_ outBoB VL0010 1.60 0.48 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.14
VL1012 3.23 0.48 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.14
VL1218 4.56 0.44 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.10
VL2440 12.52 0.38 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
Hake gillnetters VL1824 7.89 0.34 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.12
VL1218 7.89 0.34 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.12
VL2440 12.52 0.38 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
Hake longliners
VL0010 2.75 0.49 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.12
VL1012 2.75 0.49 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.12
VL1840 15.52 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.13
Hake longliners_ outBoB VL1840 15.52 0.33 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.13
Mixed demersal
trawlers
VL0010 1.45 0.39 0.14 0.06 0.10 0.12
VL1012 2.13 0.39 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12
VL1218 3.49 0.40 0.08 0.09 0.14 0.14
VL1824 4.77 0.36 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.13
VL2440 7.48 0.33 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.10
Mixed gillnetters VL1218 4.61 0.45 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.14
VL1824 6.17 0.46 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.15
VL0010 1.42 0.40 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.07
VL1012 2.33 0.45 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.13
VL2440 12.52 0.38 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.05
Non-specialized
Nephrops trawlers
VL0012 2.02 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.13
VL1218 2.97 0.40 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.16
VL1824 4.87 0.40 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.13
Pelagic trawlers VL1218 4.86 0.41 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.13
VL1824 5.65 0.38 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.15
Sole gillnetters VL0010 2.15 0.44 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.10
VL1012 3.61 0.44 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.12
VL1218 4.61 0.45 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.14
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VL1824 6.17 0.46 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.15
Specialized Nephrops
trawlers
VL0012 2.25 0.39 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09
VL1218 3.48 0.45 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.10
VL1824 4.87 0.40 0.06 0.13 0.14 0.13
Vessels using active
and passive gears
VL0010 1.37 0.41 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.15




VL0010 1.44 0.35 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.16
VL1012 3.27 0.49 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.18
Vessels using other active
gears VL0010 1.03 0.48 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.11
Vessels using
polyvalent active gears
VL0010 1.39 0.38 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.10
VL1012 2.70 0.39 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.09
VL1218 3.10 0.42 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.15
Vessels using polyvalent




VL0010 2.83 0.48 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.11
VL1012 2.63 0.49 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.13
Vessels using polyvalent
passive gears_ outBoB VL0010 1.13 0.48 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.14
Vessels using
pots/traps
VL1012 1.25 0.42 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.08
VL0010 1.34 0.38 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.12
Vessels using
pots/traps_ outBoB
VL1012 3.07 0.43 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.17




CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL IAM FOR THE
AUSTRALIAN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN SCALEFISH
AND SHARK FISHERY
C.1 Biological module
The list of represented stocks and associated population dynamics models is given
in Table C.1.
Table C.2 provides the calibration of stock dynamics. Parameters for the stocks
modelled with a global surplus production model were either retrieved from Pascoe
et al. (2018b) (School shark, gummy shark and mirror dory) or specially estimated
for this work (Ocean perch, john dory and blue-eye trevalla). The later were carried
out with the package datalowSA (Haddon, 2019) and using time series of catches from
Castillo-Jordán et al. (2018) and catch rates from Sporcic and Haddon (2018). Model
parameters for the (sex- and) age-based dynamics were obtained from stock assessments
carried out by CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere using the statistical framework Stock
Synthesis (SS3) (Methot and Wetzel, 2013). References to those stock assessments are:
— School whiting: Day (2017),
— Silver warehou: Burch et al. (2018),
— Jackass morwong (East): Day and Castillo-Jordán (2018a),
— Jackass Morwong (West): Day and Castillo-Jordán (2018b),
— Tiger flathead: Day (2016),
— Blue grenadier: Castillo-Jordán and Tuck (2018),
— Pink ling (East): pers. com. Sandra Curin-Osorio,
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Table C.1 – Modelled stocks in the Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery
Stock Species Quota IAM dynamics
Blue-eye trevalla Hyperoglyphe antarctica Yes Surplus production
Blue grenadier Macruronus novaezelandiae Yes Age- and sex-based
Blue warehou Seriolella brama Yes Static
Deepwater sharks complete list in Pattersonet al. (2018) Yes Static
Eastern school whiting Sillago flindersi Yes Age-based
Elephantfish Callorhinchus milii Yes Static
Flathead Neoplatycephalus richardsoniand 4 other species Yes Age- and Sex-based
Gemfish Rexea solandri Yes Static
Gummy shark Mustelus antarcticus Yes Surplus production
Jackass morwong (East) Nemadactylus macropterus Yes Age-based
Jackass morwong (West) Nemadactylus macropterus Yes Age-based
John dory Zeus faber Yes Surplus production
Mirror dory Zenopsis nebulosa Yes Surplus production
Ocean jacket Nelusetta ayraud No Static
Ocean perch Helicolenus barathri, H.percoides Yes Surplus production
Orange roughy (East) Hoplostethus atlanticus Yes Age- and sex-based
Orange roughy (South) Hoplostethus atlanticus Yes Static
Orange roughy (West) Hoplostethus atlanticus Yes Static
Oreodories complete list in Pattersonet al. (2018) Yes Static
Pink ling (East) Genypterus blacodes Yes Age- and sex-based
Pink ling (West) Genypterus blacodes Yes Age- and sex-based
Redfish Centroberyx affinis Yes Age- and sex-based
Ribaldo Mora moro Yes Static
Royal red prawn Haliporoides sibogae Yes Static
Sawshark Pristiophorus cirratus, P.nudipinnis Yes Static
School shark Galeorhinus galeus Yes Surplus production
Silver trevally Pseudocaranx georgianus Yes Static
Silver warehou Seriolella punctata Yes Age-based
— Pink ling (West): pers. com. Sandra Curin-Osorio,
— Redfish: Tuck et al. (2017),
— Orange roughy (East): Tuck et al. (2018).
Stock-specific reference points were also calculated from stock assessment outputs.
For (sex- and) age-based stock assessments, FMSY was determined by identifying the
multiplier µs of the current vector of fishing mortality at age Fs,g,a,0 maximizing total
yield at equilibrium (which is the production of yield per recruit and recruitment, both
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being functions of fishing mortality): FMSYs,g,a = µsFs,g,a,0. A single F value for the















with δs,a = 1 if age a is selected for the calculation and 0 otherwise. Youngest and
oldest ages having very small contribution to the catch were removed from the selec-
tion, under the constraint of remaining ages accounting for at least 90% of the catch.
Weighting coefficients δs,a are provided in Table C.2.
The same approach was followed to calculate the limit reference point F20 associated
to an equilibrium spawning stock biomass equal to 20% of its virgin value.
For stocks represented with a global surplus production model, FMSYs = rs and
F20s = rsln( 10.2).
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B2015 r K F2015
Ocean Perch 926 0.69 1190 0.16
Mirror Dory 12849 0.61 13000 0.02
John Dory 1660 0.04 4270 0.04
School shark 6943 0.08 36000 0.03
Blue-eye trevalla 3687 0.08 12375 0.08
Gummy shark 13148 0.38 17369 0.15




























Both 0 245083 0.59 0.00 0 0.00 0.01 0.00
1 134054 0.59 0.01 0 0.02 0.03 0.00
2 71429 0.59 0.16 1 0.03 0.05 0.21
3 32363 0.59 0.38 1 0.05 0.07 0.77
4 10939 0.59 0.51 1 0.07 0.09 0.96
5 4587 0.59 0.56 1 0.09 0.10 0.99
6 1050 0.59 0.59 0 0.11 0.11 1.00
7 345 0.59 0.60 0 0.12 0.12 1.00
8 116 0.59 0.60 0 0.13 0.13 1.00
9+ 63 0.59 0.60 0 0.14 0.15 1.00
Silver
warehou
Both 0 9032 0.30 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
1 4381 0.30 0.00 0 0.04 0.15 0.00
2 3781 0.30 0.02 1 0.23 0.38 0.00
3 1086 0.30 0.04 1 0.52 0.74 0.02
4 895 0.30 0.06 1 0.85 1.11 0.54
5 924 0.30 0.08 1 1.18 1.42 0.90
6 545 0.30 0.09 1 1.48 1.69 0.98
7 176 0.30 0.10 1 1.73 1.90 0.99
8 152 0.30 0.10 1 1.93 2.07 1.00
9 196 0.30 0.11 1 2.09 2.21 1.00
10 70 0.30 0.11 1 2.21 2.31 1.00
11 74 0.30 0.11 1 2.30 2.39 1.00
12 58 0.30 0.11 1 2.38 2.45 1.00
13 68 0.30 0.11 1 2.43 2.50 1.00
14 34 0.30 0.11 1 2.47 2.53 1.00
15 18 0.30 0.11 1 2.50 2.56 1.00
16 14 0.30 0.11 1 2.52 2.57 1.00
17 3 0.30 0.11 0 2.54 2.59 1.00
18 1 0.30 0.11 0 2.55 2.60 1.00
19 1 0.30 0.11 0 2.56 2.61 1.00
20 0 0.30 0.11 0 2.57 2.61 1.00
21 1 0.30 0.11 0 2.57 2.62 1.00
22 0 0.30 0.11 0 2.58 2.62 1.00
23+ 0 0.30 0.11 0 2.58 2.62 1.00
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Both 0 1110 0.15 0.00 0 0.07 0.10 0.00
1 930 0.15 0.00 0 0.10 0.15 0.01
2 780 0.15 0.00 0 0.14 0.22 0.05
3 851 0.15 0.00 1 0.20 0.33 0.24
4 905 0.15 0.00 1 0.29 0.44 0.63
5 765 0.15 0.00 1 0.38 0.53 0.85
6 508 0.15 0.00 1 0.46 0.61 0.94
7 348 0.15 0.01 1 0.54 0.67 0.97
8 144 0.15 0.01 1 0.60 0.72 0.98
9 142 0.15 0.01 1 0.65 0.76 0.99
10 80 0.15 0.01 1 0.70 0.80 0.99
11 74 0.15 0.01 1 0.73 0.83 1.00
12 95 0.15 0.01 1 0.76 0.85 1.00
13 71 0.15 0.01 1 0.79 0.87 1.00
14 83 0.15 0.01 1 0.81 0.89 1.00
15 53 0.15 0.01 1 0.82 0.90 1.00
16 52 0.15 0.01 1 0.83 0.91 1.00
17 16 0.15 0.01 1 0.84 0.92 1.00
18 14 0.15 0.01 1 0.85 0.92 1.00
19 6 0.15 0.01 0 0.86 0.93 1.00
20 9 0.15 0.01 0 0.86 0.93 1.00
21 6 0.15 0.01 0 0.87 0.93 1.00
22 9 0.15 0.01 0 0.87 0.94 1.00
23 6 0.15 0.01 0 0.87 0.94 1.00
24 5 0.15 0.01 0 0.87 0.94 1.00
25 2 0.15 0.01 0 0.88 0.94 1.00
26 2 0.15 0.01 0 0.88 0.94 1.00
27 2 0.15 0.01 0 0.88 0.94 1.00
28 2 0.15 0.01 0 0.88 0.94 1.00
29 1 0.15 0.01 0 0.88 0.94 1.00




Both 0 2342 0.15 0.00 0 0.07 0.11 0.00
1 1978 0.15 0.00 0 0.10 0.16 0.01
2 1702 0.15 0.00 1 0.14 0.23 0.05
3 1343 0.15 0.01 1 0.20 0.31 0.24
4 944 0.15 0.03 1 0.29 0.40 0.63
5 947 0.15 0.04 1 0.38 0.48 0.85
6 585 0.15 0.05 1 0.46 0.55 0.94
7 338 0.15 0.06 1 0.54 0.61 0.97
8 178 0.15 0.06 1 0.60 0.66 0.98
9 183 0.15 0.06 1 0.65 0.71 0.99
10 104 0.15 0.07 1 0.70 0.75 0.99
11 116 0.15 0.07 1 0.73 0.78 1.00
12 144 0.15 0.07 1 0.76 0.80 1.00
13 114 0.15 0.07 1 0.79 0.82 1.00
14 100 0.15 0.07 1 0.81 0.84 1.00
15 28 0.15 0.07 1 0.82 0.85 1.00
16 25 0.15 0.07 1 0.83 0.86 1.00
17 16 0.15 0.07 1 0.84 0.87 1.00
18 16 0.15 0.07 1 0.85 0.87 1.00
19 4 0.15 0.07 0 0.86 0.88 1.00
20 3 0.15 0.07 0 0.86 0.88 1.00
21 7 0.15 0.07 0 0.87 0.89 1.00
22 6 0.15 0.07 0 0.87 0.89 1.00
23 4 0.15 0.07 0 0.87 0.89 1.00
24 3 0.15 0.07 0 0.87 0.89 1.00
25 2 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.89 1.00
26 1 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.90 1.00
27 1 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.90 1.00
28 1 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.90 1.00
29 1 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.90 1.00
30+ 2 0.15 0.07 0 0.88 0.90 1.00
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Flathead Female0 8612 0.27 0.00 0 0.00 0.01 0.00
1 6436 0.27 0.00 0 0.03 0.10 0.00
2 4735 0.27 0.03 0 0.16 0.38 0.00
3 4898 0.27 0.10 1 0.48 0.69 0.57
4 3453 0.27 0.14 1 0.73 0.93 0.76
5 2573 0.27 0.17 1 0.99 1.20 0.87
6 958 0.27 0.18 1 1.26 1.48 0.92
7 1001 0.27 0.20 1 1.53 1.76 0.95
8 367 0.27 0.21 1 1.79 2.04 0.97
9 203 0.27 0.23 1 2.02 2.29 0.98
10 91 0.27 0.24 1 2.24 2.52 0.98
11 49 0.27 0.25 1 2.42 2.70 0.99
12 95 0.27 0.26 1 2.58 2.86 0.99
13 21 0.27 0.27 0 2.72 2.99 0.99
14 12 0.27 0.28 0 2.83 3.09 0.99
15 9 0.27 0.29 0 2.93 3.18 0.99
16 8 0.27 0.30 0 3.00 3.25 0.99
17 6 0.27 0.30 0 3.07 3.30 1.00
18 2 0.27 0.30 0 3.12 3.35 1.00
19 1 0.27 0.31 0 3.17 3.38 1.00
20+ 1 0.27 0.31 0 3.24 3.45 1.00
Male 0 8612 0.27 0.00 0 0.00 0.01 0.00
1 6436 0.27 0.00 0 0.03 0.08 0.00
2 4738 0.27 0.02 0 0.14 0.31 0.00
3 4954 0.27 0.08 1 0.39 0.57 0.00
4 3589 0.27 0.11 1 0.56 0.73 0.00
5 2767 0.27 0.14 1 0.72 0.88 0.00
6 1071 0.27 0.15 1 0.88 1.03 0.00
7 1161 0.27 0.17 1 1.03 1.16 0.00
8 442 0.27 0.17 1 1.16 1.29 0.00
9 254 0.27 0.18 1 1.28 1.40 0.00
10 118 0.27 0.19 1 1.38 1.50 0.00
11 67 0.27 0.19 1 1.47 1.59 0.00
12 134 0.27 0.19 1 1.55 1.67 0.00
13 31 0.27 0.20 0 1.61 1.73 0.00
14 18 0.27 0.20 0 1.66 1.79 0.00
15 15 0.27 0.20 0 1.71 1.83 0.00
16 15 0.27 0.20 0 1.74 1.87 0.00
17 11 0.27 0.21 0 1.77 1.90 0.00
18 4 0.27 0.21 0 1.80 1.93 0.00
19 1 0.27 0.21 0 1.82 1.95 0.00
20+ 3 0.27 0.21 0 1.86 1.98 0.00
168
C.1. Biological module




























Female0 7233 0.17 0.00 0 0.19 0.19 0.00
1 17581 0.17 0.00 0 0.19 0.27 0.00
2 22545 0.17 0.01 1 0.33 0.55 0.00
3 15464 0.17 0.02 1 0.60 0.80 0.04
4 14231 0.17 0.02 1 0.95 1.14 0.22
5 8325 0.17 0.02 1 1.39 1.61 0.55
6 1576 0.17 0.02 1 2.01 2.21 0.77
7 212 0.17 0.02 1 2.37 2.52 0.81
8 288 0.17 0.02 1 3.23 3.33 0.84
9 492 0.17 0.02 1 3.51 3.59 0.84
10 73 0.17 0.02 1 3.41 3.48 0.84
11 225 0.17 0.02 1 3.88 3.92 0.84
12 1319 0.17 0.02 1 3.81 3.85 0.84
13 45 0.17 0.02 0 3.85 3.89 0.84
14 32 0.17 0.02 0 3.91 3.94 0.84
15 9 0.17 0.02 0 3.92 3.95 0.84
16 10 0.17 0.02 0 4.20 4.21 0.84
17 13 0.17 0.02 0 4.20 4.21 0.84
18 47 0.17 0.02 0 4.22 4.23 0.84
19 76 0.17 0.02 0 4.22 4.23 0.84
20+ 1278 0.17 0.02 0 4.15 4.16 0.84
Male 0 7233 0.21 0.00 0 0.18 0.18 0.00
1 16979 0.21 0.00 0 0.18 0.28 0.00
2 21026 0.21 0.01 1 0.31 0.51 0.00
3 13938 0.21 0.02 1 0.54 0.71 0.00
4 12391 0.21 0.02 1 0.82 0.99 0.00
5 6975 0.21 0.02 1 1.16 1.34 0.00
6 1242 0.21 0.03 1 1.60 1.75 0.00
7 156 0.21 0.03 1 1.84 1.95 0.00
8 193 0.21 0.03 1 2.37 2.39 0.00
9 315 0.21 0.03 1 2.52 2.51 0.00
10 45 0.21 0.03 1 2.47 2.46 0.00
11 134 0.21 0.02 1 2.70 2.67 0.00
12 750 0.21 0.03 1 2.67 2.63 0.00
13 24 0.21 0.03 0 2.68 2.65 0.00
14 17 0.21 0.02 0 2.71 2.67 0.00
15 5 0.21 0.02 0 2.72 2.68 0.00
16 5 0.21 0.02 0 2.84 2.79 0.00
17 6 0.21 0.02 0 2.84 2.79 0.00
18 20 0.21 0.02 0 2.84 2.79 0.00
19 30 0.21 0.02 0 2.84 2.79 0.00
20+ 452 0.21 0.02 0 2.81 2.76 0.00
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Female0 698 0.20 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
1 420 0.20 0.00 0 0.07 0.29 0.00
2 210 0.20 0.03 1 0.32 0.81 0.00
3 227 0.20 0.10 1 0.87 1.27 0.03
4 185 0.20 0.12 1 1.42 1.70 0.27
5 131 0.20 0.11 1 2.04 2.18 0.63
6 87 0.20 0.09 1 2.69 2.75 0.86
7 56 0.20 0.08 1 3.34 3.40 0.96
8 55 0.20 0.07 1 3.98 4.09 0.99
9 41 0.20 0.06 1 4.58 4.74 1.00
10 18 0.20 0.06 1 5.14 5.33 1.00
11 21 0.20 0.06 1 5.65 5.85 1.00
12 18 0.20 0.06 1 6.11 6.30 1.00
13 9 0.20 0.06 1 6.53 6.70 1.00
14 6 0.20 0.06 1 6.90 7.05 1.00
15 3 0.20 0.06 1 7.22 7.36 1.00
16 3 0.20 0.06 1 7.50 7.63 1.00
17 2 0.20 0.06 0 7.75 7.86 1.00
18 1 0.20 0.06 0 7.97 8.06 1.00
19 2 0.20 0.06 0 8.15 8.24 1.00
20 1 0.20 0.06 0 8.31 8.39 1.00
21 1 0.20 0.06 0 8.45 8.52 1.00
22 0 0.20 0.06 0 8.57 8.63 1.00
23 1 0.20 0.06 0 8.68 8.72 1.00
24 0 0.20 0.06 0 8.77 8.80 1.00
25 0 0.20 0.06 0 8.84 8.88 1.00
26 0 0.20 0.06 0 8.91 8.94 1.00
27 0 0.20 0.06 0 8.96 8.99 1.00
28 0 0.20 0.06 0 9.01 9.03 1.00
29 0 0.20 0.06 0 9.05 9.07 1.00
30+ 0 0.20 0.06 0 9.11 9.13 1.00
Male 0 698 0.20 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
1 420 0.20 0.00 0 0.07 0.27 0.00
2 210 0.20 0.03 1 0.29 0.78 0.00
3 229 0.20 0.10 1 0.79 1.21 0.00
4 188 0.20 0.12 1 1.33 1.61 0.00
5 133 0.20 0.12 1 1.87 2.01 0.00
6 88 0.20 0.10 1 2.36 2.41 0.00
7 56 0.20 0.09 1 2.79 2.79 0.00
8 54 0.20 0.08 1 3.14 3.13 0.00
9 39 0.20 0.07 1 3.43 3.41 0.00
10 17 0.20 0.07 1 3.66 3.63 0.00
11 20 0.20 0.07 1 3.83 3.81 0.00
12 17 0.20 0.07 1 3.97 3.94 0.00
13 8 0.20 0.06 1 4.08 4.04 0.00
14 5 0.20 0.06 1 4.16 4.12 0.00
15 3 0.20 0.06 1 4.22 4.18 0.00
16 3 0.20 0.06 1 4.27 4.23 0.00
17 2 0.20 0.06 0 4.30 4.26 0.00
18 1 0.20 0.06 0 4.33 4.29 0.00
19 2 0.20 0.06 0 4.35 4.30 0.00
20 1 0.20 0.06 0 4.36 4.32 0.00
21 1 0.20 0.06 0 4.38 4.33 0.00
22 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.38 4.34 0.00
23 1 0.20 0.06 0 4.39 4.34 0.00
24 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.40 4.35 0.00
25 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.40 4.35 0.00
26 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.40 4.36 0.00
27 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.40 4.36 0.00
28 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.41 4.36 0.00
29 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.41 4.36 0.00
30+ 0 0.20 0.06 0 4.41 4.36 0.00
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Female0 2309 0.29 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
1 2122 0.29 0.00 0 0.08 0.22 0.00
2 1195 0.29 0.00 1 0.34 0.70 0.00
3 1250 0.29 0.02 1 0.93 1.30 0.00
4 803 0.29 0.02 1 1.40 1.81 0.16
5 544 0.29 0.03 1 1.92 2.38 0.54
6 329 0.29 0.04 1 2.47 2.99 0.82
7 232 0.29 0.05 1 3.02 3.56 0.93
8 157 0.29 0.05 1 3.55 4.09 0.97
9 97 0.29 0.06 1 4.07 4.57 0.99
10 67 0.29 0.06 1 4.55 5.01 0.99
11 57 0.29 0.06 1 5.00 5.41 1.00
12 42 0.29 0.07 1 5.42 5.78 1.00
13 20 0.29 0.07 1 5.79 6.11 1.00
14 13 0.29 0.07 1 6.13 6.41 1.00
15 7 0.29 0.07 1 6.44 6.67 1.00
16 3 0.29 0.07 1 6.71 6.91 1.00
17 3 0.29 0.07 1 6.95 7.11 1.00
18 2 0.29 0.07 0 7.16 7.30 1.00
19 1 0.29 0.07 0 7.35 7.46 1.00
20 2 0.29 0.07 0 7.52 7.60 1.00
21 1 0.29 0.07 0 7.66 7.73 1.00
22 1 0.29 0.07 0 7.79 7.84 1.00
23 1 0.29 0.07 0 7.90 7.93 1.00
24 1 0.29 0.07 0 7.99 8.01 1.00
25 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.08 8.09 1.00
26 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.15 8.15 1.00
27 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.22 8.20 1.00
28 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.27 8.25 1.00
29 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.32 8.29 1.00
30+ 0 0.29 0.07 0 8.40 8.36 1.00
Male 0 2309 0.29 0.00 0 0.01 0.03 0.00
1 2122 0.29 0.00 0 0.07 0.21 0.00
2 1195 0.29 0.00 1 0.30 0.64 0.00
3 1252 0.29 0.01 1 0.81 1.19 0.00
4 806 0.29 0.02 1 1.27 1.65 0.00
5 549 0.29 0.03 1 1.74 2.12 0.00
6 334 0.29 0.03 1 2.19 2.57 0.00
7 237 0.29 0.04 1 2.60 2.98 0.00
8 161 0.29 0.05 1 2.97 3.33 0.00
9 101 0.29 0.05 1 3.28 3.61 0.00
10 70 0.29 0.05 1 3.55 3.85 0.00
11 60 0.29 0.06 1 3.77 4.04 0.00
12 45 0.29 0.06 1 3.96 4.20 0.00
13 22 0.29 0.06 1 4.11 4.33 0.00
14 14 0.29 0.06 1 4.24 4.44 0.00
15 8 0.29 0.06 1 4.34 4.53 0.00
16 4 0.29 0.06 1 4.42 4.59 0.00
17 3 0.29 0.06 1 4.49 4.65 0.00
18 2 0.29 0.06 0 4.54 4.70 0.00
19 2 0.29 0.06 0 4.58 4.73 0.00
20 2 0.29 0.06 0 4.62 4.76 0.00
21 2 0.29 0.06 0 4.64 4.78 0.00
22 1 0.29 0.06 0 4.67 4.80 0.00
23 1 0.29 0.06 0 4.68 4.82 0.00
24 1 0.29 0.06 0 4.70 4.83 0.00
25 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.71 4.84 0.00
26 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.72 4.85 0.00
27 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.73 4.85 0.00
28 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.73 4.86 0.00
29 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.74 4.86 0.00
30+ 0 0.29 0.06 0 4.74 4.87 0.00
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Redfish Female0 6678 0.10 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 6033 0.10 0.02 1 0.00 0.01 0.00
2 26621 0.10 0.04 1 0.01 0.01 0.05
3 14499 0.10 0.05 1 0.01 0.02 0.29
4 3868 0.10 0.05 1 0.02 0.02 0.56
5 1846 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.73
6 1712 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.82
7 3663 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.88
8 1596 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.91
9 764 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.92
10 649 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.93
11 591 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.94
12 524 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.94
13 916 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.95
14 1147 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.95
15 880 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.95
16 570 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.95
17 161 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.04 0.95
18 69 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.04 0.95
19 68 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
20 62 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
21 96 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
22 82 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
23 83 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
24 36 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
25 20 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
26 10 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
27 7 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
28 6 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
29 3 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
30 3 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
31 2 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
32 2 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
33 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
34 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
35 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
36 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
37 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
38 0 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
39+ 2 0.10 0.06 0 0.04 0.04 0.95
Male 0 6678 0.10 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 6034 0.10 0.02 1 0.00 0.01 0.00
2 26727 0.10 0.03 1 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 14656 0.10 0.05 1 0.01 0.01 0.00
4 3933 0.10 0.05 1 0.01 0.02 0.00
5 1887 0.10 0.05 1 0.02 0.02 0.00
6 1763 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.00
7 3807 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.00
8 1672 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.00
9 805 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.02 0.00
10 689 0.10 0.06 1 0.02 0.03 0.00
11 634 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
12 569 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
13 1003 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
14 1271 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
15 985 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
16 642 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
17 183 0.10 0.06 1 0.03 0.03 0.00
18 79 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
19 79 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
20 71 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
21 110 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
22 95 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
23 95 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
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24 42 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
25 23 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
26 12 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
27 8 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
28 7 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
29 4 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
30 3 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
31 3 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
32 2 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
33 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
34 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
35 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
36 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
37 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00
38 1 0.10 0.06 0 0.03 0.03 0.00




Female0 3642 0.04 0.00 0 0.02 0.03 0.00
1 3446 0.04 0.00 0 0.04 0.05 0.00
2 3256 0.04 0.00 0 0.06 0.09 0.00
3 3072 0.04 0.00 0 0.08 0.20 0.00
4 2893 0.04 0.00 0 0.11 0.27 0.00
5 2719 0.04 0.00 0 0.15 0.36 0.00
6 2550 0.04 0.00 0 0.19 0.47 0.00
7 2386 0.04 0.00 0 0.23 0.59 0.00
8 2235 0.04 0.00 0 0.27 0.72 0.00
9 2099 0.04 0.00 0 0.32 0.86 0.00
10 1974 0.04 0.00 0 0.36 1.00 0.00
11 1858 0.04 0.00 0 0.41 1.13 0.00
12 1764 0.04 0.00 0 0.46 1.22 0.00
13 1694 0.04 0.00 0 0.51 1.28 0.00
14 1639 0.04 0.00 0 0.57 1.32 0.00
15 1590 0.04 0.00 0 0.62 1.35 0.00
16 1546 0.04 0.00 0 0.67 1.38 0.00
17 1509 0.04 0.00 0 0.72 1.40 0.00
18 1476 0.04 0.00 0 0.77 1.42 0.01
19 1449 0.04 0.00 0 0.82 1.43 0.01
20 1439 0.04 0.00 1 0.86 1.45 0.03
21 1468 0.04 0.00 1 0.91 1.47 0.04
22 1559 0.04 0.00 1 0.95 1.48 0.06
23 1619 0.04 0.00 1 1.00 1.50 0.09
24 1627 0.04 0.00 1 1.04 1.51 0.12
25 1611 0.04 0.00 1 1.08 1.52 0.16
26 1563 0.04 0.00 1 1.12 1.54 0.20
27 1502 0.04 0.00 1 1.16 1.55 0.24
28 1443 0.04 0.00 1 1.20 1.57 0.28
29 1384 0.04 0.00 1 1.23 1.58 0.32
30 1327 0.04 0.01 1 1.27 1.60 0.36
31 1340 0.04 0.01 1 1.30 1.61 0.40
32 1251 0.04 0.01 1 1.33 1.63 0.44
33 1123 0.04 0.01 1 1.36 1.64 0.47
34 982 0.04 0.01 1 1.39 1.65 0.51
35 839 0.04 0.01 1 1.42 1.67 0.54
36 728 0.04 0.01 1 1.44 1.68 0.56
37 640 0.04 0.01 1 1.47 1.69 0.59
38 570 0.04 0.01 1 1.49 1.71 0.62
39 513 0.04 0.01 1 1.51 1.72 0.64
40 462 0.04 0.01 1 1.53 1.73 0.66
41 411 0.04 0.01 1 1.55 1.74 0.68
42 358 0.04 0.01 1 1.57 1.75 0.69
43 306 0.04 0.01 1 1.59 1.76 0.71
44 259 0.04 0.01 1 1.61 1.78 0.72
45 217 0.04 0.01 1 1.63 1.79 0.74
46 182 0.04 0.01 1 1.64 1.80 0.75
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47 153 0.04 0.01 1 1.66 1.80 0.76
48 128 0.04 0.01 1 1.67 1.81 0.77
49 108 0.04 0.01 1 1.68 1.82 0.78
50 92 0.04 0.01 1 1.70 1.83 0.79
51 78 0.04 0.01 1 1.71 1.84 0.80
52 66 0.04 0.01 1 1.72 1.85 0.80
53 57 0.04 0.01 1 1.73 1.85 0.81
54 49 0.04 0.01 1 1.74 1.86 0.81
55 42 0.04 0.01 1 1.75 1.87 0.82
56 37 0.04 0.01 1 1.76 1.87 0.83
57 33 0.04 0.01 1 1.77 1.88 0.83
58 29 0.04 0.01 1 1.77 1.88 0.83
59 27 0.04 0.01 1 1.78 1.89 0.84
60 24 0.04 0.01 1 1.79 1.89 0.84
61 23 0.04 0.01 1 1.80 1.90 0.85
62 21 0.04 0.01 1 1.80 1.90 0.85
63 20 0.04 0.01 1 1.81 1.91 0.85
64 19 0.04 0.01 1 1.81 1.91 0.85
65 18 0.04 0.01 1 1.82 1.92 0.86
66 16 0.04 0.01 1 1.82 1.92 0.86
67 15 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.92 0.86
68 14 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.93 0.86
69 13 0.04 0.01 1 1.84 1.93 0.86
70 12 0.04 0.01 1 1.84 1.93 0.87
71 11 0.04 0.01 1 1.85 1.94 0.87
72 11 0.04 0.01 1 1.85 1.94 0.87
73 10 0.04 0.01 1 1.85 1.94 0.87
74 10 0.04 0.01 1 1.86 1.94 0.87
75 9 0.04 0.01 1 1.86 1.95 0.87
76 9 0.04 0.01 1 1.86 1.95 0.87
77 8 0.04 0.01 1 1.86 1.95 0.88
78 8 0.04 0.01 1 1.87 1.95 0.88
79+ 121 0.04 0.01 1 1.87 1.95 0.88
Male 0 3642 0.04 0.00 0 0.02 0.03 0.00
1 3446 0.04 0.00 0 0.04 0.05 0.00
2 3256 0.04 0.00 0 0.06 0.09 0.00
3 3072 0.04 0.00 0 0.09 0.20 0.00
4 2893 0.04 0.00 0 0.12 0.27 0.00
5 2719 0.04 0.00 0 0.15 0.36 0.00
6 2550 0.04 0.00 0 0.19 0.47 0.00
7 2386 0.04 0.00 0 0.23 0.58 0.00
8 2235 0.04 0.00 0 0.27 0.71 0.00
9 2099 0.04 0.00 0 0.32 0.85 0.00
10 1974 0.04 0.00 0 0.36 0.99 0.00
11 1858 0.04 0.00 0 0.41 1.12 0.00
12 1764 0.04 0.00 0 0.46 1.21 0.00
13 1694 0.04 0.00 0 0.51 1.27 0.00
14 1639 0.04 0.00 0 0.56 1.31 0.00
15 1590 0.04 0.00 0 0.61 1.34 0.00
16 1546 0.04 0.00 0 0.66 1.36 0.00
17 1509 0.04 0.00 0 0.71 1.38 0.00
18 1476 0.04 0.00 0 0.76 1.40 0.00
19 1449 0.04 0.00 0 0.81 1.42 0.00
20 1439 0.04 0.00 1 0.86 1.43 0.00
21 1468 0.04 0.00 1 0.90 1.45 0.00
22 1559 0.04 0.00 1 0.95 1.46 0.00
23 1619 0.04 0.00 1 0.99 1.48 0.00
24 1627 0.04 0.00 1 1.03 1.49 0.00
25 1611 0.04 0.00 1 1.07 1.50 0.00
26 1563 0.04 0.00 1 1.11 1.52 0.00
27 1502 0.04 0.00 1 1.15 1.53 0.00
28 1443 0.04 0.00 1 1.18 1.55 0.00
29 1384 0.04 0.00 1 1.22 1.56 0.00
30 1327 0.04 0.01 1 1.25 1.58 0.00
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31 1340 0.04 0.01 1 1.28 1.59 0.00
32 1251 0.04 0.01 1 1.31 1.60 0.00
33 1123 0.04 0.01 1 1.34 1.62 0.00
34 982 0.04 0.01 1 1.37 1.63 0.00
35 839 0.04 0.01 1 1.40 1.64 0.00
36 728 0.04 0.01 1 1.42 1.66 0.00
37 640 0.04 0.01 1 1.45 1.67 0.00
38 570 0.04 0.01 1 1.47 1.68 0.00
39 513 0.04 0.01 1 1.49 1.69 0.00
40 462 0.04 0.01 1 1.51 1.71 0.00
41 411 0.04 0.01 1 1.53 1.72 0.00
42 358 0.04 0.01 1 1.55 1.73 0.00
43 306 0.04 0.01 1 1.57 1.74 0.00
44 259 0.04 0.01 1 1.59 1.75 0.00
45 217 0.04 0.01 1 1.60 1.76 0.00
46 182 0.04 0.01 1 1.62 1.77 0.00
47 153 0.04 0.01 1 1.63 1.78 0.00
48 128 0.04 0.01 1 1.65 1.79 0.00
49 108 0.04 0.01 1 1.66 1.79 0.00
50 92 0.04 0.01 1 1.67 1.80 0.00
51 78 0.04 0.01 1 1.68 1.81 0.00
52 66 0.04 0.01 1 1.69 1.82 0.00
53 57 0.04 0.01 1 1.70 1.83 0.00
54 49 0.04 0.01 1 1.71 1.83 0.00
55 42 0.04 0.01 1 1.72 1.84 0.00
56 37 0.04 0.01 1 1.73 1.84 0.00
57 33 0.04 0.01 1 1.74 1.85 0.00
58 29 0.04 0.01 1 1.75 1.86 0.00
59 27 0.04 0.01 1 1.75 1.86 0.00
60 24 0.04 0.01 1 1.76 1.87 0.00
61 23 0.04 0.01 1 1.77 1.87 0.00
62 21 0.04 0.01 1 1.77 1.87 0.00
63 20 0.04 0.01 1 1.78 1.88 0.00
64 19 0.04 0.01 1 1.79 1.88 0.00
65 18 0.04 0.01 1 1.79 1.89 0.00
66 16 0.04 0.01 1 1.80 1.89 0.00
67 15 0.04 0.01 1 1.80 1.89 0.00
68 14 0.04 0.01 1 1.81 1.90 0.00
69 13 0.04 0.01 1 1.81 1.90 0.00
70 12 0.04 0.01 1 1.81 1.90 0.00
71 11 0.04 0.01 1 1.82 1.91 0.00
72 11 0.04 0.01 1 1.82 1.91 0.00
73 10 0.04 0.01 1 1.82 1.91 0.00
74 10 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.91 0.00
75 9 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.91 0.00
76 9 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.92 0.00
77 8 0.04 0.01 1 1.83 1.92 0.00
78 8 0.04 0.01 1 1.84 1.92 0.00










R0 SSB0 h µR σR
School Whiting 273325 7546 0.75 0 0.35
Silver Warehou 11838 18949 0.75 -0.63 0.7
Jackass Morwong (West) 1207 2742 0.7 0 0.7
Jackass Morwong (East) 3103 7046 0.7 0 0.7
Flathead 21977 23100 0.62 0 0.4
Pink ling (East) 1845 7669 0.75 0 0.7
Pink ling (West) 4891 7143 0.75 0 0.7
Redfish 135929 12004 0.75 -0.91 0.7
Orange roughy (East) 8763 41634 0.75 0 0.7
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C.2 Fishing activity and catch module
Metiers represented in the model were derived from a multivariate clustering anal-
ysis of catch data detailed in Appendix D. Catch and fishing effort at the vessel and
metier level were calculated from SESSF logbook data.
C.3 ITQ market module
Quota lease prices for the species not explicitely under TAC management in the
simulations were set as fixed parameters and estimated from data collected by the Aus-
tralian Fisheries Management Authority since July 2017. Transactions between related
entities (i.e. related through some type of control or ownership) were removed from the
dataset to avoid bias in the estimation. The ratio of the yearly median lease price to the
species’ ex-vessel price was calculated for the period 2017-2018 and used to estimate a
yearly lease price for 2015. Values of those ratios are given in Table C.5.
C.4 Fish price module
Ex-vessel prices for the various species in 2015 were obtained for each sector from
Australian Fisheries Statistics (Mobsby, 2018) and are provided in Table C.6. Own- and
cross-price flexibilities estimated for the SESSF by Bose (2004) were used to calibrate
fish price dynamics in Chapter 5. Only significant coefficients were kept.
C.5 Economic module
Table C.7 summarizes the estimated cost structures for the four gear types in the
SESSF. They are based on ABARES economic surveys from 2015 (Bath et al., 2018),
which reports financial performance of the average boat for the Commonwealth Trawl
Sector (CTS) and the Gillnet, Hook and Trap Sector (GHTS). Personal communication
from ABARES allowed to break down sectoral costs per main gear type (trawl and Dan-
ish seine for the CTS and gillnet and hooks for the GHTS). Depreciation costs (Cdep)
per sector were estimated by ABARES using the diminishing value method based on
current replacement value and age of the items. Following ABARES methodology, the
opportunity cost of capital (Copp) per sector was estimated at 7% per year of capital
value. This interest rate represents the long-term average rate of return that could be
earned on an investment elsewhere. Crew share (cshr) is expressed as a percentage of
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Table C.5 – Ratio between the median lease price and the ex-vessel price for species
under quota in the SESSF between 2017 and 2018.
Source: AFMA
Species Lease price/Fish price







Jackass Morwong East 0.17
Jackass Morwong West 0.17
John Dory 0.04
Mirror Dory 0.15
Ocean Perch Inshore 0.16
Ocean Perch Offshore 0.16
Orange Roughy Cascade confidential
Orange Roughy East 0.21
Orange Roughy South 0.24
Orange Roughy West 0.17
Pink Ling East 0.39
Pink Ling West 0.39
Redfish 0.03






income, variable costs (i.e. fuel costs (Cfuel) and other variable costs (Cvaroth)) were cal-
culated per fishing day, and fixed costs and capital costs (depreciation and opportunity
costs) estimated to be function of the vessel’s income. Assuming fixed and capital costs
to be function of the vessel’s income allowed to account for the variability in vessels
characteristics within sectors (e.g vessel length or engine power which are important
determinants of fixed costs and often correlated to the level of catch and derived in-
come). It also enabled to address the fact that some vessels are not only employed to
fish in the SESSF (some also operate in state waters or other Commonwealth fisheries)
and therefore their fixed costs and capital costs should be redistributed to each fish-
ery accordingly. The ex-vessel price for the modelled species in 2015 was derived from
Mobsby (2018) and values are given in Table C.6.
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Table C.6 – Ex-vessel price of the modelled species in the SESSF in 2015.
Source: Mobsby (2018)
Species Fish price (AU$/kg)CTS GHTS
Blue eye Trevalla 8.33 9.11
Blue Grenadier 1.30 1.30
Blue Warehou 3.07 3.00




Gummy Shark 6.29 6.29
Jackass Morwong 3.36 3.36
John Dory 8.66 8.66
King Dory 3.50 3.50
Mirror Dory 3.15 3.15
Ocean Jackets 1.72 1.72
Ocean Perch 5.08 5.08
Orange Roughy 5.59 5.59
Oreos 3.50 3.50
Other species 3.50 3.50
Pink Ling 5.73 5.73
Redfish 3.43 3.43
Ribaldo 3.50 4.35
Royal Red Prawn 4.01 4.01
Saw Shark 1.91 1.91
School Shark 5.99 5.99
School Whiting 3.05 3.05
Silver Trevally 4.49 4.49
Silver Warehou 1.15 1.15
Squids 3.79 3.79
Crew numbers in the fishery were found to be positively correlated with the amount
of daily landings as reported in Table C.8.
Table C.7 – Cost structures for the four main gear types in the SESSF.















TW 26 2513 2845 11 3 2
DS 46 436 1321 13 5 2
GN 42 564 403 20 7 9
HK 42 590 1208 18 6 5
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Table C.8 – Estimation of crew numbers in the SESSF.
Source: pers. comm. ABARES
Daily landings (kg/day)
< 350 [350; 700[ > 700
Crew numbers 2 3 4

APPENDIX D
METIER AND FLEET DEFINITION IN THE
AUSTRALIAN SOUTHERN AND EASTERN SCALEFISH
AND SHARK FISHERY
The aim of this analysis was twofold:
— define metiers for the South East Shark and Scalefish Fishery (excl. the Great
Australian Bight and East Coast Deepwater Trawl sectors),
— define fleets for the South East Shark and Scalefish Fishery (excl. the Great
Australian Bight and East Coast Deepwater Trawl sectors).
The metier analysis builds on the definition used by the European Data Collection
Framework (EU, 2008), which is "a group of fishing operations targeting a similar (as-
semblage of) species, using similar gear, during the same period of the year and/or
within the same area and which are characterised by a similar exploitation pattern".
Multivariate statistical methods have often been used to identify groups of trips with
similar landings compositions (Marchal, 2008; Deporte et al., 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Ono
et al., 2018). A similar approach has been undertaken here, but on the species compo-
sition of the landed value rather than the landed weight since targeting is most likely
to be driven by the value of landings than their weight.
A fleet, on the other hand, is defined here as a group of vessels showing similar
fishing practices, in other words showing similar effort allocations among metiers. Here
again, statistical clustering methods were used to identify groups of vessels showing
similar fishing practices.
181
Appendix D – Metier and fleet definition in the Australian Southern and Eastern Scalefish
and Shark Fishery
D.1 Material and Methods
D.1.1 Data
The species composition of landed catch was derived from the fishery’s logbook
data. In order to have a recent description of the fishery only records from calendar
years 2012 to 2017 were used. Annual fish prices were retrieved from the Australian
fisheries and aquaculture statistics report Mobsby (2018).
D.1.2 Definition of metiers
The definition of metiers consisted in 2 main steps:
1. A clustering of fishing hauls based on landings profiles (in value) using multivari-
ate statistical methods,
2. A post-hoc refinement of the clusters identified by the clustering algorithm in
order to: (2.1) group clusters that do not show significant differences in terms
of value profile, and (2.2) make sure that clusters reflect an intended targeting
based on expertise from members of the fishing industry.
Step 1: Statistical clustering:
The analysis follows the first 3 steps of the workflow developed by Deporte et al. (2012)
and integrated in the R package vmstools:
1.1: Identification of the main species in order to reduce the dataset to these key
species. Species were selected so that at least 90% of the total value and 70% of
each haul value was represented in the final dataset to cluster.
1.2: Investigation of running a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on the dataset
prior to the clustering. The reason for applying a PCA to the dataset is that it
reduces the number of variables in the dataset to cluster (initially, the variables
are the individual species but when running a PCA variables become the relevant
factors from the PCA).
1.3: Running a selection of clustering algorithms and dissimilarity measures. In or-
der for large and small hauls to be given equal importance, the clustering was
done on the species contribution to the haul value (the sum of which, across
all species, equals 1), rather than absolute values of catch. The input to the
clustering algorithm is therefore a 2D matrix M, with rows referring to logbook
events (index le), and columns to species (index sp), and entry Mle,sp defined as:
M(le, sp) = psp∗Lle,sp∑
sp
psp×Lle,sp
, with psp the price of species sp, and Lle,sp the landed
catch of species sp in logbook event le.
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For the sake of brevity, only the most satisfactory results will be presented in
this document. They were obtained by running the CLARA algorithm on the original
dataset (i.e. without prior PCA) with the Euclidean distance used as the dissimilarity
metric. Nonetheless, alternative choices for steps 1.2 and 1.3 were explored and the
reason for discarding them provided hereafter:
— Step 1.2: The clustering analysis was performed on four different datasets: the
original dataset with species as variables, and three PCA-transformed datasets
respectively keeping factors representing 70% of the explained variance, 80% of
the explained variance, and as determined by the Scree test. The Scree test retains
fewer axes than thresholds of 70% or 80% of explained variance, which then
results in fewer clusters. The clustering of PCA-transformed data also leads to
fewer clusters than the clustering of original data and failed at identifying rare
(but existing) metiers. This for instance concerns the targeting of orange roughy
since the fishery has only reopened in 2015 in some areas. In order not to miss
rare but important metiers throughout the clustering process, we decided to keep
working with the original dataset, without prior dimension reduction.
— Step 1.3: Three clustering methods were implemented in the vmstools package:
HAC, K-means and PAM (or its adaptation for the analysis of large datasets:
CLARA). HAC and CLARA algorithms gave similar results, unlike K-means (in
line with tests run by Deporte et al. (2012)). The CLARA algorithm was finally
chosen since more efficient on large datasets. Sensitivity of the results to the dis-
tance metric used to cluster the data was also investigated. The Euclidean and
Manhattan distances are two commonly used dissimilarity measures in cluster-
ing analyses. We observed that the Euclidean distance allowed identifying single
species clusters (e.g. royal red prawn trawling) which did not emerge with the
Manhattan distance. Since those single-species metiers are important for the fish-
ery, we decided to work with the Euclidean distance rather than the Manhattan
distance.
Multispecies technical interactions are also sensitive to the scale at which data is
analysed and working with spatially or temporally aggregated data can only increase
the level of perceived interactions. Therefore, data was kept at the finest scale as
possible, i.e. at the haul level. Not aggregating data however requires the clustering
algorithm to work on a large dataset which has been solved by using a variant of
the PAM algorithm suited to the analysis of large datasets (CLARA). In addition,
separate clustering analyses were run for each of the 5 groups specified in Table D.1
which reduced the size of the dataset to cluster and resulted in more relevant clusters.
The East-West boundary is the 147-degree meridian (also used in the management of
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certain stocks).
Table D.1 – Gear classification and groups used for clustering






Otter trawl TDO,TW Trawl - East 59383
Trawl - West 21044
Danish seine DS Danish seine 54984
GHTS




Step 2: Refinement of clusters: This refinement phase consisted in two phases:
2.1: The grouping of clusters that had similar value profiles
2.2: Based on expert knowledge of the fishery, clusters whose landed value was dom-
inated by species that are not identified as targeted species by members of the
fishing industry were assigned to a “mixed” metier as they are likely to be the
result of chance than intended targeting.
D.1.3 Definition of fleets
A similar approach using statistical clustering was used to define fleets for the
SESSF. As metiers were clusters of hauls having similar landings profiles, fleets are clus-
ters of vessels displaying similar fishing patterns (or metier profiles). A vessel’s fishing
pattern as the allocation of its annual fishing effort across the different metiers. Input of
the clustering algorithm is therefore a 2D matrix F , with rows referring to vessels (in-
dex v), and columns to metiers (index m), and entry Fv,m defined as: Fv,m = Effv,m∑
m
Effv,m
, with Effv,m) the number of hauls vessel v operated in metier m.
This analysis builds on the allocation of hauls to metiers carried out previously.
To be consistent with the methods used in the metier identification, the PAM algo-
rithm was used to identify fleets (CLARA was not necessary as the sample size is now
smaller, i.e. the number of vessels). The clustering algorithm was run separately for the
4 sectors: Trawl (East and West regions were not treated separately as some trawlers
operate across the 2 zones), Danish seine, Gillnet and Hooks.
Similarly to the metier analysis, similar clusters were merged as a post-hoc refine-
ment (step 2). This step was specifically important to ensure the inter-annual stability
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of fleets and not having vessels move between fleets from one year to another without
having significantly changed their fishing practices.
D.2 Results
D.2.1 Metiers
Table D.2 describes the species composition of the clusters identified at Step 1 and
provides the number of hauls in each cluster. It also specifies how each cluster has then
been attributed to a metier through Steps 2.1 and 2.2. After Step 1, respectively 15,
6, 6, 7 and 6 clusters were identified for Trawl East, Trawl West, Danish seine, Gillnet
and Hooks. After Step 2, those cluster have been merged into respectively 10, 6, 3, 1
and 4 metiers. When mixed clusters were found across a wide range of depths (e.g.
cluster 3 of Trawl West), their hauls were attributed to the mixed shelf when operating
at depths smaller than 250m and to the mixed slope metier when operating at depths
greater than 250m.
D.2.2 Fleets
Table D.3 summarizes the fleet identification derived from the clustering analysis
of vessels’ fishing patterns. After Step 1, respectively 6, 10, 9 and 6 clusters were
identified for Trawl, Danish seine, Gillnet and Hooks. After Step 2, those cluster have



































Main species Secondary species
Trawl
East
13 Flathead (87%) Shelf 10;20;30 All year 23 Flathead Flathead
1 Flathead (61%)
John dory, squids, latchet,
ocean jackets, other
species
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dory, pink ling, ocean
perch offshore
Slope 10;20;30 All year 6 Mixed Slope Mixed Slope























































2 Pink ling (75%)
blue grenadier, king dory,
silver warehou




Pink ling Slope 40-50 Winter 14 Blue Grenadier Blue Grenadier
1 blue grenadier, pink ling Slope 40-50
Summer -
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saw shark Shelf 50-60
Spring-
Summer
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gummy shark Shelf 50
Autumn;
Spring









9 Blue eye Trevalla
Blue eye
Trevalla
3 Pink ling (78%)
blue-eye trevalla, ribaldo,
ocean perch offshore
Slope 30;40 Spring 5 Pink Ling Pink Ling
6
other species, blue-eye
trevalla, pink ling, snapper
Shelf -
Slope





Table D.3 – Description of fleets
Sector Step 1Cluster Metiers
Number of
vessels x year Step 2 (fleet)
Trawl
1
TW.West Slope (60%), TW.West.Shelf
(15%), TW.West Blue Grenadier (9%),
TW.West.Mixed.deepwater (8%)
67 Mixed Trawler West
2 TW.East.Shelf (82%), TW.East.Slope (16%) 60 Mixed Trawler East
3 TW.East.Shelf (63%), TW.East.Slope (30%) 50 Mixed Trawler East
4 TW.East.Shelf (97%) 41 Shelf Trawler East
5 TW.East.Royal.Red.Prawn (71%), TW.EastShelf (20%), TW.East.Slope (9%) 12
Royal Red Prawn
Trawler





1 DS.Flathead (90%), DS.School.Whiting (9%) 16 Flathead Danish seiner
2 DS.Flathead (78%), DS.School.Whiting(20%) 27 Flathead Danish seiner
3 DS.Flathead (84%), DS.School.Whiting(14%) 22 Flathead Danish seiner
4 DS.Flathead (95%), DS.School.Whiting (4%) 7 Flathead Danish seiner
5 DS.Flathead (100%) 5 Flathead Danish seiner
6 DS.Flathead (70%), DS.School.Whiting(26%) 20 Flathead Danish seiner
7 DS.School.Whiting (90%), DS.Flathead (8%) 3 School WhitingDanish seiner
8 DS.School.Whiting (68%), DS.Flathead(31%) 2
School Whiting
Danish seiner
9 DS.School.Whiting (51%), DS.Flathead(48%) 3
School Whiting
Danish seiner




1 GN.Gummy.Shark (97%) 48 Gillnetter
2 GN.Gummy.Shark (90%) 29 Gillnetter
3 GN.Gummy.Shark (82%) 12 Gillnetter
4 GN.Gummy.Shark (93%) 30 Gillnetter
5 GN.Gummy.Shark (100%) 45 Gillnetter
6 GN.Gummy.Shark (75%), GN.Mixed (25%) 10 Gillnetter
7 GN.Gummy.Shark (95%) 70 Gillnetter
8 GN.Gummy.Shark (87%) 20 Gillnetter
9 GN.Gummy.Shark (57%), GN.Mixed (43%) 3 Gillnetter
Hooks
1 BL.Gummy.Shark (99%) 102 Shark Bottomliner
2 BL.Gummy.Shark (90%), BL.Mixed.Scalefish(6%) 60 Mixed Bottomliner





18 Blue eye Autoliner
5 DL.Blue.eye.Trevalla (91%) 44 Blue eye Dropliner




EXAMPLE OF STOCHASTIC TRAJECTORIES AND
ASSOCIATED VIABILITY PROBABILITIES
In the example shown in Figure E.1, bass longliners have a 100% probability of
meeting both short-term profits and crew wage constraints, whereas hake gillnetters































Figure E.1 – Examples of stochastic trajectories (200 replicates) of Gross Operating
Surplus and FTE crew wage for 2 fishing segments. The solid black line shows the
viability threshold used to estimate the probability of viability of each segment across
the 10-year projection period. Source: simulations from IAM model
APPENDIX F
INFLUENCE OF REMUNERATION SYSTEM ON CREW
SURPLUS
In the SESSF, crews are usually remunerated based on a share of the fishing income
(GVL). A scenario of alternative shared remuneration system, where crews are also
charged part of variable costs as can be observed in other fisheries (Guillen et al., 2017),
was also simulated for this fishery. In this second scenario, crews get a proportion of the
"return to be shared", which is equal to the GVL minus variable costs. Variable costs
include fuel, ice, bait, packaging, and freight and marketing. Quota costs are generally
covered by vessel owners as highlighted by Hatcher (2010). Crew shares (in %) that are
applied in both scenarios are given in Table F.1.
Table F.1 – Crew shares in two systems of shared remuneration: indexed on the gross
value of landings (GVL) or "return to be shared" (RTBS).
Source: Estimated from Bath et al. (2018)
Sector
Crew share















































































































Figure F.1 – Socio-economic indicators within the operating domain when crews are
remunerated as a share of the "return to be shared".
First column displays expected values while second columns displays values that are
guaranteed with a 90% probability.
A: Net Economic Returns (NER); B: Crew wages; C: Fisher Price Index.
The thick black bounding delineates the eco-viable space, defined as the space ensuring
biological and economic viability of the fishery and price acceptability. Dashed lines
show stock-specific FMSY and F20 reference points. Specific scenarios within the eco-
viable space are also identified: the 2015 fishing mortality rates (black square),the one
maximizing the industry’s net economic returns (Max NER), the one maximizing crew
wages (Max Wage) and the one maximizing the viable fleet size but which also minimizes
the price of fish (Max Fleet - Min Price).
Source: output from IAM model
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A comparison of the results under both scenarios (GVL scenario in Figure 5.4, and
RTBS scenario in Figure F.1) shows that when crews are remunerated as a share of the
RTBS rather than on a share of the GVL, their surplus aligns more closely with that of
capital owners. Indeed, in the RTBS scenario, wages are maximized under lower harvest
rates„ closer to the maximization of NER, than in the GVL scenario. This is a result of







G.1.1 Durabilité des activités humaines et théorie de la viabil-
ité
Dans son sens premier, la durabilité repose sur l’idée de continuité et se définit comme
l’aptitude d’un processus, d’une entité ou d’un système à se maintenir dans le temps.
Toutefois, le concept moderne de durabilité ne peut se réduire à son sens premier de conti-
nuité car il est aussi empreint de positionnements normatifs au regard de trois relations
fondamentales: (i) celles entre êtres humains et leurs contemporains, (ii) celles entres
générations présentes et futures, et (iii) celles entre Homme et Nature. Ces relations sont
au cœur d’engagements politiques sur la question de la durabilité du développement
des sociétés humaines. On peut notamment citer le rapport de Brüntland qui définit le
développement durable comme "un mode de développement qui répond aux besoins des
générations présentes sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures de répondre
aux leurs" et qui a pour but de "promouvoir l’harmonie entre êtres humains et entre
l’humanité et la nature".
Ayant vocation à orienter l’action humaine, la durabilité est une préoccupation du
temps présent. Agir aujourd’hui pour la durabilité se heurte toutefois à de nombreuses
incertitudes quant aux dynamiques des systèmes socio-écologiques. Dans ce contexte
197
Appendix G – Résumé long
d’incertitudes, l’application du principe de précaution prévaut et requiert notamment
que la prise de décision intègre les incertitudes relatives à ses effets. Par ailleurs, ne
pouvant présumer des besoins et désirs des générations futures, les générations présentes
ont également pour devoir de veiller à ce que leurs actions ne viennent pas restreindre la
liberté de choix dans le futur.
Depuis sa formalisation mathématique dans les années 1990 par Jean-Pierre Aubin,
la théorie de la viabilité fournit un cadre adapté à l’étude de la durabilité des activités
d’exploitation des ressources renouvelables. La théorie de la viabilité est un champ des
mathématiques ayant pour but l’identification de trajectoires permettant à un système de
répondre à un ensemble de contraintes de durabilité. Lorsque les contraintes considérées
sont relatives au maintien de fonds, fonctions ou services critiques au fonctionnement du
système étudié, la théorie de la viabilité permet d’aborder la question de sa perpétuation
dans le temps. On voit ici le lien étroit entre viabilité et durabilité, mais il convient aussi
de souligner en quoi le cadre de la viabilité permet aussi d’aborder les dimensions éthiques
de l’usage contemporain du terme. Tout d’abord, assurer le maintien à la fois du capital
naturel et du capital humain permet une équité de traitement entre hommes et nature.
Assurer le maintien de différentes formes de capital humain permet par ailleurs d’aborder
des questions de justice intra-générationnelle. Enfin, l’approche intègre par nature le
critère d’égalité intergénérationnelle en imposant des contraintes le long d’une trajectoire
et non à un instant unique. Originellement formalisée en contexte déterministe, son
extension plus récente aux évolutions stochastiques permet d’aborder la question de la
durabilité des systèmes sous incertitudes.
G.1.2 Une gestion durable des pêches: l’approche écosystémique
des pêches et la science en appui à sa mise en œuvre
Parallèlement à l’affirmation d’objectifs de développement durable sur la scène poli-
tique internationale, l’Approche Ecosystémique des Pêches (AEP) s’est vue introduite
lors de la Conférence de Reykjavik sur une Pêche Responsable dans l’Ecosystème Marin
en 2001 comme le cadre d’opérationnalisation d’une gestion durable des pêcheries. Recon-
nue dans de nombreuses juridictions comme le nouveau standard de gestion des pêches,
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son but est de "planifier, développer et gérer les pêcheries de manière à répondre aux
multiples besoins et aspirations de la société, sans mettre en péril la possibilité des généra-
tions futures de bénéficier de l’ensemble des biens et services fournis par les écosystèmes
marins". Elle vise aussi à "contrebalancer une diversité d’objectifs en prenant compte des
connaissances et incertitudes relatives aux composantes abiotiques, biotiques et humaines
des écosystèmes, ainsi que les interactions entre elles, et d’appliquer une approche inté-
grée dans les limites écologiques" (traduction de (FAO 2003)). Cette dernière référence
à la connaissance et aux incertitudes souligne le rôle crucial porté par la science dans la
transition vers l’AEP.
Répondre aux ambitions de l’AEP requiert le développement d’approches à même
de prendre en compte les dimensions écologiques, économiques et sociales des systèmes
socio-écologiques en question, mais aussi d’évaluer les impacts de mesures de gestion selon
ces trois dimensions. La modélisation intégrée, permettant la représentation d’interactions
à différentes échelles et à travers différentes dimensions, est devenue un domaine de
recherche soutenant activement la transition vers l’AEP.
S’appuyant notamment sur la modélisation bioéconomique, les applications de l’approche
d’éco-viabilité dans la pêche ont démontré son potentiel d’appui à l’opérationnalisation
de l’AEP. Ces études ont permis de considérer une diversité de contraintes de durabilité,
couvrant ses dimensions écologiques, économiques et sociales. Lorsque qu’utilisée pour
identifier des contrôles viables du système, l’approche d’éco-viabilité peut être mobilisée
en soutien à la gestion des pêches. Jusqu’à présent, les études appliquées aux pêcheries ont
principalement considéré l’effort de pêche comme levier d’action, bien qu’une grande par-
tie des pêcheries dans le monde soit aujourd’hui gérée en réglementant les captures plutôt
que l’effort de pêche. La considération de TACs (Totaux Admissibles de Captures) et
quotas est ainsi nécessaire afin de rendre l’approche d’éco-viabilité opérationnelle comme
outil d’aide à la décision dans ce type de pêcherie.
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G.1.3 La gestion des pêcheries mixtes
On dénomme pêcheries mixtes les pêcheries où les espèces capturées sont au cœur
d’interactions qui peuvent être écologiques (e.g. relations dans le réseau trophique), tech-
niques (e.g. capturées simultanément) ou bien économiques (e.g. produits substituables
ou complémentaires). L’application d’approches dites mono-spécifiques, basées sur des
objectifs de gestion spécifiés à l’échelle des stocks, se révèle inadaptée à la gestion des
pêcheries mixtes. Les interactions mentionnées donnent en effet lieu à des arbitrages en-
tre objectifs de conservation et objectifs socio-économiques, arbitrages qui ne peuvent
réellement s’apprécier qu’en considération de la complexité de la dynamique de ces sys-
tèmes.
Certaines juridictions ont à cet effet adapté leurs systèmes de gestion au cas des
pêcheries mixtes. En Europe par exemple, la réglementation offre désormais la possibilité
de définir des quotas dans un intervalle autour du Rendement Maximal Durable (RMD)
afin de permettre une plus grande cohérence entre quotas établis et capacité technique
des flottilles. Dans les pêcheries fédérales australiennes, le choix a plutôt été d’adopter un
objectif de gestion défini à l’échelle de la pêcherie (le Rendement Economique Maximal
(REM)) plutôt qu’à l’échelle des différents stocks. Au-delà des objectifs de gestion, des
mécanismes de flexibilité (e.g. transférabilité des quotas individuels, délai de régularisa-
tion. . . ) ont vu le jour dans les systèmes de quotas afin de faciliter leur mise en œuvre
dans les pêcheries mixtes.
L’appui scientifique à la décision a dû s’adapter à ces arrangements institutionnels.
On peut notamment citer la méthodologie FCube développée par le Conseil Interna-
tional pour l’Exploration de la Mer (CIEM) pour orienter les décisions de TACs dans un
intervalle autour du RMD, ou bien la modélisation bioéconomique pour opérationnaliser
l’objectif de REM dans la pêcherie crevettière nord-australienne.
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G.1.4 Objectifs de la thèse
La thèse propose un cadre d’évaluation multicritères de la durabilité des décisions
relatives aux TACs en pêcherie mixte. L’approche d’éco-viabilité est au cœur de la
méthodologie développée qui requiert : (1) la prise en compte des interactions critiques
à la gestion des pêcheries mixtes à l’aide de TACs et quotas, (2) l’identification de con-
traintes de viabilité pour ces systèmes, et (3) la synthèse de résultats multidimensionnels
en un avis clair, en mesure d’orienter la prise de décision.
Au regard du premier point, la thèse a pour but d’améliorer la représentation des
interactions techniques et économiques dans les modèles utilisés en appui à la décision
TAC en pêcherie mixte. Une attention particulière est donnée à la représentation des
dynamiques d’allocation d’effort de pêche, d’échange de quotas et de prix du poisson
dans ces pêcheries. Au regard du second, la thèse vise une meilleure représentation des
contraintes de durabilité économique et sociale dans l’évaluation des scénarios de TACs
en pêcherie mixte.
G.1.5 Cas d’étude
La thèse repose sur le développement et l’application de l’approche dans deux cas
d’étude : la pêcherie démersale française dans le Golfe de Gascogne (GG) et la pêcherie
démersale sud-est australienne (SESSF). Ces deux pêcheries mixtes d’importance com-
merciale notable dans leurs régions respectives capturent quelques centaines d’espèces
de manière plus ou moins sélective. Elles sont aussi toutes deux sous gestion par TACs
et quotas.
La pêcherie du Golfe de Gascogne est composée de différentes flottilles caractérisées
par l’emploi de différents engins de pêche (e.g. chalut démersal, filet maillant) et dif-
férents degrés de spécialisation (e.g. chalutiers langoustiniers versus chalutiers mixtes).
Les TACs de cette pêcherie sont établis dans le cadre de la Politique Commune des Pêches
(PCP) dans un objectif d’exploitation des stocks au RMD. Depuis 2015, l’instauration
progressive de l’obligation de débarquement dans les pêcheries européennes a mis en lu-
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mière le besoin de cohérence entre quotas d’espèces au coeur de productions jointes.
La pêcherie sud-est australienne est elle aussi composée de plusieurs flottilles déploy-
ant une variété d’engins de pêche afin de cibler différentes espèces ou groupes d’espèces.
La gestion de la pêcherie se fait notamment à l’aide de Quotas Individuels Transférables
(QIT) et la fixation des TACs doit permettre l’opération de la pêcherie au REM. Toute-
fois, les TACs sont encore fixés selon des points de référence mono-spécifiques, n’assurant
donc pas la maximisation des profits à l’échelle de la pêcherie. De plus, le REM est inter-
prété comme la maximisation du surplus des détenteurs de capitaux, négligeant par-là
les surplus des équipages et consommateurs dans la prise de décision.
G.2 Chapitre 2
Le chapitre 2 illustre une première application de l’approche d’évaluation multicritère
développée à la pêcherie démersale du Golfe de Gascogne. L’analyse se concentre en
particulier sur la gestion par TACs de deux espèces clés de la pêcherie, le merlu européen
et la sole commune. Elle met en œuvre une modélisation multi-espèce, multi-métier et
multi-agent et comprend les étapes suivantes:
1. l’identification des combinaisons de mortalité par pêche atteignables étant données
les interactions techniques entre les deux espèces. Ce domaine est appelé domaine
opérationnel.
2. l’identification des combinaisons assurant la viabilité biologique des stocks dont
la dynamique est explicitement représentée dans le modèle (stock nord de merlu
européen, stock de sole commune du Golfe de Gascogne, stock de langoustine du
Golfe de Gascogne et stock de bar dans le centre-nord du Golfe de Gascogne). Ce
domaine constitue le domaine biologiquement viable.
3. l’évaluation des scénarios de TACs simulés au regard de trois contraintes de viabil-
ité économique pour les flottilles. Les deux premières ont trait à la rémunération du
capital physique et sont: la génération d’excédents brut d’exploitation (EBE) posi-
tifs chaque année, et la génération d’excédents net d’exploitation (ENE, i.e. EBE
moins la dépréciation du capital) positifs sur une échelle de dix ans. La dernière
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contrainte a trait à la rémunération du capital humain engagé et impose une ré-
munération (à équivalent temps plein) des équipages au moins égale au salaire
moyen d’un marin en France.
Les résultats indiquent que les taux d’exploitation associés au RMD des stocks de
merlu et sole sont atteignables étant données les interactions techniques entre ces stocks.
Un domaine de viabilité biologique non vide est aussi identifié. En revanche, aucun
scénario ne permet d’assurer la viabilité économique de toutes les flottilles, suggérant
par-là une surcapacité dans la pêcherie. Nous montrons toutefois que fixer le TAC de
merlu au RMD et celui de la sole à la borne supérieure de son intervalle de RMD permet
d’augmenter le nombre de flottilles économiquement viables.
G.3 Chapitre 3
Le chapitre 3 est dédié à la modélisation des systèmes de marchés de quotas in-
dividuels en pêcherie mixte, où des quotas pour des espèces conjointement capturées
sont échangés sur des marchés séparés. Une première modélisation s’appuyant sur la
programmation linéaire met en lumière quelques résultats théoriques relatifs à la situ-
ation d’équilibre de ces marchés. Nous montrons notamment que le prix de marché de
la location de quota pour une espèce dont le TAC n’est pas atteint à l’équilibre est nul
(espèce non contraignante). En parallèle, celui pour une espèce dont le TAC est atteint à
l’équilibre (espèce contraignante) tient compte du revenu associé aux espèces conjointe-
ment capturées. La deuxième modélisation permet de représenter la convergence vers cet
équilibre de marché. Le modèle présenté imite le processus de tâtonnement walrassien
de détermination des prix en compétition pure et parfaite et permet une modélisation
mécaniste des marchés de location de quotas en pêcherie mixte. Ce modèle est ensuite ap-
pliqué à la pêcherie démersale sud-est australienne avec la considération de deux scenarios
d’allocation de l’effort de pêche à l’échelle du navire (allocation historique et allocation
motivée par la recherche de profits). Ces simulations mettent en évidence les incitations
économiques sous-jacentes aux systèmes de QIT en pêcherie mixte, notamment celles de
rediriger l’effort de pêche vers les espèces dont le TAC n’est pas contraignant mais aussi
vers celles qui ne sont pas sous quotas.
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G.4 Chapitre 4
Le chapitre 4 discute des implications pour la production d’avis TAC en pêcherie
mixte de représenter de manière endogène les dynamiques d’allocation d’effort de pêche.
La discussion repose sur la comparaison des domaines opérationnels obtenus sous deux
types de représentation de l’allocation de l’effort de pêche. La première consiste en une
allocation d’effort exogène, égale à celle observée sur une période de référence (le choix
fait pour la production d’avis TAC en pêcherie mixte en Europe), et la deuxième en
une allocation d’effort endogène motivée par la recherche de profits. L’exercice est répété
pour trois types de productions jointes dans la pêcherie sud-est australienne, mettant en
jeu des espèces d’importance économique plus ou moins grande ainsi que différents de-
grés de sélectivité. Nous montrons dans les trois cas que le domaine opérationnel obtenu
en endogénéisant l’allocation d’effort est plus vaste que celui obtenu en modélisation
exogène. Ce résultat montre qu’une prise en compte des dynamiques de pêche dans les
modèles d’appui à l’avis TAC permet d’envisager un plus grand ensemble d’options com-
patibles avec les interactions techniques. La modélisation intégrée mise en œuvre dans
ce chapitre met aussi en lumière la hiérarchie d’espèces dans la pêcherie. Nous mon-
trons en effet que les performances socio-économiques de la pêcherie sont principalement
déterminées par les TACs fixés sur les principales espèces commerciales. Ces résultats
suggèrent qu’une approche de gestion hiérarchique pourrait être envisagée dans cette
pêcherie, avec la considération d’objectifs socio-économiques impactant uniquement la
définition de TACs pour les principales espèces commerciales. Les espèces secondaires
pourraient quant à elles plutôt être gérées en réponse à des objectifs écologiques.
G.5 Chapitre 5
Le chapitre 5 fait écho au chapitre 2 en présentant une seconde application de
l’approche d’évaluation intégrée des décisions de TACs, cette fois dans la pêcherie sud-est
australienne. Nourrie des développements entrepris dans les chapitres 3 et 4, la modélisa-
tion intégrée mise en œuvre dans ce chapitre permet la prise en compte des dynamiques
d’allocation d’effort, d’échange de quotas et de réponse des prix du poisson aux quantités
débarquées. Cette dernière dynamique a permis la considération de l’impact des décisions
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de TACs sur les consommateurs. Un seuil maximal sur le prix du poisson est notamment
venu compléter l’ensemble des contraintes de viabilité proposé dans le chapitre 2. Les
simulations entreprises permettent l’identification d’un domaine de TACs éco-viables
pour le couple tiger flathead - lingue rose. La prise de décision au sein du domaine d’éco-
viabilité implique toutefois des arbitrages entre maximisation du surplus des détenteurs
de capitaux d’un côté et surplus des équipages et consommateurs de l’autre.
G.6 Discussion générale
Les résultats clés de la thèse venant juste d’être soulignés, cette dernière section
portera sur les développements méthodologiques apportés et leurs implications en matière
de support aux décisions de TACs. Ces derniers sont principalement relatifs à: (1) la mod-
élisation des dynamiques de pêcherie mixte dans une optique d’appui à leur gestion et (2)
au développement d’avis TAC intégrant les différentes dimensions de la durabilité de ces
systèmes. Enfin, des perspectives à la fois en matière de recherche et d’opérationnalisation
d’avis TACs intégrées sont proposées.
G.6.1 La représentation des dynamiques de pêcherie mixte dans
les modèles d’appui à la décision TAC
La thèse a contribué à améliorer la représentation des dynamiques de pêcherie mixte
dans les modèles impliqués dans la production d’avis TAC. Le même cadre de simulation
a été déployé dans les deux cas d’étude, le modèle de simulation intégré IAM, gagnant
toutefois en complexité entre sa première application au cas GG et sa seconde dans la
SESSF. Cette section a pour but de discuter des implications de ces développements en
matière d’avis produit.
La première différence entre les deux applications du modèle a trait à la représenta-
tion des dimensions biologiques des pêcheries. Dans la SESSF, près de 80% de la valeur
produite repose sur la capture de stocks dont la dynamique de population est prise en
compte dans le modèle (le reste étant modélisé en tant que capture par unité d’effort con-
stante, que nous réfèrerons comme de la modélisation "statique" dans le reste du texte),
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en comparaison au GG où ce chiffre n’est que de 40%. Il est important d’essayer de
limiter la part de modélisation statique dans les modèles bioéconomiques car cela donne
lieu à des anticipations excessivement optimistes ou pessimistes des impacts économiques
de variations de TACs. Dans la SESSF, la modélisation statique a pu être limitée par
l’utilisation de modèles de production globaux pour près de 25% de la production, com-
plétant ainsi les modèles structurés en âge issus des processus officiels d’évaluation de
stocks.
Les choix relatifs à la représentation de l’activité de pêche dans les deux cas d’étude
peuvent aussi être analysés. Les deux applications reposent sur la représentation de
chaque navire individuellement, un choix peu commun dans les modèles classiques d’appui
à la décision, travaillant généralement à l’échelle de la flottille. Malgré un surcoût de cal-
cul, considérer les navires comme unités d’opération dans le modèle a permis la prise en
compte de l’hétérogénéité des aptitudes de pêche au sein d’une flottille et rendrait aussi
possible l’intégration d’autres facettes de la diversité des comportements de pêche (e.g.
diversité de motivations, interactions sociales...). Dans les deux applications, la représen-
tation de l’activité de pêche fait appel à la notion de métier, qui se définit comme le
déploiement d’un engin de pêche particulier dans une zone ou à un moment spécifique,
dans le but de cibler une certaine espèce ou assemblage d’espèces. Dans le GG, les
métiers représentés dans le modèle avaient été définis dans un projet en partenariat avec
les professionnels de la pêche antérieur au travail de thèse, et avaient pour vocation de
rendre compte des principales stratégies de pêche observées dans la région. La définition
des métiers pratiqués dans la SESSF a quant à elle fait partie intégrante du travail de
thèse. L’emploi de méthodes statistiques multidimensionnelles de regroupement a per-
mis l’identification des stratégies de pêche pratiquées dans la pêcherie, des plus au moins
fréquemment observées. Cela a donné lieu à une représentation de l’activité de pêche à
une échelle plus fine dans la SESSF que dans le GG, permettant ainsi plus de marche
de manœuvre dans l’ajustement des pratiques de pêche à la disponibilité en quotas. Le
dernier point en lien avec l’activité de pêche concerne la modélisation de l’allocation de
l’effort de pêche à l’échelle du navire. Dans la SESSF, cette dernière a été représentée de
manière endogène, alors qu’elle demeurait exogène dans l’application au GG. Le modèle
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considéré fait intervenir un nombre réduit de facteurs (habitude et recherche de profit) et
permet de modéliser l’allocation de l’effort aux échelles habituellement considérées dans
les modèles d’appui à la gestion des pêches (métier et année). Les travaux de la thèse
montrent que des moyens existent déjà pour endogénéiser relativement simplement les
comportements de pêche dans les modèles actuels d’appui à la gestion et ainsi améliorer
la prise en compte de ces dynamiques dans la prise de décision.
La thèse a aussi permis des développements relatifs à la représentation des dy-
namiques de marchés de location de quotas en pêcherie mixte. Le modèle développé
représente le processus de tâtonnement walrassien pour déterminer des prix d’équilibre
de loyer de quota en compétition pure et parfaite. Il rend compte des propriétés clés des
systèmes de QITs, telles que la réallocation des droits de pêche vers les opérateurs les plus
efficients, mais aussi d’autres, spécifiques à leur mise en œuvre en pêcherie mixte, telles
que l’incitation économique à rediriger l’effort de pêche vers les espèces non contraig-
nantes du système (i.e. les espèces dont le TAC est en excès ou celles dont les captures
ne sont pas soumises à quota). Les chapitres 4 et 5 illustrent son intégration dans le
modèle de simulation IAM. Toutefois, le coût en temps de calcul de cette approche de
modélisation (approche itérative et représentation des navires comme agents du mod-
èle) peut constituer un frein à son déploiement dans les modèles de support à la décision.
Enfin, les simulations du chapitre 5 prennent en compte les variations de prix du
poisson en réponse aux variations des quantités débarquées. Considérer ces dynamiques
a notamment permis de mettre en lumière des arbitrages entre intérêts des producteurs
et des consommateurs. Les dynamiques de marché du poisson ont aussi un effet direct sur
les revenus des pêcheurs, et par conséquent sur leurs stratégies de pêche. Ainsi, il apparaît
important de tenir compte des facteurs de marché dans l’anticipation des réponses des
pêcheurs à des changements de TACs.
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G.6.2 L’intégration des dimensions biologiques, économiques
et sociales de la durabilité dans le développement d’avis
TAC
L’approche d’évaluation intégrée développée au cours de la thèse permet la visual-
isation de différents domaines ainsi que leurs possibles intersections. Le premier, ap-
pelé domaine opérationnel, permet la visualisation des taux d’exploitation atteignables
étant données les interactions techniques entre les stocks. L’approche d’éco-viabilité per-
met dans un second temps l’identification des sous-ensembles biologiquement et socio-
économiquement viables, avec, à leur intersection, le domaine d’éco-viabilité. La visu-
alisation des arbitrages entre différents objectifs vient compléter l’identification des do-
maines de viabilité.
En matière d’analyse de viabilité, la thèse a surtout œuvré à préciser les contraintes
relatives à ses dimensions économiques et sociales, traitant la dimension biologique
de manière analogue à la majorité des travaux portés sur la question. La viabilité
économique des flottilles/navires a quant à elle été décomposée en plusieurs contraintes:
(1) la rémunération du capital physique à court et long terme, et (2) la rémunération du
capital humain. Une dernière contrainte, visant à satisfaire la demande des consomma-
teurs a été considérée dans le chapitre 5.
Les analyses d’éco-viabilité ont mis en lumière des conflits entre objectifs de con-
servation et d’exploitation. La maximisation de profits à l’échelle de la pêcherie peut
notamment amener à la surexploitation de certains stocks. L’actualisation des profits
dans le calcul du REM peut aussi pousser la pêcherie hors de son domaine de viabilité
biologique. L’attention portée aux différentes dimensions de la viabilité a aussi permis
de souligner des arbitrages entre les intérêts des détenteurs de capitaux, des équipages
et des consommateurs. Dans le GG, les contraintes de rémunération des équipages em-
pêchent notamment certaines flottilles de couvrir la dépréciation de leur capital. Dans




L’approche développée permettrait de faire progresser l’avis à la décision TAC dans
les contextes européens et australiens. En Europe, l’avis TAC en pêcherie mixte se focalise
sur la cohérence entre TACs et interactions techniques, ce qui serait l’équivalent de
la première étape de l’approche développée dans la thèse (identification du domaine
opérationnel). Les dimensions économiques et sociales de la durabilité de ces pêcheries
n’ont jusqu’à présent pas été intégrées dans l’avis scientifique. Dans la SESSF, malgré
un objectif de REM à l’échelle de la pêcherie, l’avis TAC est toujours produit selon des
approches mono-spécifiques. La première contribution de la thèse a donc été la prise
en compte des interactions techniques dans la production d’avis TAC. L’analyse d’éco-
viabilité a par ailleurs permis une prise en compte explicite des conséquences économiques
et sociales des décisions de TACs, dimensions aujourd’hui traitées de manière implicite
à travers des approximations mono-spécifiques du REM.
G.6.3 Perspectives
G.6.4 La modélisation du comportement humain sous incerti-
tudes
Une gestion précautionneuse requiert la prise en compte des incertitudes dans la prise
de décision. Les simulations mobilisées dans la thèse ont permis la prise en compte des
incertitudes liées au recrutement des stocks exploités, qui pourraient par ailleurs être
complétées par celles liées aux paramètres économiques du modèle (e.g. prix du poisson,
du carburant) ou à la composition des captures, ce dernier point étant particulièrement
pertinent en pêcherie mixte. Il est non seulement nécessaire que les modèles en appui à
la décision prennent en compte les incertitudes relatives à l’évolution des systèmes, mais
il est aussi important qu’ils représentent les effets que ces incertitudes peuvent avoir sur
les comportements humains. Dans le cas particulier des pêcheries mixtes, il serait notam-
ment pertinent de représenter la manière dont les incertitudes liées à la composition des
captures ou aux dynamiques de marché des différentes espèces influencent les décisions
en matière de stratégie de pêche ou d’échange de quotas.
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G.6.5 Le défi de la dimensionnalité
Les évaluations intégrées réalisées dans la thèse ont démontré leur applicabilité et
apport dans le contexte restreint de la gestion par TACs de deux espèces au cœur
d’interactions techniques. Toutefois, les interactions techniques en pêcherie mixte met-
tent généralement en jeu plus de deux espèces. Ceci appelle à la poursuite des réflexions
quant à la généralisation de ce type d’approche à plus d’espèces. Le premier défi se
pose en termes de temps de calcul car le temps nécessaire à la simulation exhaustive
des combinaisons de TACs est une fonction exponentielle du nombre d’espèces consid-
érées. L’optimisation multicritère, permettant la recherche efficiente d’optima de Pareto
au regard d’un ensemble de contraintes de viabilité, pourrait être une voie à explorer
en ce sens. Le second défi a trait à l’analyse et communication de résultats mettant en
jeu un grand nombre de dimensions. Là-encore, la stratégie pourrait être de se focaliser
sur un nombre restreint de scénarios choisi de manière à mettre en lumière d’éventuels
arbitrages.
G.6.6 Une meilleure prise en compte des dimensions écologiques
de l’AEP
La dimension écologique de la durabilité a ici principalement été abordée sous un
angle anthropocentré. Ayant pour but d’assurer la durabilité des stocks exploités, les
contraintes de viabilité biologiques considérées ne permettent pas une analyse de la
durabilité de l’écosystème dans lequel s’inscrit la pêcherie. La santé de l’écosystème
pourrait notamment être quantifiée à l’aide d’indicateurs écosystémiques qui permettent
l’intégration de processus s’observant à et entre différentes échelles écologiques. De plus,
des tendances récurrentes dans ce type d’indicateurs faciliteraient l’identification de seuils
de perturbation pour les écosystèmes.
G.6.7 Au-delà de l’éco-viabilité
Les analyses d’éco-viabilité visent à l’identification d’options de gestion répondant à
un ensemble de contraintes de durabilité. Elles sont donc un outil intéressant, mais guère
suffisant pour aiguiller la prise de décision. Dans le cas où le domaine d’éco-viabilité est
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vide, il peut par exemple être intéressant de mettre en lumière les conflits qui ne peuvent
être résolus à l’aide des leviers de gestion considérés. Ceci permettrait d’aider à identifier
ceux qui permettraient de restaurer la viabilité du système. Même lorsque des solutions
viables existent, l’évaluation transparente de leurs conséquences au regard des différentes
dimensions de la durabilité permet d’aiguiller la prise de décision au sein de l’ensemble
viable. On pourrait aussi imaginer utiliser le cadre d’éco-viabilité pour réconcilier des
aspirations qui vont au-delà des exigences de viabilité. Différents types de contraintes
pourraient alors être envisagées, à commencer par celles ayant trait à la viabilité du




AFMA Australian Fisheries Management Authority
ABARES
Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and
Sciences
BoB Bay of Biscay
Blim ICES Limit Biomass reference point
B20
Limit Biomass reference point in the Commonwealth Harvest
Strategy Policy
CFP Common Fisheries Policy
CPUE Catch Per Unit of Effort
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
CTS Commonwealth Trawl Sector
DCF Data Collection Framework
DLS Data-Limited Stock
DPMA Direction des Pêches Maritimes et de l’Aquaculture
EAF Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries
EBFM Ecosystem-Based Fishereis Management
ECDWTS East Coast Deep-Water Trawl Sector
EU European Union
FCube Fleet and Fishery Forecast
F20
Limit fishing mortality reference point in the Commonwealth
Harvest Strategy Policy
FMSY Fishing mortality rate at MSY
FTE Full Time Equivalent
GABTS Great Australian Bight Trawl Sector
GHTS Gillnet Hook and Trap Sector
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GOS Gross Operating Surplus
GVP Gross Value of Production
HCR Harvest Control Rule
IAM Integrated Assessment Model for fisheries management
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
IEEFM Integrated Ecological-Economic Fisheries Models
Ifremer Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation de la Mer
ITQ Individual Tradable Quota
LPUE Landings Per Unit of Effort
MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
MEY Maximum Economic Yield
NER Net Economic Returns
NOS Net Operating Surplus
NPV Net Present Value
PO Producers Organisations
SESSF Southern and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery
SIH Système d’Information Halieutique
SSB Spawning Stock Biomass
TAC Total Allowable Catch
TEP Threatened, Endangered or Protected (species)
UBO Université de Bretagne Occidentale
UTAS University of Tasmania
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Résumé : La thèse contribue au développe-
ment d’approches intégrées en appui aux dé-
cisions relatives aux Totaux Admissibles de
Capture (TAC) dans des pêcheries mixtes en :
(1) prenant en compte les interactions à la
fois techniques et économiques de ces pê-
cheries, et (2) tenant compte des différentes
dimensions de leur durabilité. Les développe-
ments de la thèse permettent notamment une
meilleure représentation des dynamiques hu-
maines dans le type de modèles impliqués
dans l’élaboration des recommandations de
gestion pour ces pêcheries. Une attention par-
ticulière est donnée à la modélisation des dy-
namiques de pêche, d’échange de quotas et
de prix du poisson. La thèse oeuvre en outre à
une meilleure prise en compte des dimensions
économiques et sociales dans l’évaluation des
options de gestion. Elle fait notamment appel
à l’approche d’éco-viabilité afin d’identifier des
niveaux de captures assurant la viabilité bio-
logique, économique et sociale de deux pê-
cheries mixtes opérant dans des contextes de
gestion différents : la pêcherie démersale du
Golfe de Gascogne et la pêcherie démersale
sud-est australienne.
Title: Application of the eco-viability approach for the management of mixed fisheries under
output control
Keywords: mixed fisheries, eco-viability, integrated modelling, decision-support, Total Allow-
able Catch, Individual Tradable Quotas
Abstract: The thesis contributes to the de-
velopment of more integrated approaches to
advise Total Allowable Catch (TAC) decisions
in mixed fisheries by: (1) accounting for tech-
nical, but also economic interactions among
jointly harvested species, and (2) address-
ing the variety of sustainability requirements
faced in such fisheries. The thesis notably con-
tributes to improving the representation of hu-
man dynamics in the type of models used to
advise TAC decisions in mixed fisheries, with
a particular attention given to the representa-
tion of dynamics in the allocation of fishing ef-
fort, the trading of individual quotas and fish
markets. The thesis also focuses on how the
multiple dimensions of sustainability can be
considered in the provision of fisheries man-
agement advice. The eco-viability approach is
used here to identify future paths maintain-
ing a fishery within ecologically, economically
and socially acceptable bounds. The devel-
oped methodology has been applied to two
mixed fisheries operating in different manage-
ment contexts: the French demersal fishery in
the Bay of Biscay and the Australian Southern
and Eastern Scalefish and Shark Fishery.
